диссертация (1169605), страница 8
Текст из файла (страница 8)
Because ofthis, he said, it’s less likely that any large-scale conflicts could break out on parwith what the world had experienced in the past, since never before in history hadthe entire globe embraced one singular governing model. This is the core essenceof the “end of history”, namely that the sorts of divisions that characterized humanhistory would no longer be applicable, and instead a whole new paradigm wouldbegin.47The United States of America.
The President of The United States. The National Security Strategy of the UnitedStates of America. 16 Mar. 2006. Web. 8 January 2017. http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2006.pdf.48Kaufman R. G. In Defense of the Bush Doctrine. Lexington, 2007, pp. 87-101.49The thought about this kind of ideational symbiosis was expressed in the book: Hendrickson D. Republic in Peril.American Empire and the Liberal Tradition. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp.
53-104.50Fukuyama F. The End of History and the Last Man. N.Y.: The Free Press,1992. 418 p.31His prediction was a bold one and was articulated just months after thebeginning of what Charles Krauthammer later termed the “unipolar moment” 51, butthe facts prove that history itself did not indeed end like Fukuyama forecasted thatit would, and that most of the world today does not practice Western liberaldemocracy. Although this book was widely discussed at the time, and likely playeda huge part in confirming American decision makers’ self-confidence in theirgoverning model and the need to militantly promote it abroad in line with theDemocratic Peace Theory’s precepts, Fukuyama’s work was totally debunked withtime and revealed in hindsight to have been nothing more than the wishfuloptimism of a well-known ideologue.Neoconservative thinker Robert Kagan took a slightly different approach inhis 2008 book “The Return of History and the End of Dreams” by dismissingFukuyama’s thesis about the “end of history” but incorporating the longstandingneoliberal idea of “democracy” to proclaim that the 21 st century will be defined bythe opposition between this governing model and “authoritarianism” 52.
Though F.Fukuyama’s and R. Kagan’s views have been criticized from both theoreticalschools, they quite visibly influenced formation of grand and regional strategies,and the idea of liberal order establishment stayed on the agenda of Americanpolicy with all administrations.Before that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who served under theClinton Administration from 1997-2001, began to put neoliberal strategies intopractice. M.
Albright’s tenure eventually became known as representing the heightof the US’ neoliberal grand strategy53. She fully embraced the neoliberal conceptof “humanitarian interventionism” and used this as the pretext for launching the1999 NATO War on Yugoslavia. M. Albright is considered America’s first female“hawk” and would later be followed by her neoliberal spiritual successors - HillaryClinton, Susan Rice, and Samantha Power during the Obama Administration who51Krauthammer C. The Unipolar Moment.
// Foreign Affairs. - 1990. - Vol. 70. - No. 1. Web. 26 May 2017.https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1991-02-01/unipolar-moment.52Kagan R. The Return of History and the End of Dreams. New York: Knopf, 2008, pp. 3-12; 102-105.53Albright M. Madam Secretary: A Biography. Harper Perennial, 2003. 592 p.32convinced the President to carry out a “humanitarian intervention” in North Africaagainst Libya54.Prior to the Obama Presidency, the most comprehensive descriptions ofneoliberalism in the transforming world order come from international relationstheorist G.
John Ikenberry who released very important works during the BushAdministration. His first popularly acclaimed release “After Victory: Institutions,Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars”, came out inearly 2001 and right before the terrorist attacks, but it had strong ramifications forthe course of US strategic thought around that time 55.
G.J.Ikenberry wrote thatthere is a need for the US to transform the international system, and thatinstitutions are crucial to post-war success if the victor wants to establish asustainable order. Strong states maintain stability in these institutions while weakones receive security by joining, so Ikenberry believes that this is a win-winsolution for everybody. Institutions, he stated, foster order in the anarchic world bycreating a measure of shared values, voluntary limits on power, and being difficultto change. Moreover, he assumed that the victorious institution-creating state thatexerts the most influence on the anarchic international system essentially becomesa hegemon. Ikenberry tried to address the neorealist issue of power in internationalrelations through a modified neoliberal theory, and instead of advocating thedominance and direct control of the hegemon, he suggested how the systemicleader could apply a softer indirect approach instead through the leverage ofinternational institutions.Later G.J.Ikenberry criticized the Bush Administration policy saying that thePresident’s use of militant unilateralism was a violation of national sovereignty 56.He described how the US constructed a durable international order after the end ofWorld War II, but that 9/11 and the War on Terror led to an upheaval of this54Mann J.
Obamians. The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power. N.Y.: Penguin Books,2012. 416 p.55Ikenberry G. J. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars.Princeton, 2001. 320 p.56Ikenberry G. J. Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and World Politics. Cambridge:Polity, 2006, pp. 21-51, 175-186, 197-245.33model. Even so, Ikenberry believes that the US is still incentivized to save theliberal rules-based system that it created, but that it must confront theneoconservatives and other aggressive pro-military forces within its decisionmaking establishment first.
