Морозкина_резюме_ENG (Двусторонняя официальная помощь развитию влияние мирового финансового кризиса 2008-2009 годов), страница 3

All these factors were supposed to result in thedecrease in the volume of assistance. The absence of strong negativedynamics in the first years following the recession in spite of donors'growing budgetary limitations confirms the conclusion about an increasein donor attention to recipient needs. The share of the least developed countries among ODA recipients grewfrom 34% in 2000-09 to 44% in 2010-16, i.e. more ODA is now providedto nations that need it most, which also supports the idea of higher donorreceptivity of recipient needs. In the aftermath of the recession, the share of ODA grants dropped from86% to 83%, i.e.

less assistance is provided pro bono. The metropolesand business persons groups showed the most dramatic decrease: from90% in 2000-09 to 85% in 2010-16 and from 73% in 2000-09 to 70% in2010-16, respectively. Such change in donor behavior undermines theconclusion about an increase in donor attention to recipient needs. The share of ODA expenses which de facto do not reach the recipient(administrative expenses related to the provision of ODA, student grantsprovided in the donor country, refugee-related expenses in the donorcountry, monies spent on raising awareness about development issues)increased from 8% in 2000-09 to 11% in 2010-17.This change ispredominantly resulting from a spike in refugee-related expenses whichsaw a 4.5-fold increase in 2017 compared against 2009 and accounted for9% of total assistance provided in 2017. The share of assistance designated specifically for development projects(in the social segment, infrastructure, and production development)decreased from 58% in 2009 to 47% in 2016.

Consequently, we observedan increase in the share of humanitarian aid, debt forgiveness and other12areas which do not actually promote recipients' economic and socialdevelopment. The share of multilateral development institutions in ODA distributiondropped from 26% in 2000-09 to 24% in 2010-17, i.e. more assistance isnow provided on bilateral basis.

Bilateral assistance is typically viewedas more politicized and less efficient in terms of its ability to resolveglobal issues and account for recipients' needs. At the same time, therecent turn of events in the provision of funding by major developmentinstitutions (their support of anti-Iranian and anti-Russian sanctions)demonstrated that multilateral assistance was also affected by politicalinterests of participating donors. That is why this trend can be termedcontroversial, for it neither confirms an increase in donor selfishness nordisproves it.4.Proposed post-recession (2010-16) ODA distribution model shows anincrease in the role of factors which reflect donor priorities (Table 2). Thus, thedifferences of the post-recession assistance distribution model are as follows:altruists started to provide more assistance to recipients with lowerGDP per capita;business persons started to provide more assistance to their tradingpartners and less assistance to recipients with low GDP per capita;politicians which provide assistance to neighboring counties started topay more attention to recipients located closer to them;metropoles started to provide more assistance to their former coloniesand less assistance to recipients with low GDP per capita;politicians which provide assistance to their allies focused onassisting their arms purchasers and provided less assistance to recipientswith low GDP per capita.All donor countries do not pay attention to recipient countries’capacitytomobilizeotherfinancing13fordevelopment,althoughrecommendations of international organizations highlight importance ofallocating aid to countries with the least capacity to mobilize privateinvestment.The weight of components pointing to donor interest in this equation doesnot signify that these countries distribute assistance based exclusively on thiscriterion or their own interests.

