диссертация (1169605), страница 28
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The forced creation of a so-called “Kurdistan”/”Rojava” innorthern Syria would be akin to a modern-day Israel in the sense that it would be a“state” formed out of the territory of others and through the support of foreignentities for their own interests.From the Syrian view it is in the US supreme grand strategic interests tofurther the dissolution of Sykes-Picot, and establishment of “Kurdistan”. This newtransnational entity would also allow Washington to exert continued influenceagainst multipolar-leaning Ankara, to say nothing of the very real threat that itwould persistently pose to Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran.
The United Statesnever envisioned that its theater-wide “Arab Spring” Color Revolutions and questto construct the “New Greater Middle East” through “Blood Borders” would bedecisively blocked by Russia’s anti-terrorist intervention in Syria years later, but itcan still recapture some of the geopolitical chaos and promote the statefragmentation process that it originally intended so long as it’s successful incarving out a “Kurdistan” in Syria.This presents Russia with a major dilemma, since Moscow has historicallyenjoyed very close relations with all manner of Kurds throughout the Mideastregardless of their civic nationality, and the centrifugal forces that the US already114unleashed appear almost impossible to fully control or reverse.
Thus, as theresearch will explain, Moscow is stuck in a Catch-22 whereby it’s criticized if itturns on the Kurds (which would require potentially quagmire-like militarycommitments) but equally accused if it goes along with their “state-building”project. Faced with such a predicament, Russia appears to have opted to gentlyguide the process along the direction of its preferred interests, which is todelicately appease the Kurds through “decentralization” while still standing strongby its Syrian ally in backing Damascus internationally recognized territorialintegrity as enshrined in UNSC Resolution 2254.This approach is frankly imperfect and clouded in wishful idealism, thoughit reflects the state of Russia’s strategy towards Syria and the Kurds in theimportant period between the start of the Astana peace process in January 2017 andUNSC Resolution 2254’s formal 18-month deadline in June 2017, which is thesecond-last part of the War on SyriaSo, the Kurd’s problem was seen as a key one in the federalization plan forSyria.
The Kurdish PYD political group and its YPG militia made their“federalization” plans public in February 2015 when they released a manifestoranting about their numerous disagreements with the Syrian government245. Thisdocument has many clauses that are unacceptable to Syria, whether it’s to“eliminate the central state” and overthrow the present government, or to sociallyreengineer Syria into some sort of “socialist” utopia. The publication is difficult tofollow because of its ideologically driven concepts, but the general point behind itis that it’s an unambiguous anti-government declaration by the Kurdish PYD-YPGwhich fundamentally disproves the Mainstream Media narrative that this group issomehow “patriotic”.
In fact, it couldn’t be more anti-state and more anti-Syrian.This is an important point to dwell on because the prevailing view across theworldisthattheSyrianKurdsapparently“deserve”“autonomy”,“decentralization”, or “federalization” because of their “sacrifices” in fighting245The Project of a Democratic Syria. Peace In Kurdistan. N.p., 16 Feb. 2015.
Web. 12 February 2017.https://peaceinkurdistancampaign.com/resources/rojava/the-project-of-a-democratic-syria/.115Daesh. This is a convenient storyline for the West to spin because the group’s“federalization” objectives coincide with the progressive weakening of the SykesPicot order and therefore the steady unravelling of the regional states, the outcomeof which perfectly accords with the “New Greater Middle East” scenario of “BloodBorders” which was previously explained. At the time of the manifesto’spromulgation, however, Russia had yet to launch its anti-terrorist intervention inSyria, so this considerably less dramatic scenario was put on the backburner infavor of continuing with the US primary goal of a Salafist takeover of Syria. It wasonly after this original goal became impossible due to Russia’s involvement in theconflict that the US could not directly use the Kurds as its proxies of geopoliticalchange, accepting that the endeavored outcome would have to be sub-state and defacto instead of state-level and de-jure.At that time the Brookings Institution happened to catch on to thegeopolitical ingenuity of the Syrian Kurds’ plan and published a policy proposal inJune 2015 titled “Deconstructing Syria: Towards a Regionalized Strategy for aConfederate Country” 246.
Michael E. O’Hanlon would later go on to continueparroting this proposal in the years since its original republication, trying to getAmerican decision makers to sign on to it as the most advantageous policy topursue in Syria when it arguably became much more attractive to the US 247. Hisvision is nothing more than an American repackaging of what the Kurdsthemselves declared they would do half a year earlier in their February manifesto,except he goes at length to describe how and why this would be beneficial for theAmerican long-term strategy in the Middle East.His points are the same – the United States should dedicate the time, effort,and resources to making sure that the Kurds have their own “autonomous” statemodeled off of what Washington helped to achieve in Bosnia.
O’Hanlon of course246O'Hanlon M. E. .Deconstructing Syria: Towards a regionalized strategy for a confederal country. The BrookingsInstitute. 23 June 2015. Web. 28 January 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/research/deconstructing-syria-towards-aregionalized-strategy-for-a-confederal-country/.247O'Hanlon M. E. HOW THE U.S. CAN WIN IN SYRIA. Newsweek.
