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- Ленинград: Изд-во ЛГУ, 1989 год. - С.40-50.61After the destruction of the bipolar system of the world order, the Arab worldtemporarily found itself on the “periphery of history”, developing dangerously close tothe “civilizational fault line” between the integrating Europe and emerging as aninfluential geopolitical player in Asia, led by the PRC and India rapidly gainingeconomic, political and demographic power.Against this background, the scope of the spread of radicalism andfundamentalism expanded during the second "passionary" shift, which significantlyinfluenced the geopolitical situation of the region as a whole, and the position of themain players on the subcontinent.
In the years proceeding the “Arab spring”, the socialcontract between the authorities and the people rapidly deteriorated, and the ruling classcould not offer the population any positive agenda. It is for this reason, based on thelogic of the work of A. Voskressenskiy188, the analysis of the situation on the groundmust be carried out through the prism of local changes in individual countries, enablingus to soberly assess the new alignment of forces in the Middle East and describe theforces the local regimes are trying to curb and channel into the right direction189.In the short term, the consolidation of political-ideological blocs that is currentlyunderway in the region leads to the emergence of clear dividing lines between localplayers.
This deprives the system of regional relations of certain flexibility and raisesserious concerns regarding its sustainability. In the longer term, the problem of thedisunity of the social foundations of the political order in the region can come to thefore as the main stumbling block. To prevent new threats to international security, theregional powers need to understand how to respond to sources of destabilization.Meanwhile, the solution of this task is hampered by differences in the interests of worldplayers involved in the region and the restrictions that they themselves impose onthemselves.Within the framework of a new actively globalizing space, the conflict ofnational interests of the main actors becomes the cause of events shaping the188Воскресенский А.Д.
Общие закономерности, региональная специфика и концепция незападнойдемократии / А.Д. Воскресенский // Демократия в российском зеркале / ред.-сост. А. Мигранян, А. Пшеворский. М.: МГИМО-Университет, 2013. - С. 289-349.189Наумкин В.В. Ближний Восток, Арабское пробуждение и Россия: что дальше? / Институтвостоковедения РАН, - Москва, - 2012, - 595 с.62geopolitical configuration of the Middle East, on which, in turn, the variability of theentire architecture of international relations depends. Mass protests that engulfed theArab countries in 2011, gave impetus to the "tectonic shift" in the Middle East. There isa total reconstruction of the whole system of cultural, social, economic and politicalrelations.
It is caused mainly by internal reasons - both political and culturalcivilizational, but the connection with the most disturbing trends of global developmentis also obvious. The loss of controllability by international processes, the return of thefactor of brute force into them, the increase in the role of chance, the strengthening ofthe world periphery, the crisis of national states and identities find here a concentratedexpression.Most of all, the failure of state building in the region is due to the fact thatwithin the arbitrarily drawn borders of the countries, of which the Middle East regioncurrently consists, there are no full-fledged established nations190. In all the mostsuccessful countries of the world, the processes of state and national construction runparallel to each other.
In the region of the Middle East, the notion of a nation state wasintroduced from the outside at a time when the indigenous population was not yet readyto learn it191. With the passage of time, the problems of nation building wereincreasingly acutely felt. The policy of the state was aimed at inculcating a sense ofcommunity on the people by means of: the development of a policy on the protection ofnational borders, the issue of passports, the introduction of a system of legislation andtaxation, the development of national education systems. Still it has yielded virtually noresult192.In some countries there has been an expansion of political participation,modernization of political systems, some of the elite are being modernized; there was anawareness of the need for reform and the search for effective responses to new threatsand challenges.
However, today the weakening and sometimes the destruction of the190N. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab state: Politics and Society in the Middle East - London: IB Tauris, -1996, - Р.218 р.191R. Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, (London and New York:Routledge, 2000);192Наумкин В.В. Кризис государств-наций на Ближнем Востоке // Международные процессы.
