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Thus, the secondhypothesis on the aesthetic dimension of the encounter in “Being andNothingness” is tested: the gaze of the Other-subject is imaginary. The conclusionis drawn that the dimension of the "encounter" inevitably makes this analogy19incomplete.
In paragraphs 1.1.4-1.1.1.6 a similar attempt is made to compare thetheses of “The Imaginary” with the description of the gaze of the Other-subjectfrom “Being and Nothingness” on the basis of three other characteristics whichSartre gives to the image: “quasi-observation” (the other in the gaze, just like in theimage, is given at once and in block, but, unlike the subject of image, the Other inhis gaze is not determined by our knowledge of her/him), “néantisation” (the gaze,just like the image, allows to pose negativity, but unlike the subject of image, theOther in his gaze exists and is present here and now) and “spontaneity”(imagination is the testimony of absolute freedom of the conscience, whereas theencounter with the Other in the gaze is its limitation).
Thus, according to ouranalysis, a specific visibility of the gaze of the Other-subject from “Being andNothingness” cannot be described in the terms of the “perception/imagination”opposition coined by Sartre in the period of “The Imaginary”. This impossibility isdirectly linked by us with the illegitimacy of the very problem that the topic of thegaze of the Other-subject is supposed to address in the “Being and Nothingness” –the problem related to the distinction between the Other-subject and the Otherobject. Section 1.2 is devoted to the analysis of this problem.Section 1.2 shows the discrepancy between Sartre's description of the Othersubject encountered in the gaze from “Being and Nothingness” and his mostradical theses from “The Transcendence of the Ego” forming the basis of hisoriginal philosophy of the conscience and early criticism of the concept of the“subject”.
Paragraph 1.2.1 dwells on the distinction between the Other-subjectand the Other-object from “Being and Nothingness” in its relation to the sharpopposition between the conscience and the object brought forward by Sartre in“The Transcendence of the Ego”. The conclusion is drawn that in “Being andNothingness”, the Other-subject becomes a sort of intermediate reality between theextremities of the conscience and the object. Though such “intermediate reality”seems, according to our analysis, pertinent in the context of description of theencounter of the conscience with the Other-subject, it nevertheless does not fit wellinto Sartre's sharply dualistic ontology based on an invincible opposition of for-20itself and in-itself.
Paragraph 1.2.2 contains a similar discussion of the distinctionbetween the I-subject and the Me-object in the light of the theses of “TheTranscendence of the Ego”. It is possible, as we show, to detect, in the descriptionof the encounter between the conscience with Sartre's gaze of the Other, theelements of what will later be called “subjectivization” (already in its twoparadigmatical aspects – those of submission and emancipation), which couldexplain this distinction and its appearance in the fragment on the gaze of the Otheror, at least, make it also pertinent.
However, apparently, such a theoretical solutionwould demand taking the perspective of becoming, not less problematic within theframework of dualism of the “Being and Nothingness”. In the conclusion to thissection, we assert that the concepts of the “Other-subject” and “I-subject” are aspertinent to the description of the encounter of the Other, as they are illegitimatefrom the point of view of the general ontologic sketch of the “Being andNothingness”.The overall conclusion drawn from chapter 1 is that Sartre's ambiguouspresentation of the encounter with the Other-subject from “Being andNothingness” makes it possible to see in it also a unique description of the specificvisibility of the Other-subject, different from the visibility of the object;nevertheless, such specific visibility and such specific subject appear to be nontheorized by Sartre.
An assumption is made that the visibility of the subject can’tbe but non-theorized within the framework of dualism which Sartre's ontologybasically is. On the ground of the analysis of this chapter we formulate the doubleconstraint of the topic of our study: to theorize the heterogeneity of the visible(irreducible to the “positive”, perceived visible) and to sophisticate the relationbetween the aspects of passivity and activity in the notion of the subject.
