Summary (1136981), страница 5
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First, aswas shown in the theoretical chapter, what matters is whether an attorney is amember of any professional associations (in addition to mandatory membership inthe regional bar association). In Russia, there are only a few associations of lawyerson a federal level involving not so many attorneys (relative to the total number ofprofessional), however membership in these associations can give certainpreferences (D. Duvanova illustrated using the example of business associations thatorganizations with mandatory membership are unable to replace voluntaryassociations). Findings from the survey evidence the limited member base ofvoluntary associations – only 16.5% of the sample are members of any given activityof attorney’s association.
The second important aspect is an attorney's participationin professional events, such as seminars, conferences, networking, etc. Thesequestions served as the basis for building a variable for regression analysis purposes,namely: the attendance of events more than once a year (50.8% of the sample).Third, the attorney's contacts with their former fellow students may also proveimportant as many of them can work in other parts of the legal profession, includingin court and law enforcement agencies (such contacts are maintained by 80% ofrespondents). Finally, respondents were asked whether or not they had experiencein working as heads of regional bar associations and/or of organizations of attorneys(21.1% had such experience).
This kind of experience can be interpreted as bothsocial and human capital, but one way or another it strengthens the attorney's tieswith the community.The third important group of variables which are included in all regressionmodels encompasses factors describing the attorney's focus on various ethicalvalues: "reputation focus," "personal gain focus," as well as a "negative image of theprofession." These factors were based on 10 attitude questions inviting attorneys toassess the level of their consent to different sayings, such as willingness to workwith a colleague who violated ethical values or consent to defend a mafia for a large19amount of money.
These sayings were based on similar studies conducted in othercountries and were piloted within the survey among law students and a pilot surveyamong attorneys. The consistency of findings from factor analysis and the tiesbetween factors and key variables in the pilot and main survey evidence that themethodology is reliable.Other variables which may affect activity of attorneys are work experienceand the type of legal education. Work experience is of paramount importance sincemany attorneys came to the profession from law enforcement agencies and are in aposition to use their experience to build effective interaction with the prosecution(not only and not so much corrupt). The size of the city in which an attorney worksis important for understanding the social embeddedness of their work. Smallersettlements do not have so many attorneys and law enforcement officers, whichenables them to establish closer informal ties.
Moreover, the size of a settlementaffects the market size, too: it is easier to find solvent clients in the capital of a region.The type of activity of legal organization may be of importance as itcharacterizes the organizational setting. Collegiums of attorneys employ manylawyers and represent the easiest way to start a career. A bureau can bring togetherseveral attorneys, who are typically experienced lawyers with good reputation (andtheir office, which is often named using the last names of major partners, has its ownbrand).
Legal office consists of one attorney, who is thus less connected to theprofessional community but is expected to have a stable client base. Finally, legaladvice center implies community outreach in areas with shortages of other activityof attorneys educations. This is the least prestigious form of activity, relativelymarginal though (employing 4.4% of attorneys from our sample).All regression models further include control variables describing the sociodemographic characteristics of attorneys (gender, work seniority, education) and thetype of sample.Main findingsAn important theoretical and methodological issue solved in this research wasto find a reliable indicator to measure the independence level of an attorney.
The20percentage of cases in which the attorney's clients consent to "special order" hasbeen selected as the most suitable indicator. Plea bargaining per se is not a sign ofdependence as it can be explained by different circumstances of a specific case.However, a high percentage of such cases (more than 50%) can evidence that theattorney works hand in hand with the prosecution. In "special order" cases thedefendant makes a full confession in exchange for commutation (not more than 2/3of the maximum term of sentence).
Yet research by the Institute for the Rule of Lawshows that in normal order courts rarely impose the maximum sentence since thedefendant's benefit from the bargaining is psychological in nature. On the contrary,the law enforcement officers' benefit from "special order" is obvious as they do nothave to investigate the case, thus saving their time, and may forget about fear ofappeal against or cancellation of the verdict delivered by a higher instance. Theattorney's role in the process after plea bargaining by their client gets minimized.Further evidence of an attorney's dependence in the event of high percentage of"special order" cases is that they more rarely achieve a favorable outcome for thedefendant (e.g., suspended sentence or termination of the case on exonerativegrounds).Although it is commonly believed in foreign literature that the likelihood ofplea bargaining is associated with the defendant's characteristics and not with theattorney's characteristics, analysis shows that at least the second part of the theory iswrong.
An alternative suggestion implies that an attorney's social, economic, andhuman capital (measured as specified above) affects the level of his/herindependence from law enforcement officers, thus, in turn, allowing the attorney tooppose them more often, including by not recommending that clients consent to pleabargaining.
The above conclusion is confirmed by the regression model where thepercentage of clients consenting to "special procedure" is a dependent variable.The second question of interest to us in this research is about the factors whichincrease an attorney's specialization in work on the appointment of the court. Thistype of works leads to an attorney's strong institutional dependence on lawenforcement officers, which, first, are in a position to allocate such cases and,21second, have to record an attorney's working hours based on which theyare remunerated. In theory, participation in work on the appointment of the courtshould be evenly distributed among all attorneys, yet in reality cases like these areappointed in a very uneven manner: 41.2% of attorneys from our sample do notconduct them at all, whereas some attorneys do almost nothing but work on theappointment of the court (though representing minority, they make up the largestshare of all such cases in Russia).
Regression analysis shows that work on theappointment of the court in Russia are done by attorneys with lower levels of socialcapital and low demand in the market. Attorneys with few civil cases, no loyalclients, and low workload (i.e. with no market demand for their services) are farmore dependent on court-appointed cases. Analysis shows that such attorneys areisolated from the rest of the community – they are neither members of anyassociations, nor attend professional events, nor keep in contact with their formerfellow students. Personal contact networks are essential to get clients in the singulargoods market, whereas a lack of these networks makes an attorney dependent on thestate, which de facto becomes their primary employer.The situation with pro bono work is completely different.
Although, on theface of it, this kind of services might appear to be similar to work on the appointmentof the court, in reality it is the opposite in terms of participants and the factors bywhich they are affected. Free legal aid is rendered by attorneys who are members ofprofessional associations, network with their colleagues, and have ethical valuesrelated to reputation focus and not personal gain focus.In order to draw a more accurate picture, analysis has been conducted as towhich attorneys work under an agreement only (in the theoretical model on Fig. 2they are located in the spot which is close to the market). In full conformity with themodel these are professionals whose services are in greatest demand in the market,who have neither strong ties with the professional community nor reputation focus.This circumstance is further evidence of earlier conclusions.Accordingly, we have found that social and economic factors affect theindependence levels of attorneys in a criminal case.
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