Морозкина_резюме_ENG (Двусторонняя официальная помощь развитию влияние мирового финансового кризиса 2008-2009 годов), страница 2

For all countries, the correlationbetween ODA and these indices is either close to nil or negative and, consequently,it was eliminated from the final list of indices under consideration. Thus, we canconclude that over 2000-16 not a single donor engaged in systematic distribution6of assistance based on recipients’ institutional progress in the observance of humanrights or the development of democracy. This inference is particularly interestingas it applies to the U.S.A., where the provision of assistance is officiallyproclaimed as being contingent upon the establishment of a democratic society.Inclusion of new donors, such as China and Iceland; and processing ofindicators which were not analyzed for some countries (distance for Austria andKorea, arms transfer for China and OAE) allowed to update and elaborate resultsof previous researches.At the second stage of the study, analytical conclusions pertaining to therecession's effect on the ODA system are complemented with the results of crosscountry econometric analysis.

The author performs regression analysis of paneldata on 33 donors and 142 recipients (total number of inquiries – 35,615) between2000 and 2016 splitting the period of observation into two subperiods: 2000-09and 2010-16. The analysis shows that after the recession variables whichcharacterize donor interest became more relevant for the majority of donors, whilethe role of recipient needs declined, especially among the most vulnerable groupsof recipients. Since donors are sorted into groups, the author can analyze postrecession changes for each separate group of donors and manage to showdifferences in assistance distribution models before and after the recession for eachgroup.AuthortestedOLS,fixed-effectandrandom-effectregression.Wald, Breusch–Pagan and Hausman tests showed the preferability of the panelregression model with fixed effect.

However, this model does not allow forestimation of coefficients of time-invariant variables. Two such variables - colonialpast and distance - are of critical importance to the model. For such cases there is amethod suggested by J.Hausman and W.Taylor. Comparison of Hausman-Taylormodel and fixed-effect model showed the preferability of the Hausman-Taylormodel for all donor groups and periods.Author estimates the following regression:7ln( ) = 1 ∗ ln(−1 ) + 2 ∗ ln(−1 ) +3 ∗ + 4 ∗ ln( ) + 5 ∗ ln(−1 ) +6 ∗ ln(−1 ) + 7 ∗ ln(ℎ ) + 8 ∗ ln( ) +9 ∗ −1 +10 ∗ ln(−1 ) + 11 ∗ 2010 +2∑= ∗ + ε + , [1]1 where – volumes of ODA of recipient country j, allocated by donor ito recipient j in a year t; −1 - GDP per capita of recipient j in ayear (t -1); −1 – trade volume between donor i and recipient j in a year t1; – dummy variable, taking a value of 1 for recipient j, which is aformer colony of donor i; – distance between capital of donor i andrecipient j; −1 – arms sales of donor i to recipient j in a year t1; −1 – net private inflows of recipient j in a year t-1; ℎ –volume of ODA, received by recipient j from all donors, except donor i in a year t; – population of recipient j in a year t; −1 – level of democracyin recipient country j in previous year (t -1); −1 – GDP of donorcountry i in previous year (t -1); 2010 – dummy variable, taking a value of 1for Haiti in 2010; – dummy variable, fixed effect for each year from 2001 to2016; ε – random element; – random effect, individual for each donorrecipient pair.Main findings.

Main findings submitted for dissertation defense:1.Distribution of development assistance by donors in most cases doesnot reflect real recipients' needs or officially stated goals for providing suchassistance. Analysis of donor strategies shows no difference in officially statedgoals for providing assistance. In providing assistance, donors typically seek toeliminate extreme poverty, facilitate sustainable growth, support the developmentof democratic institutions, and establish the rule of law.

All these goalspredominantly reflect recipients' needs, but studies on actual ODA distribution8demonstrate that the provision of assistance as a means to increase recipients'living standards is not a priority for most donors. The truth of the matter is thatdonors' political, economic, and strategic interests play a key role in deciding onthe provision of assistance and prevail over such motives as the promotion ofeconomic growth, development support, and reduction of inequality in recipientcountries.2.This dissertation classifies donors into five groups based on criteriathat affect the distribution of development assistance based on previous researches(including McKinlay, Little, 1977, Alesina, Dollar, 2000, Hoeffler, Outram, 2011).Results were actualized and elaborated using correlation and regression analysis(Table 1).The first group of donors is the benchmark group because its membersprioritize the promotion of international development and recipients' needs.Researchers typically refer to these donors as altruists because they comply withrecommendations issued by international organizations and are less explicitlydriven by national interests when distributing assistance (Gates, Hoeffler, 2004).The second group of donors provisionally referred to as the businesspersons provides assistance based on established economic ties, including tradingand investment relations.

