Диссертация (1136841), страница 19
Текст из файла (страница 19)
(2013), Rossijskoe gosudarstvo i obščestvo v period liberal’nyh reform [Russian Stateand Society in the Period of Liberal Reforms], Moscow. (In Russian.)MARTIN Nirian (2015), “Diagnostics in a Simple Correspondence Analysis Model: An ApproachBased on Cook’s Distance for Log-Linear Models”, Journal of Multivariate Analysis, vol. 136, pp.175–89.MCCOMBS Maxwell E. & SHAW Donald (1972), “The Agenda-setting Function of Mass-Media”,Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 36, no.
2, pp. 176–187.MCFARLANE Thomas & HAY Iain (2003), “The battle for Seattle: protest and popular geopoliticsin The Australian newspaper”, Political Geography, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 211–232.MERTON Robert King (1968), Social Theory and Social Structure, New York; London:The Free Press.NIM Evgeniya (2010), “O sociologah, televeduščih, rycarjah i čučelah: dekonstruktsijamediadiskursa sotsial’nyh problem” [About sociology, television presenters, knights and stuffed: thedeconstruction of media discourse of social problems], Journal of Social Policy Studies, no.
1, pp.13–32. (In Russian.)OLDS Christopher (2013), “Assessing presidential agenda-setting capacity: dynamic comparisons ofpresidential, mass media, and public attention to economic issues”, Congress & the Presidency, vol. 40,pp. 255–284.PICARD Robert G. (2005) ‘‘Money, Media, and the Public Interest,’’ in G. Overholser & K. H.Jamieson (eds.), The Press, Oxford: Oxford University Press.VOL. 47 / N°4 – DÉCEMBRE 201669Russia’s Accession to the WTOSHEPOTYLO Oleksandr & TARR David G. (2013), “Impact of WTO accession on the bound andapplied tariff rates of Russia”, Eastern European Economics, vol.
51, no. 5, pp. 5–45.SHOEMAKER Pamela J. & REESE Stephen D. (2011), Mediating the Message: Theories ofInfluence on Mass Media Content, Routledge.SPECTOR Malcolm & KITSUSE John I. (1987), Constructing Social Problems, New York: Aldinede Gruyter.SWINNEN Johan F. M. & FRANCKEN Nathalie (2006), “Summits, Riots and Media Attention:The Political Economy of Information on Trade and Globalisation”, The World Economy, vol.
29,no. 5, pp. 637–654.TIDMARCH Charles M., HYMAN Lisa J. & SORKIN Jill E. (1984), “Press Issue Agendas in the1982 Congressional and Gubernatorial Election Campaigns”, Journal of Politics, vol. 46, no. 4,pp. 1226–42.VARTANOVA Elena (2000), “Media v postsovetskoj Rossii: ih struktura i vlijanie” [Media inPostSoviet Russia: their structure and influence], Pro et Contra, no. 4, pp.
61–81. (In Russian.)WALKER Jack L. (1977), “Setting the agenda in the U.S. Senate: A theory of problem selection”,British Journal of Political Science, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 423–445.WEGREN Stephen K. (2012), “The Impact of WTO Accession on Russia’s Agriculture”, PostSoviet Affairs, vol.
28, no. 3, pp. 296–318.WOLFE Michelle, JONES Bryan D. & BAUMGARTNER Frank R. (2013) “A Failure toCommunicate: Agenda Setting in Media and Policy Studies”, Political Communication, vol. 30, no.2, pp. 175–192.YASAVEEV I. (2006a), “Konstruirovanie ‘ne-problem’: strategii deproblematizacii situatsij”[Construction of a “non-problem”: Strategies deproblematizing situations], Journal of Sociologyand Social Anthropology, no. 1. (In Russian.)YASAVEEV I. (2006b), “Konstruirovanie ‘povestki dnya’: sotsial’nye problemy rossiyskogoobshchestva v novostyakh federal’nyh telekanalov” [Construction “agenda”: social problems ofRussian society in the news the federal TV channels], Scientific notes of the Kazan State University,Humanitarian sciences.
(In Russian.)ZVEREVA Vera (2009), “Rossijskoe TV: teorija i praktika” [Russian TV: Theory and Practice],Art of Cinema, no. 1. (In Russian.)VOL. 47 / N°4 – DÉCEMBRE 201670Framing Sanctions inthe Russian Media:The Rally Effect andPutin’s EnduringPopularityAnastasia KazunHigher School of EconomicsAbstract: This article analyzes a paradoxical situation:sanctions have real negative effects on the Russianeconomy, but are not recognized by the population as aproblem.
