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– New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976.– P. 260.133Greene K.F. Why Dominant Parties Lose?: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective. – New York:Cambridge University Press, 2007. – P. 12.134O’Leary B. Britain’s Japanese Question: “Is There a Dominant Party?” // Margetts H., Smyth G. (eds.) TurningJapanese: Britain with a Permanent Party of Government. - London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1994. – P.
4.130191) regular competitive elections with the participation of more than one party orcandidate;2) continuous control over chief executive by a party for 18 years or more.Section 1.3. The characteristics of democracy and authoritarianism withinthe dominant party regimes covers differences of a single-party dominance underdemocratic and undemocratic regimes. The analysis suggests that the democratic /authoritarian context of single-party dominance determines different mechanisms ofits endurance. However, the existence of single-party dominance as such is animportant characteristic of a political regime, which largely determines theallocation of resources, the logic of political competition between incumbent andopposition, and therefore it becomes a regime-distinguishing notion.
Regardless ofthe degree of democracy within a particular dominant party regime, there is somemerging of government institutions with the dominant party structure, as well as theweakening of electoral competitiveness and, consequently, a declining probabilityof any turnover in power as a result of elections.Section 1.4.
The origins of the rise of single-party dominance studies maintheoretical approaches to explaining the nature of dominant party regimes and keyconditions for its emergence. These include the absence of significant socialcleavages in the society, the need to overcome the fragmentation of social structureand the social demand for power consolidation.Section 1.5. Ensuring elite integration is devoted to the dominant parties asmechanisms for coordinating elites.
Due to the fact that the ruling party dominanceis sustained through continuous electoral superiority over the opposition, thedominant party becomes a leading unchallenged political actor with a crucialinfluence on the political decision-making process135. Thus, the dominant parties coopt a lot of politicians seeking seats, offices and a successful political career136. TheGiliomee H., Simkins C. The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy.
– Amsterdam: HarwoodAcademic Publishers, 1999. – P. 12.136Greene K.F. Why Dominant Parties Lose?: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective. – New York:Cambridge University Press, 2007. – P. 5-6.13520attraction of large political and corporate groups by the dominant party, in turn, leadsto the elite integration around the dominant party structure. Therefore the dominantparty gains resource advantage over opposition. So ruling party’s competitors havelow electoral support to win elections and gain control over chief executive office.Section 1.6.
Incumbent and opposition within the electoral space studies thenature of political competition under single-party dominance. The consolidation ofsingle-party dominance creates stable expectations at the levels of political elites andvoters. Generally, these expectations can be summarized as a lack of any alternativeat the political arena and a lack of party choice for pragmatically minded politicalactors. Under such conditions, the incumbent gets a steady superiority over thechallengers for a long time.The second chapter develops theoretical implications for the effects ofinstitutional and political factors on the single-party dominance persistence.
Theseeffects are introduced in the theoretical hypotheses describing the nature of therelationship between institutional and political factors and the single-partydominance persistence.Section 2.1. The type of institutional design considers the influence ofinstitutional design on the single-party dominance persistence. The effect ofinstitutional design on the single-party dominance persistence is explained throughthree key implications: influence of the dominant party on the election results,ideological identification of incumbent and challengers, problems of electioncampaign’s organization.Under presidentialism, the opposition is able to more successfully overcomethe ruling party advantage in electoral support137.
The candidates’ personalcharacteristics, individual profiles and political views are more important in137Scheiner E. Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State. - NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2006. – P. 216.21presidential elections, while the role of party affiliation is more important inparliamentary ones.Parliamentarianism and presidentialism have different consequences for thecandidates’ agenda formation. The direct and fixed presidential mandate, which doesnot depend on the support of the parliamentary majority, stipulates candidates’autonomy from the ideological positions expressed in party platforms to createagenda in accordance with own political views.
In particular, it leads to leaningtowards the median voter and avoiding extreme views. The more blurred ideologicalidentification of candidates in presidential regimes eliminates the advantage of thedominant party in greater ideological flexibility.In parliamentary regimes, single-party dominance becomes more durable dueto greater importance of incumbent’s advantages over opposition in electoralcampaign organization.
Parliamentarianism expose the opposition to difficultproblem of ensuring the most efficient way of turning electoral support into seats inparliament and cabinet.The following theoretical hypothesis about the relationship between the typeof institutional design and the single-party dominance persistence is formulated:H1: Single-party dominance in parliamentary regimes has a longer durationthan in presidential ones.Section 2.2.
The level of electoral system’s disproportionality inparliamentary elections analyzes the effects of the level of the electoral system’sdisproportionality in parliamentary elections on the single-party dominancepersistence. This factor refers to the level of correspondence between the shares ofvotes and seats. It is measured by the Gallagher's Index.The logic of the effects of the level of electoral system’s disproportionality onthe single-party dominance persistence is examined in the context of ideologicalidentification of the incumbent and the opposition, as well as coordination problemsbetween the challengers.22The resource and electoral advantage of incumbent over opposition hasgreater significance in plurality systems. The ideological attractiveness of thedominant party for the median voter matters more in plurality settings. Underproportional representation settings, this advantage does not play such an importantrole.
Therefore, the opposition’s chances of winning the elections are improved.Moreover, opposition gains advantage from leaning electoral behavior towardsoriginal structure of voters’ preferences.It was revealed that the peculiarities of plurality systems effects (in particular,the inducing two-party or two-bloc system), expose the opposition to difficultproblem of providing internal coordination. Challengers should be cooperative tonominate consolidated candidates.
In proportional representation systems,opposition parties can be successful by nominating several party lists and gainingthe increasing aggregate share of seats in parliament.As a result, the following theoretical hypothesis is formulated about therelationship between the level of electoral system’s disproportionality and thesingle-party dominance persistence:H2: Regimes with a higher electoral system’s disproportionality have a longerduration of single-party dominance.Section 2.3.
The level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitorsclarifies the impact of the level of electoral support of the ruling party's competitorson the single-party dominance persistence. Due to the fact that single-partydominance is maintained in competitive elections, the threat of losing power by adominant party as a result of defeat in elections increases under conditions of higherlevel of electoral support for its competitors.