2 Sept. 2016. Web. 28 January. 2017.http://www.newsweek.com/how-us-can-win-syria-495076; O'Hanlon M. E. Why confederation can work inSyria. TheWashingtonTimes.31Oct.2016.Web.28January2017.http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/oct/31/why-confederation-can-work-in-syria/.116doesn’t talk about what a failure that project was, but in a sense, that’s the wholepoint – the US never truly wants to resolve the identity conflicts that it helpedprovoke, but merely wants to freeze them in place for reactivation at a later time.This preserves Washington’s hegemonic position in the post-conflict space bymaking it the go-to actor for resolving any internal differences between the bitterlydivided forces. In this case, the Kurds would be taking the place of the BosnianMuslims and Croats.
The Brookings plan is important to pay attention to becauseof the institution’s paramount influence over Washington policy-making circles,and in hindsight, the publication of this “confederate” document can be seen as thebeginning of the US seriousness in entertaining such as scenario.It also serves as proof that the concept of “Identity Federalism” is active inthe thinking of American strategists.
To explain, this idea holds that the mostgenerally acceptable compromise solution to any prolonged domestic crisis is toaccord each identity-focused conflict participant a degree of “self-rule” or“autonomy” in exchange for reaching a peace agreement. This happened in Bosnia,but it’s also been seen lately in Iraq, South Sudan, and Nepal, with Myanmar alsotaking steps in this direction since pro-American “State Counselor” Suu Kyi cameto power there a few years ago. While it might serve to halt fighting in the short- orperhaps even medium-term, it’s impossible to escape the geopolitical nuances ofthis approach as it relates to neorealist grand strategic ends. Basically, it amountsto an internal partition which carves out a checkerboard of quasi-independentidentity-focused statelets which could then be divided and ruled by outside players,in these instances, mostly the United States.What the Syrian PYD-YPG Kurds aim to do is just this, whether they’reself-aware of it or not, and it’s why the US has thrown its full backing behind thesegroups at the expense of its decades-long strategic partnership of Turkey.
In thenew American strategic calculations after Russia’s anti-terrorist intervention inSyria, the Kurds are a much more valuable resource to cultivate and protect thanthe Turks, and this is due to the destabilization potential that this demographicholds for geopolitically re-engineering the Middle East and unleashing117“managed/controlled chaos” all throughout the region. These concepts wereexplained earlier in the dissertation, but they once more become relevant whendiscussing the latest iteration of American strategy towards Syria, which thusextends towards the Middle East as a whole.
The Kurds are the US preferredagents of geopolitical change in the region, and it’s for this reason why grantingthem their own de-facto statelet via a remixed “Balkanization” plan248 (despiteWashington’s public claims to the contrary249 in order to diplomatically appeasethe Turks) has now become one of the main goals in Syria.13 months after the Kurds first published their “federalization” manifesto,they formally declared that they were setting up their own government in northernSyria in March 2016250. This proclamation was immediately condemned by theauthorities of the Syrian Arab Republic 251 (including President Assad himself252),Turkey, and even the United States, the latter of which was just paying lip serviceto its nominal ally in Ankara.
Russia retained a neutral position and said that itwould only support whatever the Syrian people themselves decide should be thefuture political administration of their country253, a supposedly “balanced’approach which would later give Moscow the flexibility to actively work towards“decentralizing” Syria in order to try and appease the Kurds while simultaneouslypleasing Damascus. The important point to concentrate on is that the Kurds’ publicdecree of “federalization” was internationally condemned, though this doesn’tmean that every critic’s rebuke should be taken seriously.The United States supports the Kurds’ “federalization” plans, but feelscompelled to diplomatically retain its relations with NATO-member Turkey, which248Osman M. US to balkanize Syria under Kurdish pretext. RT.
3 Apr. 2017. Web. 28 January 2018.https://www.rt.com/op-edge/383291-syria-kurdish-balkanization-us-forces/.249Said R. Syria's Kurds rebuked for seeking autonomous region. Reuters. 17 Mar. 2016. Web. 28 January 2018.http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-federalism-idUSKCN0WJ1EP.250Kurdish-controlled areas declare federation in Syria's north – media reports. RT. 17 Mar.
2016. Web. 28 January2018. https://www.rt.com/news/335951-kurds-federal-system-syria/.251Syria's Federalization Violates Int'l Law - Ambassador to Russia. Sputnik. 17 Mar. 2016. Web. 28 January 2018.https://sputniknews.com/politics/201603171036481779-security-kurds-region/.252Assad to French Lawmakers: Syria is ‘Too Small’ for Federalization. Sputnik.
27 Mar. 2016. Web. 28 January2018. https://sputniknews.com/politics/201603271037042472-assad-syria-federalization/.253Russia says no to Syrian federalization as former NATO commander talks partition. RT. 12 Mar. 2016. Web. 28January 2018. https://www.rt.com/news/335384-syria-ceasefire-federalization-partition/.118sees the PYD-YPG’s “nation-building” quest as akin to setting up a terrorist safehaven all along its southern borderland region. In fact, it’s for these reasons whyTurkey would conventionally invade Syria less than half a year later during“Operation: Euphrates Shield” because of the highly sensitive security dilemmathat it fell into ever since the US started overtly backing the PYD-YPG withmilitary, logistical, training, and other sorts of support. In hindsight, however, it’sunlikely that the Kurds would have gone forward with their public moves had theynot earlier secured implicit American backing, so their March 2016 announcementshould be understood as an indirect statement of the US’ geopolitical intentions inSyria and the broader Mideast.The RAND Corporation came out with its own set of policy proposals aimedat enhancing the attractiveness of a “federalized” solution to the War on Syria.
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