Диссертация (1137878), страница 23
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Показано, что политика розничных сетей неприводит к вытеснению из отрасли мелких продавцов и соответствующему ростуконцентрации производства.Таким образом, можно сделать вывод о том, что сами по себе вертикальныеограничения, применяемые российскими торговыми сетями, не являютсяоднозначным способом злоупотребления монопольной властью с их стороны.Хотя результаты эмпирического исследования подтверждают предположение отом, что крупные поставщики получают большие выгоды от взаимодействия сторговыми сетями, в отличие от мелких компаний, не получено подтвержденийтого, что рост современных торговых форматов на региональных рынкахсопровождается вытеснением мелких поставщиков.
Закон о торговле сам по себене вносит значительного облегчения в общее правое бремя контрактной практикимежду торговыми сетями и поставщиками, а также приводит к еще большемусужению выбора эффективных инструментов взаимодействия игроков.119Список литературы1.Ailawadi K. L. The retail power-performance conundrum: What have welearned? // Journal of Retailing. - 2001. - № 77 (3). – pp: 299–318.2.Ailawadi K.
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