The article analyzes the key strategies used todeproblematize the economic sanctions (and the Russianfood embargo) that were used in four Russiannewspapers from March 2014 to December 2014.Drawing on agenda-setting theory, we assume that theuse of deproblematization strategies in the mediadiscussion on economic sanctions proves to people thatthe effects of the sanctions are not severe. The secondsection discusses another puzzle: against the backgroundof a large-scale economic and political crisis in Russia,Vladimir Putin’s support is increasing.
We explain thisoutcome using the rally-around-the-flag effect. Weargue that Russia’s media discussion can explain whythe rally effect in Russia is substantially more stable thanin other countries.Russia’s annexation of Crimea on March 18, 2014, had a significantimpact on Russia’s relations with the West. Public discussion aboutthe annexation of Crimea was largely ideological. Countries have adoptedAnastasia Kazun is a Research Fellow at the Laboratory for Studies inEconomic Sociology at the National Research University Higher School ofEconomics (HSE), a Ph.D. candidate at the HSE Faculty of Social71Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media72Sciences, and a Lecturer at the HSE Department of Economic Sociology.20, Myasnitskaya St., Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation. Email:adkazun@hse.ru.327various positions on the issue and defended them in various ways,including through the media.
It is possible to accuse the Russian34 and theWestern media35 of promoting a politically desirable public opinion on thisissue. Western countries have supported Ukraine in the conflict anddescribed Russia as the aggressor. Thus, the declared purpose of theeconomic sanctions Western countries imposed on Russia is the return ofCrimea to Ukraine and the revision of Russian foreign policy.A number of governments imposed sanctions on Russian individualsand businesses immediately after the annexation of Crimea. Initially, thesanctions had the largest impact on the country’s image and involved onlya travel ban on the officials named in the sanctions list to the countries thatintroduced these measures. Later, the sanctions were extended, andadditional countries supported them.
In addition, the West began to imposeeconomic constraints on Russia. Thus, in July 2014, a new package ofsanctions targeted certain Russian raw materials and defense companies,and in September, restrictions limited loans to Russian companies andindividuals. One reason for the expansion of economic sanctions was theconflict in Eastern Ukraine.International sanctions against Russian individuals, businesses andofficials became an iconic topic in 2014 for the Russian media.
Thepossible consequences of the sanctions were actively discussed. In 2014,the central and regional press published 92,155 articles on this issue,according to an analysis of the Integrum database. 36 The sanctions alsoattracted substantial public attention. According to surveys by the LevadaCenter, the issue was repeatedly named as the most memorable event ofthe month prior to the survey (21-28% of respondents).3734Marlene Laruelle. 2016. “The Three Colors of Novorossiya, or the Russian NationalistMythmaking of the Ukrainian Crisis.” Post-Soviet Affairs 32 (1): 55–74; Yuri Teper. 2016.“Official Russian Identity Discourse in Light of the Annexation of Crimea: National orImperial?” Post-Soviet Affairs 32 (4): 378-396.35Oliver Boyd-Barrett. 2015.
“Ukraine, Mainstream Media and Conflict Propaganda.”Journalism Studies, October, p. 1–19.36In comparison, 54,964 articles were published on the Olympic Games, whereas Crimea wasmentioned in 97,678 articles (according to the Integrum database of print media).37For example, see the research of the Levada Center “Sanctions: evaluations andexpectations”. URL: http://www.levada.ru/28-08-2014/sanktsii-otsenki-i-ozhidaniya.72Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media73After the sanctions were implemented, Russia faced seriouseconomic problems, including a decline in foreign trade and GDP percapita. The sanctions contributed to other economic problems in Russia,including the drop in the price of oil, ruble devaluation, inflation, andbudget deficits.38 However, unexpectedly, the economic sanctions were notrecognized by the population as a problem.
Opinion polls revealed that alarge proportion of Russians did not perceive negative effects from thesanctions for the country as a whole (62 percent) and for themselvespersonally (92 percent). 39 Additionally, the Russian food embargo waspositively evaluated.We assume that these perceptions are due to the purposefulconstruction of the image of the economic sanctions in the media. Althoughthe public has observed the price increases connected with the sanctions,40it believes that the sanctions and, in particular, the food embargo willbenefit domestic manufacturers and therefore the country as a whole.41 Ofcourse, the fate of domestic producers is routinely discussed in the mediaand represents a topic that is approved and supported by the public.
![](https://s.studizba.com/z.php?f=/templates/si/i/noavatar.png&w=100&h=100&t=1"){kind=avatar}