It just demonstrates the existence and importance ofdistinctive interests for each group of donors. For example, high importance of thetrade index for the business persons group does not mean that all assistance isdistributed exclusively to donors' trading partners.14Table 2 – Results of Hausman-Taylor model of bilateral ODA allocation by five donor groups, before and after crisis.Assistance to neighborsAltruistsBusiness personsMetropolesAssistance to alliesVariablesGDP per capitaof recipientTradeDistanceColonyArms salesPopulationNet capitalinflowsDonor GDPDemocracyOther donors’ODAHaiti 2010ConstantN of observations2000-2009-1.55***(-7.7)0.08**(2.2)-3.90**(-2.0)-2010-2016-2.96***(-9.1)0.06(1.6)1.37**(2.5)-2000-2009-1.23***(-4.3)1.77***(4.0)-2.38**(-2.5)-2010-20160.44(1.3)2.01***(4.2)-0.25**(-0.3)--0.01(-0.1)1.33***(14.0)-0.08**(-2.5)0.09(0.8)0.43***(2.8)0.40***(10.1)--0.08(-0.7)1.00***(7.0)-0.05(-1.1)1.92***(5.4)0.14(0.6)0.43***(8.0)3.51***(3.6)13.1(1.1)7 9690.07(0.8)0.75***(3.8)0.05(1.3)0.703***(5.0)0.49**(2.5)0.46***(10.0)-0.08(0.7)0.77***(5.0)-0.03(-0.5)1.26***(3.4)0.161(0.7)0.21***(3.7)4.43***(4.3)-31.7***(-2.8)3 205-5.2(-0.9)10 774-44.8***(-5.2)4 0632000-2009-0.01(-0.1)0.079**(2.5)-8.56***(-2.7)1.93***(5.7)0.04(0.4)0.90***(10.3)0.08**(2.4)1.61***(15.4)-0.37*(-2.2)0.27***(6.2)-19.7***(-4.9)11 9032010-2016-0.52**(-2.3)0.21***(5.5)-11.40***(-3.5)1.84***(5.5)-0.002(-0.0)0.57***(6.6)-0.08(-1.6)2.47***(8.9)-0.23(-1.1)0.21***(4.0)5.25***(5.4)-40.5***(-5.2)8 8622000-2009-1.01***(-3.1)0.06(1.1)1.18(1.1)4.65***(6.1)0.01(0.1)1.17***(5.6)0.09**(2.2)0.36**(2.0)0.33(1.5)0.49***(9.1)-24.7**(-2.4)5 5722010-2016-0.39(-1.3)-0.07(-1.1)-1.38**(-2.2)5.93***(4.7)0.01(0.1)1.35***(10.5)-0.09(-1.5)2.43***(4.5)0.05(0.2)0.29***(4.5)1.526(1.2)-45.2***(-2.8)4 0952000-2009-0.66***(-2.8)0.24**(2.2)-0.57***(-4.9)-2010-20160.190(0.2)0.158(1.0)-0.37***(-2.9)-1.57***(13.4)0.82***(2.8)0.14*(1.8)1.60***(5.7)0.81**(2.0)0.30***(3.0)-2.37***(18.1)1.47***(2.8)-0.07(-0.6)1.30*(1.8)0.51(0.8)0.87***(6.9)8.43***(3.7)5.7(0.2)2 134-34.0**(-2.2)3 270t-statistics in parenthesis ***/**/* - significance on 1%/5%/10% level.

All regressions control for fixed year effects usingdummies for each year for 2001-2009 and 2011-2016.15In order to get a whole picture, the author assesses regressional dependenceof ODA volumes for three recipient groups based on their income level (Table 3)in accordance with 2016 World Bank classification (since the study processes datacollected up to 2016).As we have already shown, all regressions in donor groups exhibit negativedependency between recipient's GDP per capita and the volume of providedassistance.