The liberals and neoconservatives were faced with achoice after 9/11, and it’s their subsequent reaction to this watershed event that’sdetermining the future course of American foreign policy. Ikenberry thinks that theneoconservatives wanted to advance the Balance of Power and security rivalryparadigms, while the neoliberals were in favor of greater engagement and moreaccommodation with the US’ partners. In a sense, a superficial analysis of theObama Administration’s earliest years would suggest that the neoliberals finallysucceeded in their power struggle against the neoconservatives, since it would havebeen unimaginable, for example, for anyone that Bush would address Muslims inCairo like Obama did in 2009.
Though soon it was evident that the 44th USPresident continued the policies of his predecessor while hiding behind morefriendly rhetoric57.Ikenberry’s last contribution to neoliberal theory came out in 2011 and wascalled “Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of theAmerican System” 58. As he’s already established in his previous two works,Ikenberry reaffirms that the US is the world’s liberal hegemon (hence the title), butit is under severe strain, partially due to mistakes of the Bush administration thatweakened the liberal characteristics of the US-built international system andstrengthened its imperial ones instead. The removal of previously self-imposedrestraints and the subsequent predisposition to engage in dangerous risk-takingendeavors exposed the US’ system to destabilization. The only way to save theLiberal Leviathan, as seen by Ikenberry, was return to diplomatic internationalism.The US needed to strengthen its commitment to rules and norms, he said,otherwise it’ll take even longer for the system that the US built to recover andevolve.
Despite the setbacks the system has experienced since 9/11, IkenberryШаклеина Т.А. Россия и США в мировой политике. М., 2017. С. 120-177.Ikenberry G. John. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order.Princeton, 2011, pp. 1-33, 279-333.575834mentions, he remains confident that it will not be destroyed or replaced by anycompetitor. It would be an exaggeration to say that Ikenberry is one of the mostinfluential international relations thinkers of the present era, but one can’tobjectively dismiss the accuracy with which he described American grand strategy.It’s certainly true that the US built the post-Cold War international system, and thatthis hegemonic structure is under threat from a combination of Americanmiscalculations and the rapid rise of non-Western powers such as Russia, China,and others.Russian expert Tatiana Shakleina analyzing neoconservative writings andofficial documents at the beginning of the Bush administration predicted that theneoconservative unilateral strategy wouldn’t be successful.
She stated that mostactive critics of the imperial character of the American international strategyrightly claimed that empires are non-democratic and encourage opposition fromother countries59.Developing her conception of the structural transformation in the 21 stcentury, T.
Shakleina mentioned that emergence of a larger number ofcontemporary leading world powers made the issue of accommodation between theUS and China, Russia, Brazil, India and others rather urgent for the stabledevelopment of international relations.Her idea and suggested three possible scenarios of the governing core in thefuture order were to a certain extent similar to conceptions of American IR expertswho criticized neoconservatives in general, and tried to develop more constructivevariants of the American international behavior.
There were hopes that the Obamaadministration will listen to Bush administration critics and change its policymaking it less militant. However Obama Democrats after very promisingШаклеина Т. А. Идейное обеспечение внешней политики администрации Буша. М.: Институт США иКанады РАН, 2003. 38 c.; Шаклеина Т. А. Эволюция глобальной стратегии США (2001-2011) // ВестникМосковского университета. Сер. 25 Международные отношения и мировая политика, 2011, № 3. С.
35-58.5935declarations started to act within the same paradigm, and the Middle East remainedin the focus of American policy of regime change 60.At the same time, though, and in spite of the US’ failures and the oppositionthat it was receiving from the rising great powers, the US still tried to spread itsinstitutional web far and wide.
This can be evidenced by the never-endingexpansion of NATO and the attempted promulgation of two American-centrictrade blocs, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and theTrans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). While behaving unilaterally during the Bushyears, the US sought to moderately re-embrace limited multilateralism duringObama’s tenure, so Ikenberry’s ideas remained definitely relevant.One of the most enduring theoretical constants throughout American foreignpolicy in general has been its consistency in misunderstanding the world,regardless of which decision makers and strategists are in power or whateverpolicies they end up executing under realist or liberal pretenses. Paul R.
Pillar, anearly three-decade-long veteran of the CIA and non-resident senior fellow at theBrookings Institution, attempted to answer the question of “Why AmericaMisunderstands The World”, writing that everything essentially comes down tomisperceptions. While not overtly saying as much, his book reads like anexplanation of constructivism in practice, which might be the key conceptualelement for understanding the US’ foreign policy in the moment of its application,whether it ultimately takes realist or liberal manifestations. Pillar’s book is filledwith subsections with such titles as “Blaming Bad Guys with Bad Ideas”, “TheMonolithic View of Terrorism”, “Personalizing the Enemy”, “A Bifurcated Viewof the World”, and “Demonization”, which are all buzzwords for perception andtherefore the constructivist theory of International Relations 61.Шаклеина Т.
![](https://s.studizba.com/z.php?f=/templates/si/i/noavatar.png&w=100&h=100&t=1"){kind=avatar}