Business persons include such major donors as Germanyand Japan. The importance role of trade and economic ties in their ODAdistribution was pointed out in earlier research. The group also includes newdonors – Latvia and Poland. For both countries, earlier studies noted theimportance of distance, i.e. the factor which reflects the propensity to provideassistance to neighboring nations. The difference in results pertains to the changein the structure of assistance as compared to the period before the 2008-09recession when prior studies were performed (for example, Szent-Ivanyi, 2010used data for 2001-2008).The third, fourth and fifth groups tend to provide assistance based on itsown political interests. In previous works (Hoeffler, Outram, 2011) they werecombined in one group by political motive, although researches used different9indicators to capture the effect (number of years of colonial dependence, distance,arms sales).

Given the diversity of the group, the author splits this donor group intothree subgroups: (1) donors which provide assistance to their former colonies; (2)donors which provide assistance to neighboring nations; (3) donors which provideassistance to their military allies.Table 1. Country groups by the motive of ODA allocationGroupCountryAverageshare ofODA inGNP, 2016Sum of groupODA, bln. USD,2016« Altruists »Denmark,Ireland,Iceland*, Italy, Canada,Luxembourg*,0.626.4Netherlands,Norway,Finland,Sweden,Switzerland.«BusinessGermany,Latvia*,0.311.1persons»Poland*, Slovenia, Japan.«Politicians»:Australia,Austria*,assistanceto Greece, Israel*, Korea,neighboringKuwait, New Zealand,0.321.3nationsThailand, Turkey, CzechRepublic, Estonia«Politicians»:Belgium, UK, Spain,assistance to their Portugal, France0.434.5former colonies«Politicians»:China*, OAE*, USAassistanceto0.738.7military alliesIncl.

USA0.1834.4Source: composed by author on the base of correlation analysis of OECDdataNote: countries market by * are those for which new results were achieved:this factor was not analyzed or allocation of ODA was not analyzed.3.Prior scholarly models for ODA distribution (Fuchs, Dreher, 2014,Banks, 2015, Berneo, 2017) do not fully account for changes in the ODA system10after the global recession of 2008-09.

The financial crisis of 2008-09 brought onchanges in the economies of both donors and recipients.Donors' ability to provide ODA was hampered by: (1) decline in economicactivity which lowered the tax base and, consequently, state revenue; and (2)increase in expenditure caused by countercyclical budget and tax expansion. Thesetwo processes resulted in the deterioration of fiscal budgets and a dramatic increasein the deficits of consolidated budgets, as well as an increase in the amount of debtin the first years following the recession.

Thus, programs not related to supportingthe economy faced limitations in state funding.Post-recession changes exhibited by recipients involved increased demandfor development assistance caused by: (1) 12.2% decline in global trade volume(the sharpest decline since World War II); (2) 4% decrease in the volume of moneytransfers into developing countries in 2009 (the largest decrease sine 1970); and (3)high volatility of food prices, which had the strongest effect on the poorestcountries where food expenditure exceeds 50% of total household expenses; theFood Price Index issued by the Food and Agriculture Organization increased by25% in 2008 and 22% in 2011.Moreover, donors faced more budget restrictions, and recipients exhibited anincrease in ODA demand, which caused changes in the system promotinginternational development.

Some of these shifts confirm prior findings whichrecorded an increase in donor attention to recipients' needs while other recordedchanges go against these conclusions. The author delineates and analyzes thefollowing trends: 2008-09 recession had an overall effect on bilateral developmentassistance for all countries which saw a drop in aggregate assistance in2011 and 2012 by 1% and 5% respectively compared against 2010 data.Assistance volumes still exceeded pre-recession numbers due to a 1.6%increase in 2009 and 7% increase in 2010 compared against 2008. Duringprevious crises of 1973, 1980, 1991, and 1998, ODA provided byaffected countries on average dropped by 10% compared against the pre11crisis period and typically took four years to rebound to pre-crisis level.A similar trend was expected to occur with the 2008-09 recession due tothe deterioration of fiscal budgets, increase in the deficits of consolidatedbudgets, and donor debts.