Still, regression outcomes for recipient groups show that assistance isnot distributed in accordance with recipient needs in the most vulnerable countries,i.e. countries with the lowest income. Within a group, all other things being equalassistance is sent to countries with higher GDP per capita regardless of their accessto other sources of funding. This being said, countries with the lowest incomedepend on ODA more than others; they need it in order to survive, for countries inthis group have the highest share of population living below the absolute povertyline, lowest life expectancy, and the highest child and maternal mortality rates.And due to high market risks these are the countries which lack the ability to funddevelopment projects from other sources.Table 3 - Results of Hausman-Taylor model of bilateral ODA allocation bythree recipient groups, before and after crisis.VariablesGDP per capitaof recipientTradeDistanceColonyArms salesPopulationNet capitalinflowsLow incomecountries2000-2009 201020160.36***(3.9)0.03(0.9)1.26*(1.7)6.12***(4.6)0.36**(2.1)1.35***(7.1)0.07**(2.2)0.87***(3.6)0.10***(2.7)-1.91**(-2.4)5.24***(3.4)0.253(1.6)0.78***(3.7)0.17***(4.4)Lower middleincome countries2000201020092016-1.05***(-3.1)-0.01(-0.4)-1.33**(-2.1)4.67***(4.7)0.24***(2.9)0.46***(2.9)0.003(0.1)Upper middle incomecountries20002010200920160.03-0.62** -0.60**(0.1)(-2.5)(-2.2)0.13*** 0.12*** 0.30***(3.7)(4.0)(9.0)-2.42*** -0.80*** -1.60***(-8.0)(-3.4)(-7.5)6.12*** 7.03** 5.60***(2.7)(2.2)(5.2)0.85*** 0.15** 0.12***(12.0)(2.2)(2.8)0.69*** 0.64*** 0.92***(8.5)(3.7)(11.9)0.060.08*** 0.10**(1.3)(2.8)(2.0)VariablesLow incomecountries2000-2009 20102016Donor GDPLower middleincome countries20002010200920161.63***(13.3)0.10(0.5)0.24***(3.5)-DemocracyOther donors’ODAHaiti 2010ConstantN of observationsUpper middle incomecountries20002010200920161.90*** 1.26*** 2.12*** 0.63***(6.2)(10.4)(10.5)(5.5)0.85*** 0.34**0.120.50***(3.9)(2.3)(0.8)(2.8)0.50*** 0.69*** 0.35*** 0.22***(4.4)(15.6)(5.9)(7.1)3.98***(7.8)-52.5*** -34.3*** -18.9*** -22.8***-8.8(-7.2)(-3.3)(-3.2)(-3.6)(-1.6)9 2977 53313 63911 50214 972t-statistics in parenthesis***/**/* - significance on 1%/5%/10% level1.48***(7.0)-0.22(-1.1)0.20***(5.7)-15.4**(-2.2)13 117All regressions control for fixed year effects using dummies for each year for2001-2009 and 2011-2016.5.Based on the proposed model for the distribution of developmentassistance and on the analysis of changes in the post-recession ODA system, theauthor provides priority recommendations on the reformation of the internationaldevelopment assistance system that would raise the efficiency of assistancedistribution for development purposes.

First, it is necessary to stimulate boundingof ODA to recipient needs and development goals. Second, we need to excludedonors' student- and refugee-related expenses from aggregate assistance becausethese segments nominally increase assistance volume without promoting recipients'development.Third,itisnecessarytostimulateimplementationofrecommendations of international organizations, especially in coordination ofrecipient’s capacity to attract other financing sources for development and ODAallocation.List of author’s original articles:Articles published in journals recommended by the Higher AttestationCommission:171.Balter E., Morozkina A. Bilateral Aid Allocation for Internationaldevelopment: Impact of Financial Crisis.// Moscow University Economic Bulletin,2018 № 4, pp. 100-1212.Morozkina A., Sabelnikova E.

Education Systems and Multilateraldevelopment Banks: International Practices and Perspectives// InternationalOrganisations Research Journal, 2017 Vol.12 №1, pp. 24-423.Morozkina A. The New Development Bank in Global Finance andEconomic Architecture.// International Organisations Research Journal, 2015Vol.10 №2, pp. 89-1054.Kulpina V., Morozkina A., Pavlyushina V., Shuvaeva D. Russia-BRICSCooperation on Social Issues.// International Organisations Research Journal, 2015Vol.10 №4, pp. 49-71Other publications:5.Morozkina A. The New Development Bank in the global financial andeconomic architecture. In Kirton J., Larionova M. (Eds.) BRICS and globalgovernance. London: Routledge. 2018, pp.

91-105.6.Morozkina A. BRICS in Development Assistance System. In «SecuringSustainable Development: Financial Initiatives of BRICS countries: proceedings ofworkshop», RISS, 24 October 2017 Moscow: RISS. 2018, pp. 148-158.7.Flores R., Oliveira I., Carneiro F., Mutanga S., Simelane T., Makarov I.A.,Morozkina A., Wood C., Mothiane M. Drivers of Regional Integration: ValueChains, Investment and New Forms of Co-operation. Johannesburg : EconomicPolicy Forum (EPF) and South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA),2015.8.Leonid Grigoryev, Alexandra Morozkina «Infrastructure Investment inBRICS Countries» in «VII BRICS Academic Forum» (Ed.: G. Toloraya), 2015.ISBN 978-5-394-02691-118.