Шабалин_резюме_ENG_финал (1137925), страница 2
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Similarly [Da Silva, Subrahmanyam, 2007]constructed the variable based on monthly observations in the Brazilianmarket.We estimate multiple regressions models on panel data in order to evaluatethe effects of the control premium determinants: Pooled OLS, PCSE (PanelCorrected Standard Errors), Fixed Effects and Random Effects models. Severalspecifications of the following generalized econometric model are estimated:, = 0 + _, ′ 1 + , ′ 2 + , ′ 3 + , ′ 4 + , = 1, … , ; = 1, … , (2)where – dependent variable, _, ′ – vector of corporategovernance quality variables, ,′ – vector of control contest probabilityvariables, , ′ – vector of ownership structure variables, , ′ – vector ofcontrol variables, – random disturbance (0, 2 ).In order to account for heteroscedasticity and intragroup autocorrelation inPooled OLS, Fixed Effects and Random Effects models Rogers clustered standarderrors are estimated [Rogers, 1993].
When there is a presence of cross-sectionalcorrelation based on statistical test results we estimate Driscoll and Kraay standarderrors [Driscoll, Kraay, 1998]. Driscoll and Kraay standard errors areheteroskedasticandcontemporaneouslycross-sectionallycorrelatedwithautocorrelation estimated based on moving average process with lag of q. The PCSEmodel implies that standard errors are heteroskedastic, contemporaneously crosssectionally correlated, and autocorrelated of type AR (1).Time-invariant variables are estimated in a following hybrid model [Allison,2009; Schunk, 2013]:, = 0 + (, − ̅ )′1 + ′2 + ̅ ′3 + + , = 1, … , ; = 1, … , (3)7where and denote company and quarter respectively, , – dependentvariable, 1 – «within» estimates [Mundlak, 1978], 3 – «between» estimates[Mundlak, 1978], 2 – estimates of time-invariant variables, – individual randomeffect, , – random disturbance (0, 2 ).Main findings:1)the identified influence of legislation changes of 2012 and 2013 inSouth Korea that was aimed at improving corporate governance practice in thecountry.
It was shown that the overall market spread decreased as a result of theamendments to the «Commercial Act» in 2012 and to the «Financial InvestmentServices and Capital Markets Act» in 2013 improving corporate governance;2)the results of empirical testing of the hypothesis of expropriation ofminority shareholders in family-owned companies in South Korea as well as theeffect of the government ownership on the spread in Brazil and Russia. It was shownthat the spread is higher in family-owned companies compared to the companieswithout significant family participation in voting rights. It was shown that spread islower in Brazilian companies by 19-20 pp.
with government participation comparedto the companies without significant government share of voting rights. It was alsoshown that spread is lower in Russian companies by 40 pp. if government hasqualified majority of voting rights;3)the results of the empirical testing of control contest probability oncontrol premium in Brazil and Germany. In accordance with the voting model weshow that the higher the probability of control contest in a company the highercontrol premium.Contribution:1)the complex theoretical study devoted to the impact of the dual-classshare structure on company market value was conducted;2)the impact of the effectiveness of corporate governance on the spreadbetween common and preference share prices on a base of corporate governanceindex (CGI) in South Korea was first studied. The negative relationship between8corporate governance quality and the spread was found for the subsample ofcompanies with CGI;3)the impact of legislative changes aimed at improving corporategovernance quality on a country level in South Korea and Russia was first studied.It was shown that the overall market spread in South Korea decreased as a result ofthe amendments to the «Commercial Act» in 2012 and to the «Financial InvestmentServices and Capital Markets Act» in 2013;4)the comparative study of the influence of the type of controllingshareholder on control premium was first conducted in Brazil, Germany, Russia andSouth Korea; the positive impact of family ownership in a company on controlpremium was found in South Korea and the negative impact of the government shareabove 75% in Russia;5)the influence of the difference in dividends attributed to controller andminority shareholders as a corporate governance aspect was firstly found in Russianstock market.
We have found the negative relationship between spread and specialprovision embedded in the Articles of incorporation of most Russian companiesproviding the dividends for preference stock at least at the level of common stockdividends if the dividends for the former were lower compared to the latter. Theempirical finding of redistribution of dividend benefits from minority preferredshareholders to the controlling owner was first obtained for companies that do nothave the provision in the corporate charter;6)the inclusion of stock class in the market index was first accounted forin econometric modelling of control premium determinants. It was shown that theinclusion of common shares in the main market index has the positive impact on thespread in Germany market.Conferences.1)PhDSeminar«FinancialMarketsandCorporateStrategies:Comparative Studies» of Finance Department, XVIII April international scientificconference on the problems of development of the economy and society (Moscow).Report: «The modelling of the shareholders voting rights value using derivatives»;92)30th IBIMA International Conference (Madrid).
Report: «PreferredStocks as an Instrument for Sustainable Development: Valuation Aspects».List of author’s original articles.Articles published in leading peer-reviewed scientific journals recommendedby the Higher Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science ofthe Russian Federation:1)Shabalin, P.G. The modelling of the shareholders voting rights valueusing derivatives // Journal of Corporate Finance Research. – 2017. - №11. – pp. 7889.2)Shabalin, P.G. The estimation methods of the value of corporate votingrights // Financial Business.
– 2016. - №5. – pp. 48-51.3)Shabalin, P.G. The impact of voting rights variation on company marketvalue // Finance and Business. – 2016. - №1. – pp. 103-120.Other articles:1)Shabalin P.G., Kaisin D., Byhovskiy A. The spread between prices ofpreference and common shares in Russian stock market: dynamics and keydeterminants // Stock Market. 2014. № 2. pp. 1-15..