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Intensity of the debate on economic sanctions, the euro and dollarexchange rates and the price of oil (March 2014 - March 2015)79Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media80Note: The graph shows the number of articles about the issues in theRussian press (according to the Integrum database).However, by the end of the year, the intensity of the debate on theeconomic sanctions began to decrease amid increasing interest in the rubleexchange rate and oil prices. Because media “throughput” is limited,67 to acertain extent, more pressing economic issues replaced this topic in thenewspapers. However, in several cases, different economic problems didnot compete among themselves for attention.
Instead, they formed“bunches” that attracted increasing attention to each of the bunch’scomponents.68 In this regard, it is logical to analyze not only the articles oneconomic sanctions but also the articles on topics related to them.Initially, the discussion about the economic sanctions was stronglyconnected with Crimea’s annexation into Russia. In March 2014 (directlyafter the Crimean status referendum on March 16, 2014), more than 50percent of the articles on the sanctions contained references to thepeninsula. Thus, the main focus of the discussion shifted in the directionof the question “why?” At this stage of the public debate, news articlesoften emphasized a connection between Crimea’s accession to Russia (asthe cause) and the sanctions against Russia (as the consequence).67Stephen Hilgartner and Charles L.
Bosk. 1988. “The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: APublic Arenas Model.” American Journal of Sociology 94 (1): 53–78.68Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts. 2013. Policingthe Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order. London: Palgrave Macmillan.80Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media81Table 1. Number of articles on sanctions that contained references toCrimea, oil prices and the ruble exchange ratePercentage of articles on sanctions that containedreferences to:CrimeaOil pricesRuble exchangerateMarch 201451.712.011.4April 201437.810.69.5May 201426.112.19.5June 201422.210.29.0July 201422.86.39.0August 201418.28.08.4September 2014 15.712.910.2October 201411.216.214.1November 2014 12.123.423.6December 2014 18.323.625.3January 201516.324.422.7February 201512.819.719.2March 201517.819.817.7Note: Calculated for the Russian press using the Integrum database.However, subsequently, the percentage of articles on the sanctionsthat also referred to the accession of Crimea began to decrease and byNovember 2014 did not exceed 12 percent.
Simultaneously, the number ofarticles that referred to the ruble exchange-rate fluctuations and changes inoil prices increased. Thus, the discussion began to focus more on theimplications of the sanctions, and media attention on the reasons forimposing the measures decreased. The discourse of “why?” was replacedby the discourse of “what now?” The sanctions had become a familiar81Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media82situation, and the public was no longer interested in the reasons for them.Questions regarding the consequences of the deterioration of relations withWestern countries and ways to adapt to the new conditions became morerelevant for Russians than information about reasons for sanctionsimplementation.As is well known, the effectiveness of economic sanctions is low. Infew cases have sanctions resulted in changes in the sanctioned country’spolicies.69 It is logical to assume that one reason for this effect is the shiftin the public debate from an analysis of the causes of the sanctions to adiscussion on how to adapt to the sanctions.
As researchers note, mediafreedom decreases in a country on which economic sanctions have beenimposed.70 Therefore, in this case, we can expect the public debate to beinfluenced by external actors who seek to create a certain image of theproblems.71Deproblematization StrategiesEven if the losses caused by economic sanctions are assessed assignificant, 7273 unsympathetic counter-rhetoric 74 prevails in the publicdiscourse (Table 2). That is, generally, the media stress that the situation isnot a problem. Thus, immediately after the implementation of the firstsanctions package, the anti-patterning strategy gained popularity.
Thisstrategy drew attention to the fact that the measures had not significantlydamaged the Russian economy or its financial markets. Thus, the economicsanctions appeared to the newspaper reader as a series of separate negativeepisodes primarily related to officials and legal entities.Generally, the popularity of this strategy during the initial period ofthe sanctions can be explained by the details of the issue’s development. In69Robert A. Pape 1997. “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work.” International Security 22(2): 90–136.70Dursun Peksen.
2010. “Coercive Diplomacy and Press Freedom: An Empirical Assessmentof the Impact of Economic Sanctions on Media Openness.” International Political ScienceReview 31 (4): 449–469.71Peter Dreier. 1982. “The Position of the Press in the U. S. Power Structure.” SocialProblems 29 (3): 298–310; Olessia Koltsova. 2000.
“Kto i Kak Vliyaet Na ProizvodstvoNovostey v Sovremennoy Rossii [Who and How to Affect the Production of News in ModernRussia].” Pro et Contra 4 (5): 82–108.72For example, “Putin praised the losses from the sanctions of $160 billion.” Forbes, Aprilw7,73. URL: http://www.forbes.ru/news/287237-putin-otsenil-poteri-ot-sanktsii-v-160-mlrd74Peter Ibarra, and John Kitsuse.
