диссертация (1169605), страница 7
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Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. New York: Liberal Arts, 1957, pp. 8-14.Huth P. K., Allee T. L. The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 1-34, 277-298.37Pazienza T. Challenging the Democratic Peace Theory - The Role of US-China Relationship. // Scholar Commons.Graduate Theses and Dissertations. University of South Florida, 25 Mar.
2014. Web. 26 May 2017.http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5098.3626“humanitarian interventionism”, and “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). It’s clear tosee the connection between the Democratic Peace Theory and Bush’s “democracypromotion” in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as Obama’s clandestine support of thisduring the “Arab Spring” theater-wide “Color Revolutions”, so this doesn’tnecessarily need any further elaboration.
As for the latter two, it’s useful to pointout that they’re the cusp of this ideology in the present day and serve as itsoperational motivation in certain cases. In 2002 US Ambassador to the UNSamantha Power released a highly influential publication about “humanitarianinterventionism” called “A Problem from Hell: America and the Age ofGenocide”, in which she makes the case that the US – as the unipolar globalhegemon that it is – has a moral duty to intervene in foreign conflicts in order tostop genocide and ease the humanitarian suffering on the civilian population 38.According to the UN’s official website, R2P grew out of the 1990s concept of“humanitarian interventionism”, and it can be defined as responsibility that theinternational community has to stop genocide or the threat thereof39.Understandably, it’s inferred that the promotion of “democracy” in the targetedstate would follow the encouraged military intervention, thus connecting these twotheories to their neoliberal Democratic Peace Theory roots.American policy in the Middle East and in Syria is part of the US globalstrategy, so it is necessary to see how general and specific aims of the US strategywere interconnected, especially in the Middle East.1.2 Conceptualization of the American Mideast StrategyThe doctrinal origins of neorealism in American post-Cold War foreignpolicy towards the Mideast lie with the Wolfowitz Doctrine of 199240, in which thethen-Secretary of State inexplicably stated that the US will take whatever actions38Power S.
A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Basic, 2002. 656 p.Background Information on the Responsibility to Protect. United Nations, 2013. Web. 26 May 2016.http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml.40Taylor P. E. 1992 Wolfowitz U.S. Strategy Plan Document. // The New York Times, 8 Mar. 1992. Web. 28 June2017.
http://work.colum.edu/~amiller/wolfowitz1992.htm.3927are necessary to preempt the rise of any potential rivaling power anywhere in theworld. This pronouncement was made not even a year after the end of the GulfWar and just a few months following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The UShad just assembled a global coalition to expel Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein fromKuwait, which Washington had said was a threat to worldwide stability. Theremoval of the Soviet Union from the strategic equation transformed the bipolarsystem into one of unipolarity, and with the US having just demonstrated that it’smore than capable of leading dozens of nations to war in the Middle East, itbecame overly emboldened and set out to proactively take whatever steps itsubjectively felt necessary to indefinitely secure its hegemony.
Although notformally stated by P.Wolfowitz, his doctrine essentially advocates the HegemonicStability Theory.The years preceding the 9/11 terrorist attacks saw the rise of theneoconservative movement. Government and academic figures who were hardcoreneorealists came together to form the Project for a New American Century(PNAC) think tank in 1997.
This organization is best known for publishing theSeptember 2000 document “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces, andResources for a New Century” 41. This work was perhaps the clearest and mostprescient blueprint of what observers could later come to expect from the BushWhite House, where many members of the PNAC were later employed or had anadvisory influence. In relevance to the dissertation, the document articulated whythe US feels that it must attack Iraq.
The authors framed Saddam Hussein and hiscountry in such a way, as to make them out to be the greatest supposed threat tointernational security, so keeping with the tenets of neorealism, the WolfowitzDoctrine, and the Hegemonic Stability Theory, the neoconservatives that wouldlater enter into the US Presidential Administration after the election of George H.W. Bush were compelled to seek his overthrow through a future muscle-flexing41Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century.
Project for the NewAmericanCentury.Washington,Sept.2000.Web.26June2017.http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/pdf/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf.28conventional invasion that would show off America’s prestige and power to therest of the world42.There were already earlier signs that the neorealists-neoconservatives wereaiming for this objective. Prominent foreign policy thinker, former Director ofPolicy Planning for the Bush White House, and current President of the Council onForeign Relations Richard Haass published a 1997 book titled “The ReluctantSheriff: The United States After the Cold War” 43. He wrote in it that the US needsa balanced and middle-ground approach that could be embodied by a doctrine ofregulation. R.Haass expands on this idea by explaining that the US should embraceeconomic multilateralism but aim for security unilateralism whenever it’snecessary for Washington to take the lead in promoting international stability, or inother words, be the “sheriff” punishing the unipolar rule-breakers.
