диссертация (1169605), страница 30
Текст из файла (страница 30)
He thought that thisoutcome could weaken the sway of Islamic fundamentalism as any kind of“decentralization” in the Levant is strongly opposed by Islamic State extremistswho see their ideal in a strictly unitary state in the form of a caliphate” 258.However,thevery seriousconcernsof Syrian decision makersthat“decentralization” would lead to the fragmentation of their country weren’t heeded.That’s why there was literally no progress on advancing Russia’s envisionedconstitutional ‘solution’ for the entirety of the year.V. Naumkin’s views are still very valuable because they hint that Russiabegan to conceptualize the Syrian peace process in accordance with its owndomestic situation and “Near Abroad” interests in Ukraine, which could havecontributed to groupthink at the highest levels of the Ministry of Foreign Affairsand the subsequent promulgation of a policy that is at variance with the realities onthe ground, similar in a sense to the shortcomings of the US own policies towardsthe region.
Russia’s intentions were the opposite of the US because Moscow hassought to leverage its influence with the Kurds for constructive ends in retainingthe unity of the Syrian state (however “decentralized” it ends up being) whileWashington has endeavored to weaken it through employing the exact samedemographic-geographic instruments.The Kurdish factor becomes even more relevant in regional relations thanever before when one considers the trend of federalization that V. Naumkin also258Naumkin V.
Russia and the Kurds. Russian International Affairs Council, 8 Jan. 2015, Web. 27 April 2018.russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/comments/russia-and-the-kurds/.124commented on. He wrote that it’s seemingly sweeping the region and coulddangerously open up a Pandora’s Box, warning how centrifugal processes recentlytore apart Sudan and could potentially do the same for other countries as well ifthey’re not controlled. This, he observers, is the consequence of the identity crisisgripping the Mideast in the wake of Sykes-Picot revisionism and the weakening offormerly strong states since the beginning of the 21st century, like what was citedabove from his previous analyses.
Nevertheless, V. Naumkin says that “thatnationalism has not only not perished, but is preparing for a revival, although it cantake new forms”, hinting that all is not lost and that the dissolution processes mightbe stopped before they get out of hand. Even so, he concludes by hinting that theremight be some positives that could be obtained from “federalization” if it’sproperly approached: “Will the universal federalization ensure a successful wayout of the crisis in the region that does not cease to amaze the world, or at least ofthose countries, which became classified as failed states? Perhaps this will happen.However, let us not downplay the risks that a radical change in the configuration ofthe state structure of any country brings, especially in the context of the traditionalconfrontation of unionism and particularism, Islamism and secularism”259.Therein lies the crux of the problem and it’s apparent paradox –federalization could be a ‘solution’ in and of itself, but it carries serious risks thatcould jeopardize regional stabilization and undermine the strategic gains thatRussia has achieved ever since the commencement of its anti-terrorist interventionin Syria.
That said, Moscow did indeed suggest “decentralization” in the “draftconstitution” that it suggested for Syria, so it’s clear to see that Russia is trying toharness this process and redirect it so that it’s no longer the weaponized instrumentthat the US intends for it to be but could reversely become a crucial factor inrestoring stability to the country and region as a whole.One possible reason might have to do with the geostrategic dynamics of theWar on Syria, namely the fact that Russia might have come to believe that the state259Naumkin V.Pandora's Box of Federalization. Russian International Affairs Council, 25 Dec.
2017, Web. 27 April2018. russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/comments/pandora-s-box-of-federalization/.125fragmentation process which had started years ago with the 2003 US War on Iraqand 2011 theater-wide “Arab Spring” Color Revolutions was irreversible, and thatthe best course of action which Moscow could hope to initiate would be to‘manage’ events and ideally guide them in the direction of Russia’s ‘least-bad’interests.However, hard geopolitical facts suggest that the Syrian PYD-YPG Kurdsare very close American allies which Washington would be reluctant to give up.The United States has already ruined decades’ worth of political-strategic relationswith Turkey in order to support these militias, so it’s not likely to ‘give them up’ toRussia or back down in the face of competition for their loyalty.
