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In this context, the attorney's social capital and thelevel of their engagement with the professional community have a crucial role toplay since they allow them to find clients. Therefore, the independence of theattorney can be affected by the assessment tool on which their clients rely and theextent of an attorney's engagement with the professional community.In general, the consequences of the theory of singular goods market are veryclose to the concept of embeddedness of the professional services market.Assessment tools include networks and any sources of trust in the market that fullycoincide with the concept of embeddedness. What makes a drastic difference is whocontrols the selection process.
Embeddedness entails a natural process of attorneyselection in reliance upon social ties and cultural norms, whereas in the singulargoods market there is competition between different sources of knowledge aboutwhich commodity is the best. Embeddedness does not bring into question thecomparability of services and the measurability of uncertainty, which are denied bythe theory of singular goods. Although choosing between two theories necessitatesfurther analysis (which is not the aim of this study), in the subsequent analysispreference was given to the theory of singularity based on the empirical studies about14the attorney-client relationships discussed earlier. However, both concepts suggestthat independent activity of attorneys is directly related to social factors.A combination of the theories of professional control and the professionalservices market makes it possible to clarify the concept of independent activity ofattorneys (see Fig.
1 below).Fig. 1. Forms of control for activity of attorneysMarketMIndependentlawyerPProfessionSStateBeing an independent attorney implies keeping a distance from all of the threekey points: the state, the market, and a professional corporation. Simultaneously,they constitute the sources of activity of attorneys control and create assessmenttools on which the consumers of legal services rely. A switch towards any point ofthe triangle causes an attorney to lose their autonomy.
It is crucial for us in this studyto assess the attorney's ability to stay independent from the state as the strongestactor affecting professional defenders in Russia. Russia's legal community is notstrong enough to have a decisive impact on the attorney, and market influence islimited by the singularity of public goods and modest solvency of individuals.However, this model makes it possible to formulate the following hypothesis: inorder to maintain independence from the state the attorney has to maintain ties withthe other two points (the professional community and the market).The last key concept discussed in the theoretical chapter is the issue ofcollective action.
The legal services market and various forms of control which15govern this market create a stable order which, however, is hardly remunerative forall community members. In the case of Russia, a strong law enforcement systemcreates a threat to independence of the attorney community. International experienceshows that possible solutions to this issue include mobilization of professionals.Lawyers are not only able to change their own status in the society, but also oftenfind themselves to be the agents of larger-scale social changes, like it happened, forexample, in Pakistan and Tunisia. Law firms which often form broader coalitionswith the representatives of the civil society have a key role to play in this process.Going beyond a particular criminal case to discuss the issue of the attorney'sindependence in a broader sense, the model needs to be amended by adding the civilsociety (these three parties were first offered by L. Karpik).
This leaves us with themodel (see Fig. 2) which gives due regard to the independence level of the lawcorporation in general (blue spot) and individual attorneys in particular (greenspots).Fig. 2. Interactions of attorneys and the attorney profession with the state,market, and civil society.MARKETProfession oflawyersOn the appointmentCIVIL SOCIETYSTATEThis model makes it possible to give due consideration to three types ofattorney work discussed in this research, namely: work under an agreement (for afee), work on the appointment of the court and pro bono legal services. Furthermore,this model illustrates clearly that an individual attorney's independence level(optimal spots are highlighted in green) is associated not only with their personal16disposition in the juridical field, but also with the independence level of the entireattorney corporation (blue spot).
If a law corporation shifts from the market and civilsociety to the state, an individual attorney finds it harder to stay independent.Accordingly, individual attorneys' demand for the functioning of a strongprofessional organization will evidence the willingness to strengthen theirprofessional independence.The theoretical model (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2) allows the hypotheses of this researchto be formulated.First, the attorney's social, human, and economic capital allows the attorneyto maintain independence, which may manifest itself in their clients' frequentwaivers of plea bargain ("special order”).
In other words, the attorney's ties with theprofessional corporation and the market, in a way, counterbalance the influence ofthe law enforcement system.Second, work on the appointment of the court in Russia are presumably doneby attorneys with lower levels of social capital and low demand in the market. Thisdirectly follows from the theoretical model where work on the appointment of thecourt is distant from the market (which does not regulate it to any extent) and closeto the state.Third, pro bono work attracts attorneys with high levels of social capital anda community focus.
Since this kind of work is not encouraged in Russia by the state,it will primarily involve those who have close contacts with the professionalcommunity, which is the key distributor of this public good due to its singularity.Fourth, following the theory of mobilization of lawyers, we assume thatdemand for a strong professional association will be boosted by "exogenous shocks,"namely: encountered breaches of the defendants' rights by unscrupulous lawenforcement officers. Finally, due to contentious relationships between the legalprofession and the law enforcement system, we suggest that it is the managers ofactivity of organizations of attorneys that will most commonly face violations of thedefendants' rights and, consequently, demonstrate higher demand for collectiveaction.17Data gathering and analysis methodologyMaterials for this research are represented by findings from Russia'snationwide survey among attorneys arranged by the Institute for Industrialand Market Studies of HSE and the Institute for the Rule of Law at the EuropeanUniversity at Saint-Petersburg with support from the Russian Federal Chamber ofLawyers (RFCL).
Given the heterogeneous attorney community and the limitedorganizational capabilities of regional bar associations, the survey was conductedusing three sampling approaches: a random sample of organization of attorneys inMoscow and the Leningrad Region; whole sample in 8 regions with strong barassociations (with 20% to 25% of questionnaires returned); at least 40 attorneys weresurveyed in 25 more regions reflecting the country's regional peculiarities.A total of 3,317 attorneys from 35 regions of Russia were surveyed,accounting for 4.5% of all lawyers with a valid status as attorney. Survey wasconducted using an anonymous questionnaire, which was distributed amongattorneys for self-completion and collected through regional bar associations.
Thisis a representative sample in respect of the attorneys who stay in contact with theregional association. Judging from socio-demographic determinants and personaldata, the difference between whole and random sample is not more than 2%.The survey was preceded by a pilot study (survey among 372 attorneys in 9regions), which solved various methodological issues and tried and tested theresearch design. 6 semi-structured interviews with attorneys were further conductedbefore this research.
Moreover, findings were supplemented with information frompublic consultations with members of the legal community in respect of the projectduring a variety of workshops, as well as media publications about high-profilecriminal cases in contemporary Russia.The economic factors of activity of attorneys in research are assessed throughtwo key questions: work mostly with regular clients (yes/no) and estimatedworkload. Whether or not an attorney conducts any civil cases (apart from criminalones) is also indicative of demand for their services. Attorneys with specialization18on civil cases (more than 60% of cases) can be less dependent on the state as theirclient base does not really depend on criminal cases and earns stable income.An attorney's social capital is measured through four key questions.
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