Диссертация (1137447), страница 21
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Полученные результаты могут применяться как непосредственно к системам с граничными оценками,так и к произвольным системам, использующим процедуры устранения безразличия в предпочтениях сторон.5. Исследован механизм организации приемной кампании в России; показаны особенности и «узкие места» используемой псевдоцентрализованной схемы. В частности, продемонстрировано, чтопорождаемое используемым механизмом обобщенное паросочетание не является устойчивым.6. Разработан комплекс программ, реализующий предложенные механизмы построения устойчивого обобшенного паросочетания.151Литература1. Оре О.
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