Hopefully,though, the more pragmatic of the Syrian Kurdish leaders will realize that they’rebeing exploited as pro-American tools and lobby for a more balanced approachtowards Moscow and Damascus, though this looks very unlikely.Altogether, when evaluating the consequences of the Russian-written “draftconstitution” for Syria, it’s fair to say that Moscow had the best intentions in mind,but that it poorly performed in its execution. Damascus’ reception to the proposalwas uncharacteristically cool, and almost all “moderate rebel opposition” groupsrejected the document for unnecessarily ceding Syria’s sovereignty to the Kurdsthrough the dismantlement of the existing unitary state.
Russia denied that it waspressuring Syria or had any of these goals in mind, but the soft power damage wasdone and it’s not for naught that Moscow later recognized in mid-April that it was“too early” for Syria to assemble a “constitutional commission” to discuss theseproposals260. That can be read as a tacit sign of Russian backtracking byrecognizing that it completely overstepped in its well-intentioned efforts tointernally “balance” the Kurds with Damascus in order to externally “balance” theUS destructive regional plans with Russia’s ones for reinforcing the regional order.Moreover, there could have also been more Machiavellian plans at work aswell, such as Russia’s desire to retain limited but credible indirect pressure on260Too Early to Set Up Body on New Syrian Constitution - Moscow.
Sputnik. 13 Apr. 2017. Web. 28 January 2018.https://sputniknews.com/politics/201704131052618096-syrian-constitution-work/.126Turkey vis-à-vis the Syrian Kurds in order to make sure that Ankara remains in theTripartite with Tehran. Ultimately, it’s impossible to know with any degree ofabsolute certainty what Russia was thinking in reversing its policy towards theKurds and actively – in spite of its repeated denunciations to the contrary –working to “decentralize” the Syrian state in order to give its nominal Kurdishallies “cultural autonomy”, but the previously postulated ideas put forth in thepassages above likely provide the best indication of what calculations might havebeen considered. Even so, just because Russia now seems to be in the game ofmanaging different degrees of “decentralization” (and inevitably, as the authorbelieves, state fragmentation and Sykes-Picot revisionism) doesn’t mean that theUS has given up on its own designs; instead, it’s only made everything much morecomplicated and if anything emboldened Washington to continue full-speed ahead.Washington didn’t decide to forego its Kurdish proxies but insteadretrenched its efforts to maintain their loyalty and give them their hoped-for“federalized” domains.
These two qualifiers – that the US has not abandoned“federalization” despite Russia’s administrative-diplomatic outreaches to the Kurdsin the “draft constitution”, and Moscow’s reluctance to support anything other than“decentralization” and “cultural autonomy” – are important to remember inanalyzing how the RAND Corporation and Carnegie Endowment have sought toperfect the US’ “New Greater Middle East” and “Blood Border” plans. Acceptingthat the Russian anti-terrorist intervention in Syria had scuttled the former Salafistdriven catalyst for these designs, yet also understanding that Moscow’s reluctantembrace of “decentralization” and “cultural autonomy” had emboldened the Kurds,these two think tanks put forth separate policy proposals which must be taken inconjunction to understand the reformatted new approach that the US is consideringfor Syria.The RAND Corporation published the third and last installment of their“Peace Plan for Syria” series in early February 2017 focusing on “Agreed Zones of127Control, Decentralization, and International Administration” 261.
The strategicadaptation mentioned in the document is that UN forces and/or a ‘coalition of thewilling’ should be deployed to Syria in order to maintain “agreed zones of control”under an “international administration”, which will help to further the goal of“decentralization” if this takes place in the northeastern regions of the countrypresently under Kurdish and Daesh occupation. Essentially, the RANDCorporation is asking for a large-scale international ‘peacekeeping’ (occupation)force to be used to enforce the de-facto creation of a quasi-independent sub-state“Kurdistan” on Syrian territory, though hiding behind the ‘(semi-)plausiblyjustifiable’ excuse that this move is needed to retain stability in the post-Daeshsocio-political environment.The Carnegie Endowment, however, doesn’t go nearly as far as the RANDCorporation does with its latest plans, but it does offer a more cunning and wilyway to achieve its objectives with comparatively less expenses or commitments.
![](https://s.studizba.com/z.php?f=/templates/si/i/noavatar.png&w=100&h=100&t=1"){kind=avatar}
