диссертация (1169605), страница 25
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The operation was unexpected even101though Turkey had been sending strong signals about it for months – even years –beforehand, but it was all made possible due to the dramatically rearrangedgeopolitical situation following the Russian-Turkish rapprochement and the failedcoup against Erdogan. As is known, Russia is the dominant external military poweractive in Syria, being present in the country at the formal behest of thegovernment, and it could very well have intervened to stop Turkey’s offensive hadit felt that it constituted a threat to its own anti-terrorist operations or potentially toDamascus.Moscow didn’t act in this regard because it had regained the solid trustwhich was previously lost with Ankara, but also due to the fact that Russia onlyhas limited military resources in Syria.
As for the first point, Russia’s decisionmakers and strategists understood Turkey’s concerns about the threat that Kurdish“federalization” (de-facto separatism and internal partition) in Syria posed to itsown territorial integrity, although of course disagreeing with it over Ankara’sdesignation of Moscow’s nominally (and historically) allied PYD-YPG militiapartners as equivalent to PKK “terrorists”. Be that as it may, it was alreadybeginning to seem at that time that the US had successfully completed the full coopting of this group into its proxies and that little hope remained for the Kurds toreturn to their historical role as Russia’s partners, so it can be inferred that Moscowmight have had a purpose in mind in passively allowing Turkey to invade northernSyria in order to impede the unification of the Kurds’ “federalized” territories andtherefore scuttle the US post-war plans to a certain extent.Moreover, it needs to be remarked that the entire regional paradigm wasrocked by the failed coup against Erdogan just one month prior, and that the talk ofAmerican complicity might have been convincing enough for Russia to realize thatTurkey would never be as close to the United States as it previously was.
Bothcountries became very close in the aftermath of that failed regime changeoperation, which itself might have even been launched in order to preempt therestored strategic partnership between the two which had already shown signs of102materializing in the immediate run-up to the coup221. This changed reality mighthave conceivably convinced President Putin that he had nothing to fear at the timefrom Erdogan’s adventure into northern Syria, hence why it was ‘permitted’ tooccur without militant opposition.About the second point related to Russia’s comparatively limited resourcesin Syria (relative to its aggregate arsenal that’s mostly still based in the homeland),however, it should be accepted that Moscow has no inclination to start a war withNATO and that it does not want to be drawn into an Afghan-like quagmire overSyria.
Even in the event that a certain degree of lingering distrust remainedbetween Russia and Turkey, Moscow would naturally be reluctant to enter into ahigh-stakes game of brinksmanship in trying to make Ankara back down, let aloneduring the context of rapidly improving relations between the two. However, itwould then have had to return to its heavier military presence in the Arab Republicin order to present a credible deterrence to scare off what at that time would havebeen its neighboring ‘foe’.
This in turn would have contradicted Moscow’s desireto de-escalate its conventional involvement in the country and potentially openedup a Pandora’s Box of ever-escalating tensions which Russia could ill-afford tounnecessarily engage in.Reflecting on what ultimately transpired, it can be confidently asserted thatwhether Turkey received implicit ‘approval’ from Russia for its operation or not,both sides eventually entered into convenient cooperation with the other in January2017 over the north Syrian town of Al Bab, when Russia carried out its first-everjoint anti-terrorist airstrikes with a NATO-member country222.
This was meantmore as symbolism than substance, however, as it occurred in the week prior to theAstana conference co-brokered by Russia, Turkey, and also Iran per the Tripartiteformat. Interestingly, though, for as smooth as Russian-Turkish relations had beenprogressing during this time, the Syrian authorities still insisted that Turkey had221Mercouris A.
Why Reports of the Russian Tip off to Erdogan May Be True. The Duran. 21 July 2016. Web. 24June 2018. http://theduran.com/reports-russian-tip-off-erdogan-may-true/.222Syria conflict: Russia and Turkey 'in first joint air strikes on IS' BBC. 18 Jan. 2017. Web. 24 March 2018.http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38667895.103illegally invaded their country and was occupying it in contravention of allinternational laws, though Damascus did not make any demands of Moscow todiscontinue its cooperation with Ankara.In September 2013 it had been unthinkable that the United States will usevaried forms of conventional intervention in the War on Syria.
The US hadpreviously been bombing the country under anti-terrorist pretexts, but what reallyneeds to be focused on and brought to attention is how the US has set up threeseparate bases on Syrian territory, deployed a small number of US Marines(generally thought of as conventional US foot soldiers, albeit well-trained), andlaunched a cruise missile strike against the Syrian Arab Army.The US has illegally opened a total of three bases on Syrian territory in theKurdish-dominated northeastern regions controlled by its PYD-YPG proxies underthe SDF umbrella. These facilities are in Rmelian 223, “Kobani” (Ayn al Arab)224,and Tabqa225, and their ostensible use is to contribute to the fight against Daesh.However, knowing how the US operates, it’s very likely that these bases will servean ulterior motive in guaranteeing the “territorial integrity” of the Kurds’unilaterally “federalized” regions and preventing the Syrian Arab Army fromliberating them after the defeat of Daesh.
This would be in line with the USstrategy of “Balkanizing” Syria per the Bosnia template of internal partition in lieuof formally dividing it up into separate independent “states”.In support of this objective, the US deployed 400 Marines to Syria in March2017226 to assist in the “Race for Raqqa”227, the first-ever dispatch of what aregenerally recognized as conventional troops to the war-torn country.