2018. Том15. №2 (49)63statehood of several countries, the civil wars in Libya, Syria and Iraq, the hundreds ofthousands of victims and millions of refugees, humanitarian catastrophes, the expansionof terrorism, the strengthening of the "jihadist alternative" that has again turned thisregion into a global threat.The overall result of the transformation of the region is so far negative.Reformatting the regional system of international relations has resulted in thedestruction of the old and the formation of new alliances.
A key role is played by nonstate actors, sometimes pursuing their own goals, and sometimes acting as agents ofexternal forces. The countries destroyed by civil wars have turned into arenas of new“proxy wars”. At none of the levels the transformation process has not only beencompleted, but has not reached its climax. The contours of the future design of theregion are still not visible, and it is hardly possible to talk about the completedismantling of the old system.A significant part of the states of the region this far shows high adaptability tochanging conditions.
Whether they can create a strong foundation for a new MiddleEast, or they themselves will be plunged into a cycle of turbulence tomorrow, isunknown. Russia is convinced that the all-round strengthening of their institutions todayis becoming an important task, as important as the settlement of ongoing conflicts. Theoperation of the Russian military in Syria under these conditions contributed to a changein internal balances and may have opened the possibility for seeking breakthroughapproaches in the context of intensifying a political settlement. This unexpecteddecision was not entirely motivated by the tasks of strengthening Russian influence inthe region.
It appears that it was based on concern about the growth of destructivetendencies close to Russia's borders, the apotheosis of violence and terrorism, and theagony of statehood.Another curious feature: virtually all conflict situations in the Middle East areprone to rapid internationalization. Military intervention drew particular attention to therole of global powers, which seemed to increasingly influence the regional situation andcontribute to the formation of trends to reduce the influence of regional forces. It shouldbe noted that over the last quarter of a century Washington's transition from offshore64balancing to active positioning has not developed an effective system of multilateralinstitutions for regional security193.
Existing organizations (the League of Arab States orthe Council of Cooperation of the Arab States of the Arabian Gulf) are not able toassume the basic functions for ensuring security in the region, as was clearlydemonstrated in recent conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.An additional complicating factor was the collapse in prices for energyresources in 2014-2016, which provoked a sharp aggravation of socio-economicproblems not only in the oil and gas exporting countries, but throughout the Arab world,which stimulates the escalation of threats to domestic political stability.Seizure of nuclear materials by terrorist groups, “dirty bomb” in their hands orin the “failed” states remain a threat.
The very possibility of expanding the group of“failed” regimes is high on the agenda. The list of candidates for getting into this group,can be increased so far by seemingly stable states. What is particularly alarming is thatsome global and regional players are likely to continue to seek to apply certain means ofpressure against certain regimes, such as sanctions, including unilateral, and even theuse of military force.At this stage, Russia adheres to an extremely conservative approach tointernational affairs, proceeding from the fact that any change in the status quo willprovoke instability. Its current regional strategy appears to the wisest and mostconsistent one – a tactical wait-and-see.
In the era of chaotic changes reliance on theprinciples of state sovereignty, international law and allies are supported by countrieswhose position in the system of international interactions was viewed merely as objectsof great powers’ aspirations only half a century ago194.193John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Case for Offshore Balancing A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy// Foreign Policy. – July-August 2016. – 70-84 p.194Российский консерватизм оказался беспроигрышным на Ближнем Востоке [Электронный ресурс] //Российскийсоветпомеждународнымделам.–URL:http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-andcomments/comments/rossiyskiy-konservatizm-okazalsya-besproigryshnym-na-blizhne/65CHAPTER IIIPROBLEMS OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM 2003AND UNTILL 20193.1.
Approaches to Ensuring the Regional Security System in the Middle EastMeanwhile, with all the significance of each of the above-mentioned complexproblems, they are all, in the final analysis, manifestations of a fundamental crisis of theinterstate system in the Middle East. Obviously, without reforming this system, one canhardly hope to overcome the various consequences of its current crisis.With obvious differences in the past, all cases of functional regional securityarrangements that have ever existed in the Middle East shared a few fundamentalcharacteristics. First, the main elements of the system were states of the region, and themost significant security threats were determined by interstate contradictions andconflicts.
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