If the UnitedNations Security Council won’t approve US military action against whatWashington says to be an international transgressor, then the Pentagon would justhave to assemble a coalition of the willing instead.Co-founders of the PNAC William Kristol and Robert Kagan came out withtheir 2000 joint publication “Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in America’sForeign and Defense Policy” 44. This was a collection of 21st-century forwardlooking policy essays that were designed to influence decision makers and reflectestablishment viewpoints. The authors preached that the US should practice“benevolent global hegemony” by embracing unipolarity in order to recoup thelosses from what they feel was the 1990s “decade of squandered opportunity”.They refuted Haass’ principle of the ‘reluctant sheriff’ and said that the US shouldactively promote “liberal-democracy” all across the world and not be ashamed ofusing the military to take out Saddam.
In fact, one of the chapters in their book is42The American scholar R. Pillar wrote that demonization of enemies is deep in the American political culture.There was belief that the moment you remove the threat the liberal order will automatically emerge. This mistakenassumption led to many surprises and dissatisfaction with the results of regime change operations. See: Pillar P.L.Why America Misunderstands the World.
National Experience and Roots of Misperception. N.Y.: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 2016, pp. 158-159.43Haass R. N. The Reluctant Sheriff. The United States after the Cold War. N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations,1997, pp. 21-78.44Kagan R., Kristol W.. Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy. SanFrancisco: Encounter, 2000, pp. 3-47, 9-111.29titled “Iraq: Saddam Unbound” and fear mongers about the threat that hesupposedly presents to the rest of the world, obviously with the intent of inspiringAmerica’s leaders to take unilateral action against him.There are countless examples of neorealism implemented in practice after9/11, with the most obvious being the conventional Wars on Afghanistan, Iraq, andLibya, and the unconventional one in Syria, for example, but keeping with thefocus of this dissertation and the particular chapter of the work, this subsection willonly address two era-defining pieces of literature.
The first one is R. CraigNation’s “Russian Security Strategy Under Putin: U.S. And Russian Perspectives U.S. Interests In The New Eurasia - Russia's Threat Perception And StrategicPosture”. Although geared mostly towards addressing Russia, some very importantlessons in IR neorealist thought can be acquired from this 2007 work which aredirectly applicable for explaining American policy towards the Middle East aswell. Nation references the geopolitical theory of Halfred Mackinder45 in arguingthat the “Heartland” is the Eurasian pivot space, and that the US must maintainstability here and in its surroundings in order to prevent the creation of an Arc ofInstability. In pursuit of this grand strategy, the US must “promote democracy”,“advance social equality”, “encourage good governance”, “invest in modernizationprojects”, and “fight against transnational crime, drug, and terrorist syndicates”.Therefore, Nation concludes, the US needs to focus its Eurasian policy on theMideast.As was already evidenced by that time, the US was already followingNation’s and many other neoconservatives’ advice as part of what has been calledthe Bush Doctrine.
Professor Robert Kaufman from the neoconservative HeritageFoundation think tank released a book, “In Defense of the Bush Doctrine”, thesame year that R. Nation did. He said that everything that the US did after 9/11 isfounded on the National Security Strategy of 2002 46, which he analyzes as45Mackinder H. The Geographical Pivot of History. The Royal Geographical Society, Apr.
1904. Web. 16 May2016. http://stoa.usp.br/danilousp/files/-1/16432/Geographical+Pivot+at+History+%28Mackinder%29.pdf46The United States of America. The President of the United States. The National Security Strategy of the UnitedStates of America. 17 Sept. 2002. Web. 6 May 2017. http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2002.pdf.30practicing “moral democratic realism” and which preceded the later NationalSecurity Strategy of 2006 47 that expanded upon the neoconservatives’ core ideas.Kaufman continues by expounding on what he has identified as the US’ twoforeign policy determinants. The first one is to support what amounts to theWestern conception of “human rights” (“liberalism”) and the American-controlledcapitalist system, while the second is more like cautionary advice in that hesuggests that prudence must be maintained at all times 48.
It will later be argued inthe dissertation that not much has changed in the Obama Administration, and thatseveral examples from literature prove that there is an undeniable policycontinuum between Presidents Bush and Obama. This could be taken to mean thatthe influence of neorealism and that of its neoconservative acolytes is stronglyembedded in the US’ permanent military, intelligence, and diplomaticbureaucracies 49.The most infamous example of neoliberalism in IR pre-9/11 literature wasFrancis Fukuyama’s 1992 book “The End of History and the Last Man” 50.Fukuyama interpreted the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the SovietUnion as confirmation that the rest of the world would thenceforth from that pointeventually adopt the Western liberal-democratic model of governance.
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