Thus, weexplain the inadequacy of the description of the gaze of the Other-subject from“Being and Nothingness” to the key oppositions of two of his basic earlier textswith the demand of radical reorganization of the whole space of the conceivableclaimed by our topic.In the second chapter, we analyze an attempt of Maurice Merleau-Ponty to21design such theoretical field. In the introduction to chapter 2, the relevance ofMerleau-Ponty's endeavor to our study is associated both with his specific interestin the visible, including the visible of the seer, and with a more general accordanceof his later philosophical project with the challenges of the topic of our study.According to our analysis of Sartre's fragment on the gaze, the key theoreticalchallenge of the topic of visibility of the subject is that it demands theabandonment of the dualistic style of thinking (to make conceivable the commonbetween the subject and the visible, traditionally associated with the object’s wayof being) but can’t do it by simply rejecting the subject/object distinction (so as notto lose the specificity of the subject's visibility in comparison with any othervisibility).
Building on the existing secondary literature, we argue that beginningwith the mid-1950ies, Merleau-Ponty has precisely settled down to a course ofovercoming of Sartre's dualism without losing its constituting tension. However,the question is whether Merleau-Ponty has actually achieved this aim. It is to theanswer to this question that chapter 2 is devoted to, its structure closely followingthat of chapter 1: the first section analyses Merleau-Ponty's answer to the Sartre's“perceptions/imagination” opposition in connection with the visibility of the Othersubject; the second section is devoted to a later answer given by Merleau- Ponty toSartre's second opposition – the opposition between conscience and the object inconnection with the incomplete reversibility of the visible and the seer.In section 2.1., based on the material of the lecture courses read by MerleauPonty in 1950ies in Sorbonne and in Collège de France, we study the developmentof his own theory of relations between the perceived and the imagined in hiscontroversy with Sartre.
Particular attention is paid to the role of the specificvisibility of the Other-subject this answer’s elaboration. The importance of thisanswer for Merleau-Ponty's later ontology of “The Visible and the Invisible” isshown.In paragraph 2.1.1. the first stage of this process is considered – the courseread in Sorbonne in 1949-1952 and referred to as “Child Psychology andPedagogy”. In one of the lectures of this course, Merleau-Ponty states the necessity22to revise the contemporary theories of imagination in order to better understand ofits role in the life of the child. In this lecture, Merleau-Ponty reproduces in ageneral way Sartre's theses of “The Imaginary” and proposes the first version oftheir criticism.
As we show, this criticism extends to the problems far beyond theframework of a narrow topic of the role of imagination in the life of the child andtouches primarily upon questions of relations with the Other. We try to show thatin this first and yet rather approximate version of criticism, the specific visibility ofthe Other subject plays a key role. According to the Merleau-Ponty of this course,this specificity consists in calling into question the sharp opposition betweenperception and imagination (in case of the Other, we just can’t tell for sure whethera certain quality, response, emotion etc.
was really perceived or only imagined byus, as here any verification appears impossible). We analyze in detail the variousmotives critical to Sartre intertwined in this argument and strengthening it.Nevertheless, eventually, as we try to show, Merleau-Ponty’s first attempt toovercome the Sartre's “perception/imagination” opposition remains controversialand does not go far beyond Sartre's very approach to imagination: insisting on acrosspoint between imagination and perception in case of visibility of the Othersubject, Merleau-Ponty still build upon Sartre's distinction of them - if notpolarizes it in a more radical manner.In paragraph 2.1.2., we pass on to the second course by Merleau-Ponty, readin College de France in 1954-1955, and devoted to the topic of passivity “TheProblem of Passivity: Sleep, the Unconscious, Memory”).
It shows a moreelaborate stage of the development of his own theory of relations betweenimagination and perception. In the first part of the course, in which thephenomenon of sleep is analyzed, Merleau-Ponty puts forward five separatearguments against Sartre's “perception/magination” opposition. However, as we tryto show, the most effective among them, though still not devoid of contradictions,is the argument of perception/imagination of the Other-subject, in many respectscontinuing the argument from the Sorbonne course: even when we’re awake, theOthers seem to us even as a kind of dreams or myths, and this fact is enough to call23into question the “split” between the real and the imagined.Not limiting ourselves to the analysis of this direct criticism of Sartre'sopposition between perception and imagination, continuing the analysis ofMerleau-Ponty's College de France course of 1954-1955, we also consider itssecond part, devoted to the unconscious.
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