2003. “Claims-Making Discourse and VernacularResources.” In Challenges and Choices: Constructionist Perspectives on Social Problems,N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, p. 17–50.82Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media83fact, during the first stage, the sanctions affected the country’s image morethan its economy. Subsequently, the first package of sanctions againstRussian companies (defense and raw materials) was adopted in July 2014.Until that moment, the sanctions only restricted entry to certain countriesfor individual Russian citizens.
Thus, the sanctions did not directlyinfluence the economy. However, an indirect impact of the first sanctionslist on the business climate occurred because of Russia’s decreasingattractiveness as a business partner. However, the media wrote little aboutthe problem in these terms.By the end of 2014, when the anti-patterning strategy began to beless frequently applied, the “telling anecdote” strategy gained popularity.This strategy involves using examples to refute the claim that the economicsanctions are a problem. Generally, these counterexamples can beseparated into two levels: the world level and the Russian regional level.For instance, a significant number of articles in the print media includedreferences to the experience of other countries (primarily China and Iran),which also faced economic sanctions.
In addition, the emphasis was not onthe fact that the country did not suffer significant losses as a result of thesanctions, but on the fact that the measures by Western countries were anincentive for development.Table 2. Matrix of counter-rhetoric strategies used in the media discussionregarding economic sanctions75Sympathetic counter-rhetoric75Unsympathetic counter-rhetoricThe classification of counter-rhetoric strategies is based on the theory of Ibarra and Kitsuse.83Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media84Naturalizing“Of course, sanctions areunpleasant for every countryexcept perhaps the U.S.However, at the same time, insome sectors, they are essentialto us.
In the agricultural sectorfor sure. <...> It is clear that itis easier to accept a rollbackand to import Moroccan applesthan to grow your own.However, we are obliged toprovideourselveswithagricultural products! And inthis regard, the sanctions arenecessary for us to shakeourselves and wake up.” [AiF,December3, 2014]Telling anecdote“Twenty-five years ago, the U.S.imposed sanctions against Chinabecausetheycondemnedthecrackdown in Tiananmen Square.
Thesanctions were very similar to thosethat are now operating against Russia.<...> So what? Now, the economy ofthe West has greatly weakened, butChina is the second-largest economyin the world, and the United States isChina’s debtor. In fact, the sanctionsare a chance for the Russians to makethe country rich and cease to look backat the U.S.” [AiF, November 5, 2014]Tactical criticism“The British foreign secretaryvividly described for thenewspaper Daily Telegraph,whose sanctions will be appliedto Moscow in response to herdesire to restore historicaljustice and to avoid bloodshedin Crimea.” [RossiyskayaGazeta, March 24, 2014]Antipatterning“In 2008 and now, the sanctions ofWashington were more symbolic.What has Russia (the country, ratherthan a number of officials,businessmen and banks) really lost thistime?”[AiF, March 26, 2014]84Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media85Сounter-rhetoric of insincerity“Banks and oil companies form aqueue for government support as ifthey have suffered from thesanctions.”[AiF, November 5, 2014]“A special role in this war (ofsanctions) will be played by the“nationaltraitors”(natsionalpredateli), who under the guise offighting for the purity of Russiancorporate companies will try toundermine the position of the flagshipsofthenationaleconomy.”[Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 4, 2014]Сounter-rhetoric of hysteria“Sanctions against individuals who arenot related to Ukraine but werementioned in the delirious essays ofNemtsov and Navalny (Do youremember these former politicians?)arecompletelyinadequate.”[RossiyskayaGazeta, March 26, 2014]Note: The matrix and the translations are provided by the author.In unison with the optimistic reference to the experience of othercountries, representatives of the Russian regions noted increasingopportunities to develop domestic producers following the restriction ofcompetition that resulted from the Russian food embargo.
Interestingly,several years earlier, free competition connected with Russia’s accessionto the WTO was described in the media as the way to develop the Russianeconomy. 76 However, later, a switch occurred in the public debate, andprotectionism began to be perceived as the best condition for thedevelopment of domestic production rather than free-trade policies.However, the high assessment of the importance of domestic productionremained constant. Import substitution (importozameshenie) became amagical incantation that not only evoked the view that the sanctions were76Svetlana Barsukova and Anastasia Korobkova. 2014. Russia’s Accession to the WTO: TheDebate in the Russian Mass Media / Working papers by NRU Higher School of Economics.Series WP4 “Sotsiologiya rynkov”. Available at: http://www.hse.ru/da-85Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media86a “non-problem” but also the desirability of the current form of relationswith Western countries (particularly the food embargo).Two additional strategies emphasize the reasons to distrust theinterest groups that problematize the issue.
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