While thePresident promised that these forces wouldn’t be used in direct combat but would223Al Rifai D. US 'takes control' of Rmeilan airfield in Syria. Al Jazeera. 20 Jan. 2016. Web. 24 January 2017.http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/takes-control-rmeilan-airfield-syria-160119141331681.html.224Pentagon Expands Air Base in Northern Syria for Use in Battle for Raqqa. Sputnik.
5 Apr. 2017. Web. 4 January2018. https://sputniknews.com/military/201704051052299455-us-airbase-syria-kobani/.225US Eyes Tabqa Air Base as Turkey Sours on Washington's Ties to Kurds. Sputnik. 11 Apr. 2017. Web. 14 June2018. https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201704111052534346-syria-raqqa-operation-incirlik/.226Gordon M. R. U.S. Is Sending 400 More Troops to Syria. The New York Times. 9 Mar. 2017. Web. 24 January2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/world/middleeast/us-troops-syria.html.227Haddad H., Korybko A.
The Race For Raqqa And America’s Geopolitical Revenge In Syraq (I). OrientalReview. 14 Oct. 2015. Web. 24 January 2018. http://orientalreview.org/2015/10/14/the-race-for-raqqa-andamericas-geopolitical-revenge-in-syraq-i/.104only help with artillery targeting and other indirect sorts of attacks, the moveindisputably proved that the US was engaged in mission creep at the time, eventhough it later began withdrawing those said units a little over half a year later inNovember 2017228.Again, it can’t help but be wondered whether these troops were there to fightterrorists like the US claimed or if they were really tasked with protecting theKurds’ territorial gains and safeguarding their “federalist” project by helping themcapture Raqqa for that reason.As for the cruise missile strike against the Syrian Arab Army, PresidentTrump initiated this audacious and completely unprecedented move in response toa fast-moving chemical weapons false flag attack in Idlib Province, one which notcoincidentally carried with it a similar fingerprint as its Ghouta forerunner threeand a half years prior.
The circumstances of what exactly happened during thisincident are still unclear, but Russia and Syria clarified that the Syrian Air Forcebombarded a terrorist warehouse which happened to have chemical agents in it,thereby releasing them into the atmosphere and inadvertently contributing tocivilian casualties, while the US and its allies naturally accused President Assad ofusing illegally retained chemical weapons on purpose against civilians. Allindicators point to the Idlib incident being a repeat of the Ghouta one, except thistime the American President refused to ‘back down’ like his predecessor did andinstead fired off a volley of cruise missiles at a Syrian airbase in near Homs inresponse.This supposedly “one-off” strike shattered whatever misperceptions theremay have previously been about Russia’s military mandate, as Moscow didn’tshoot down the incoming projectiles, and First Deputy Chairman of the Committeeon International Affairs of the Council of Federation Vladimir Jabarov later saidthat it wouldn’t respond to any future such strikes in order to “not be dragged228“More Than 400 US Marines Leaving Syria.” Voice of America, 30 Nov.
2017, www.voanews.com/a/more-than400-us-marines-leaving-syria/4143948.html.105into a military confrontation”229. This reaffirms the understanding that Moscow’smilitary mandate only covers anti-terrorist operations. American press reports wentwild about how this was supposedly a major strike against Russia’s “prestige”, andthe inadvertent soft power damage that Russia incurred because of its principledmilitary restraint will be difficult to quantify in the short term.
However, given thereasons laid out by Mr. Jabarov, it may very well have been for the right reasonsand worth whatever trade-off occurred in the name of preserving the greater peacebetween the rival Great Powers 230.Russia’s anti-terrorist intervention in Syria has had profound consequenceson the Mideast, and therefore the world. Distinguished Russian scholars VitalyNaumkin, Irina Zvyagelskaya and Vasily Kuznetsov think that Russia’s efforts areaimed at stemming the state disintegration process which was sparked by the“Arab Spring” Color Revolutions 231. The geopolitical damage wrought by the“Arab Spring” has been tremendous, and there’s no going back to the old paradigmof regional relations and the balance of power which existed before that moment,but nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that the chaotic processes need to be taken totheir fullest extent. The number one thing which Russia wants to avoid above allelse is the change of borders in the Mideast, which according to V.
Naumkin andhis colleagues, would only perpetuate the ongoing chaos in the region. The authorspraise Russia for having “facilitated the change in the domestic balance andopened opportunities for breakthrough solutions on the road to politicalsettlement”, which therefore feeds into the relative restoration of stability in the229Russia Unlikely to Counter New US Missile Strikes in Syria - Senior Lawmaker. Sputnik. 10 Apr. 2017. Web.
4January 2018. https://sputniknews.com/politics/201704101052503997-russia-unlikely-counter-us-strikes/.230In the Russian academic community there were rather different, sometimes diverse, opinions on the decision tostart the military operation in Syria. See, for instance: Russia and the Greater Middle East, Russian InternationalAffairs Council, 29 May 2013, Web. 4 January 2018. http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=1897; Barmin Y.Identifying the Strategy behind Russia’s Air Strikes in Syria. Russian International Affairs Council, 5 Oct. 2015,Web.
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