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But if the middle space rebuffs the West, becomes an assertivesingle entity, and either gains control over the South or forms an alliance with themajor Eastern actor, then America's primacy in Eurasia shrinks dramatically”94.Although Brzezinski’s geopolitical recommendations bring into doubtwhether or not the United States is opposed to the emergence of a “vacuum” forstrategic reasons, nevertheless, the idea of stultifying regional hegemons and“convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role orpursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests” (even ifmilitary, covert, or regime change means must be used to achieve this) haveremained the hallmarks of American foreign policy.
Z. Brzezinski was a strongproponent of the US domineering role in world politics and hegemonic strategyafter the end of the Cold War. Slightly different view was presented by a famousscholar Samuel Huntington95. But both prominent scholars accepted thatchallenges will assuredly arise to American hegemony, and that the rise ofmultipolarity might end up being inevitable. Therefore, they proposed that the UStake proactive measures in order to indefinitely safeguard its global position for aslong as possible, though accepting that this will ultimately be a difficult taskcontingent on many factors.94Brzezinski Z. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York, NY:BasicBooks, 1997.
240 p.95Huntington S. also wrote about the perspective of America’s dominant role in the post-cold war period. But hedeclared that the United States cannot solve all the global problems unilaterally, and suggested accommodation withother great powers including Russia and China. See: Huntington S. P. The Lonely Superpower // Foreign Affairs. 1999. - Vol. 78. - No.
2, pp. 35-49. Later the same idea was expressed by Christopher Layne in his book: Layne Ch.The Peace of Illusions. American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present. Ithaca, 2006. 304 p.50Mentioned above T. Barnett was motivated by a similar self-interested desireto preserve America’s post-Cold War primacy, though he fundamentallyreconceptualized the world in a way which deals less with geopolitics and morewith “networks”. His “functioning core” and “non-integrating gap” (whichincludes the Mideast) required that the Pentagon rely on non-military means suchas demography, economy, immigration and others in order to complement itsconventional capabilities in fighting this century’s war. He evaluated the US Waron Iraq as being designed to trigger a “Big Bang” of “positive military-politicaldevelopments” in the region, and presciently forecast that the long-termconsequences would reverberate against Syria and ultimately Iran (the latter ofwhich is the main target) 96.R.
Craig Nation who was writing on American policy in Eurasia, was moregeopolitically minded than T. Barnett, though he also echoes some of his ideasabout how the US can retain the regional order in Eurasia. C. Nation’s referencesto Halford’s Heartland theory, Brzezinski, and Mackinder’s conception of the“world island” show how he understands the importance of CENTCOM’s sphereof operations in the Mideast and Central Asia. He argues, just like Brzezinski does,that the US must prevent the emergence of the “Eurasia” idea, both in Russia andelsewhere in the supercontinent, because it poses a serious threat to Americanleadership.
C. Nation identifies American enduring interests in Eurasia as being theneed to secure his country’s access to its resources, managing the rise of China,fighting terrorism in the Mideast, and assisting Russia with its “democratictransition”. According to his concept these objectives can be promoted throughstrengthening energy security, waging the Global War on Terrorism, and the USefforts to promote its envisioned regional order. C. Nation also suggested thatNATO active policy and “democracy promotion” could greatly aid Washington incontrolling Eurasia. His ideas align with what Russian academic Alexei Bogaturovwrote about American conduct.
Bogaturov made an assumption that one of theBarnett T. The Pentagon’s New Map. War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century. New York: G.P. Putnam’sSons, 2004, pp. 191-247.9651three zones of US interests “encompasses the oil-producing regions of the MiddleEast and the Caspian Sea with outreaches into Central Asia”. This perfectlyoverlaps with CENTCOM’s boundaries and represents the geostrategic pivot spaceof Afro-Eurasia (essentially the entire Eastern Hemisphere). Bogaturov theorizesthat the US always acts according to its own interests and that this has powerfulrepercussions such as driving its proselytizing quest to “democratize” and“liberate” the whole world 97.
Similar idea about evangelical character of Americaninternational behaviour was also expressed by Hendrickson 98.Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya from the Strategic Culture Foundation wroteabout the US plans in the Mideast, linking together Condoleezza Rice’s “NewMiddle East” strategy, Ralph Peters’ “Blood Borders”, and Zbigniew Brzezinski’s“The Grand Chessboard” in order to prove that the US is in fact pursuing amultifaceted destabilization campaign against the Middle East in order togeopolitically engineer the region 99. His work is very comprehensive and presentsa holistic view of American strategy.
It wonderfully incorporates theaforementioned works together in providing a concise and summarized assessmentof what the United States is aiming for in the Mideast and why.The Obama administration continued policy of the previous administrationsthough he promised that he would reverse all of the disastrous policies of hispredecessor.
Upon taking office, a strong case could be made that the US had bythat point officially become an empire. Well-known authors Christopher Layne andBradley A. Thayer discussed this issue and agreed that America is indeed anempire and that it doesn’t admit this for public relations and soft power purposes,but they differ of what sort of imperial rule it wields 100.
On the one hand, the97Bogaturov A. The Sources of American Conduct // Russia in Global Affairs. 9 Feb. 2005. Web. 08 March 2018.https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_4426.98Hendrickson D.C. Republic in Peril. American Empire and the Liberal Tradition. N.Y.: Oxford University Press.2018. 304 p.99Nazemroaya M. D. Plans for Redrawing the Middle East: The Project for a New Middle East. Global Research.ca,14 June 2014. Web. 27 January 2018.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/plans-for-redrawing-the-middle-east-theproject-for-a-new-middle-east/3882.The same idea about this destabilizing purpose of the United States was presented by George Friedman in hisfamous book The Next 100 years.
A Forecast for the 21st Century. (N.Y: Anchor Books, 2010), pp. 5, 40-46.100Layne Ch., Bradley A. Thayer. American Empire: A Debate. New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 166.52argument is presented that the US is a formal empire in terms of its military andeconomic power, but this is contrasted with its cultural and ideological sway topersuade the reader that American might actually be a non-traditional empireinstead. Debates on the question whether the United States is an empire took placein 1990s and in 2000s. They came back already in 2016-2018 after D. Trump cameto power, however opinions still differ and the discussion will continue 101.The reality is likely somewhere in between, since it’s true that the USdirectly exercises exorbitant military and economic power, but it also indirectlyuses its culture and ideology to progressive enact social change within targetedsocieties.
Both methods, though, share the common denominator of working toinstall and maintain friendly regimes all across the world. As for the maindifference between the two authors, this comes down to Layne’s support of“offshore balancing” and Thayer’s advocacy for “offensive realism”. The firstpolicy is pretty much a synonym for the Balance of Power and relies more ondiplomacy just like the earlier-referenced ‘reluctant sheriff’ concept expressed byR. Haass, while the second one is akin to the Democratic Peace Theory and favorsa more aggressive approach that carries strong shades of liberal interventionistthought.