Резюме на английском_Турченко Михаил (1136366), страница 3
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1. P. 68–83.Turchenko M. S. Faktory fragmentatsii partiinykh sistem ros-siiskikhregionov (2003-2013) [Factors of Party Systems Fragmentation in the Russian Regions (2003-2013)]. Politiia. 2015. I. 2. P. 38–53.Turchenko M. S. & Zavadskaya M. A. Kauzal’nyi mekhanizm vsnagromozhdenie faktov? Kriterii otsenki prichinno-sledstvennykh sviazei vcase studies [Casual Mechanism vs. Pile of Facts: How to Evaluate CasualLinks in Case Study Research]. Polis: Politicheskie Issledovaniia. 2017. I.2. P.
134–146.Turchenko M. S. 2018 Elektoral’nye reformy v sravnitel’noi perspective [Electoral Reforms in Comparative Perspective]. Politicheskaianauka. 2018. I.1. P. 283–300.11Turchenko M. Why Are There so Many or so Few Parties? Factorsof Party System Fragmentation in the Russian Regions. Problems of PostCommunism. 2018. I. 65(4). P. 233–242.Works published elsewhere:Turchenko M. & Shevchuk S. Veto Players and Major Electoral Reforms in Russia. Russian Politics.
2016. I. 1(2). P. 203–221.The content and main findings of the aforementioned works are embedded into the thesis’s text.II. Analysis of data and findingsAs an example of electoral engineering this study includes a givenregion’s use of those electoral rules that are highly biased in favour of the“party of power”, United Russia. As a large party, United Russia wouldhold an advantage in small assemblies, small district magnitudes, high legalelectoral thresholds and methods for allocating list seats based on smallquotas (Colomer 2004, p.46).To operationalise a phenomenon of “electoral engineering”, an indexwas developed by summing up values representing the main dimensions ofa given regional electoral system, i.e., assembly size, the share of PR deputies, legal electoral threshold, and method for allocating list seats, depending on whether a given dimension would be beneficial to United Russia.The index reflecting the degree of electoral engineering varies from 0to 4, where higher values indicate a greater degree to which a system favours representation for United Russia.The analysis is based on data from three regional electoral rounds, soregressions were built for each electoral round separately.
The method ofanalysis employed in this study is ordered logistic regression.As regression results indicate, the federal center was the only actorthat influenced electoral engineering at the regional level during the first12round of regional legislative elections. The same effect was also in placeduring the second round.The link between electoral engineering and any other actors, exceptthe federal center, was not found during the first two rounds of regionalelections: neither United Russia, nor governors influenced the regionalelectoral systems’ transformations, as the analysis has shown. The possibleexplanation for this could be that the federal center’s activity in creatingelectoral rules favourable to United Russia anticipated all incentives whichcould have stemmed from United Russia itself and the heads of regions.The latter two actors had nothing but to follow electoral changes promotedby the Kremlin.
Moreover, during the first and the second electoral roundsrestrictive electoral rules were employed even by those Russian regionswhere incumbent elites fully controlled political process in their domains.A very different picture could be seen during the third round of regional elections compared to the first and the second. The federal centerceased to affect electoral engineering at regional level after having reducedthe maximum possible legal electoral threshold from 7 to 5 per cent.
Despite the fact that Russian regions were allowed to elect by PR two timesfewer deputies in the course of the third round than in the first and the second, only a couple of regions used this provision. The explanation could bethat governors feared to lose control over the legislative process due to theentrance of more SMP-deputies into regional parliaments.At the same time, the requirement to reduce legal electoral thresholdswas balanced out in some regions by adopting more restrictive seat allocation formulas, by reducing the assembly size and by rejection of a pure PRsystem. Heads of regions were the key principals in these “compensatory”politics, especially, those governors who faced structural limitations ontheir use of “tough” forms of manipulation (electoral fraud or voter intimidation) for United Russia’s benefit.13As statistical analysis has showed, electoral engineering was not dependent during all three rounds on a strategy of those regional governorswho have not been ruling by a given region for a long time.Finally, the results revealed that electoral engineering was unlikely tobe related to United Russia’s incentives: the link between ENPS and thedependent variable was not found during all rounds of regional elections.The findings of this study shed light on the logic of authoritarianelectoral engineering.
Based on obtained results, it could be supposed thatthe transformations of electoral systems may be of importance even in undemocratic political regimes. It could be the case under certain circumstances, namely, when authoritarian incumbents do not have opportunitiesto rely on “tough” electoral manipulations like electoral fraud or voter intimidation for assurance their political domination (or when these are quitescarce). Conversely, electoral engineering may not be of interest for thoseautocrats who have full discretion with respect to the wide range of toolsfor the manipulation of electoral outcomes.III. Reference listAhmed A.
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