Диссертация (Конструирование дискуссии по экономическим вопросам в печатных СМИ (на примере вступления России в ВТО и введения экономических санкций)), страница 24

For instance, according to GallupOlessia Koltsova. 2000. “Kto I Kak Vliyaet Na Proizvodstvo Novostey v SovremennoyRossii [Who and How to Affect the Production of News in Modern Russia].” Pro et Contra4 (5): 82–108.78http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/.79Vladimir Mau. 2016. “Between Crises and Sanctions: Economic Policy of the RussianFederation.” Post-Soviet Affairs 32 (4): 350–377.80Timothy Frye, Scott Gehlbach, Kyle L.

Marquardt, and Ora John Reuter. Forthcoming. “IsPutin’s Popularity Real?” Post-Soviet Affairs.7789Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media90opinion polls, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush’sapproval rating increased 35 percent in one week.81 The attack on PearlHarbor resulted in a 12 percent increase in Franklin Roosevelt’spopularity.82 The Falklands War played an important role in the re-electionof Margaret Thatcher,83 and the Gulf War increased George H. W. Bush’sapproval rating from 58 to 89 percent for two months.84 This effect has alsobeen observed for other heads of states.

The phenomenon of increasingsupport for national leaders against the background of external threats andcrises has been termed the rally-around-the-flag effect.85 The effect occurswhen an event displays certain characteristics: citizens unite around thenational leader after sudden events of an international scale that arerelevant to the country as a whole. The personalized “other” is equallyimportant. That is, the damage caused by natural disasters or industrialaccidents does not contribute to the popularity of the authorities. On thecontrary, such incidents are often perceived as the indicators of weakness.We propose the hypothesis that should be tested in the followingstudies: the economic sanctions and the Russian food embargo, whichoccurred after the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, became the basisfor a large-scale rally-around-the-flag effect in Russia and the increase inPutin’s approval rating.

Moreover, we assume that the strategies of themedia can make this effect more stable and last longer. Below we showwhy this assumption is plausible.Many researchers have noted the substantial influence of the mediain triggering the rally-around-the-flag effect. 86 The knowledge ofindividuals regarding consolidating events is mediated by discussion in themedia because only a small part of the population is directly involved insuch events. Thus, it is difficult to deny the impact of massMatthew A. Baum. 2002. “The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-FlagPhenomenon.” International Studies Quarterly 2: 263–298.82Baum, The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon, 263–298.83Chris Ogden.

1990. Maggie: An Intimate Portrait of a Woman in Power. New York: Simon& Schuster.84Barbara Norrander, and Clyde Wilcox. 1993. “Rallying around the Flag and PartisanChange: The Case of the Persian Gulf War.” Political Research Quarterly 46 (4) 759–770.85John E. Mueller. 1970. “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson.” The AmericanPolitical Science Review 64 (1): 18–34.86Samuel Kernell. 1978. “Explaining Presidential Popularity: How Ad Hoc Theorizing,Misplaced Emphasis, and Insufficient Care in Measuring One’s Variables Refuted CommonSense and Led Conventional Wisdom Down the Path of Anomalies.” American PoliticalScience Review 72 (2): 506–522; Lian Bradley, and John R.

Oneal. 1993. “Presidents, the Useof Military Force, and Public Opinion.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 (2): 277–300; BrianNewman and Andrew Forcehimes. 2010. “‘Rally Round the Flag’ Events for PresidentialApproval Research.” Electoral Studies 29 (1): 144–154.8190Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media91communications on the rally-around-the-flag effect. After all, individualsperceive not the problem itself but its media image.

87 In addition, inexplaining the impact of the media on the rally effect, researchers note that,during crises, events occur suddenly and quickly replace one another.58Under such difficult circumstances, the authorities have a monopoly oninformation, whereas opposition leaders who suffer from a deficit ofreliable information prefer to refrain from commenting.59 Therefore,criticism of government action is virtually absent from public discussion.It is logical that the media audience believes that its government’s actionsare correct and that the national leader will contribute to overcoming thecrisis.An interesting example of media influence on the appearance of therally-around-the-flag effect is the case of the Gulf War.

The mediacoverage of the events in the Middle East was not completely objective.Thus, directly prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the number of supportersand opponents of U.S. policy regarding the war was similar.60 However,television news outlets ignored the opposition to the president’sadministration, which did not approve military aggression. Supporters ofthis position received less than 1 percent of screen time.61 Thus, publicopinion regarding the Gulf War significantly changed directly after thestart of the Desert Storm military operation. The number of Americans whosupported such actions increased by more than 16 percent, and the numberof opponents of military action in the Middle East fell by 26 percent.62Subsequently, this gap continued to increase.63Such dramatic changes in public opinion can be explained by a rallyaround-the-flag effect that partly involves the specifics of the mediacoverage of an event.

However, we can assume that the unequalrepresentation of different positions in the media not only influences thepublic to perceive a president’s decision as correct but also encouragesdissenters to conceal their opinions. Thus, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumannnoted that due to the fear of being isolated individuals are less likely tovoice their opinions if they assume that they are in the minority.64 Thistheory was subsequentlyFraming as We Know It … and the Future of Media Effects.” Mass Communication andSociety 19 (1) 7–23.58Richard Brody.

1991. Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and PublicSupport. Stanford: Stanford University Press.59Brody, Assessing the President.87Michael A. Cacciatore, Dietram A. Scheufele, and Shanto Iyengar. 2016. “The End of91Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media92John E. Mueller. 1993. “American Public Opinion and the Gulf War: Some Polling Issues.”Public Opinion Quarterly 57 (1): 80–91.61Gene Ruffini.

1992. “Press Failed to Challenge the Rush to War. The Media and the GulfWar” in Hedrick Smith (eds.), The Media and the Gulf War. Washington, DC: Seven LocksPress, 282-292.62John E. Mueller 1993. “American Public Opinion and the Gulf War: Some Polling Issues.”Public Opinion Quarterly 57 (1): 80–91.63Barbara Allen, Paula O’Loughlin, Amy Jasperson, and John L.

Sullivan. 1994. “The Mediaand the Gulf War: Framing, Priming, and the Spiral of Silence.” Polity 27 (2): 255–284.64Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. 1984. The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion, Our Social Skin.Chicago: University of Chicago Press.60developed, and the idea of the spiral of silence was transformed into atheory of preference falsification,88 according to which a person’s privateand public opinion are not the same things.

That is, individuals falsify theopinions that they believe to differ from majority views because they fearthe disapproval of society or state sanctions. Therefore, the media debateaffects the perception of an issue and the estimation of a situation and canencourage individuals who disagree with the policy of the authorities tofalsify their preferences. One should not underestimate the role of themedia in constructing the rally-around-the-flag effect. Therefore, theassumption, that Putin’s popularity is connected with media discussionabout the external threats has some validity.Moreover, previous studies have demonstrated that economicsanctions may contribute to the consolidation of the public around thenational leader.

A recent example is the case of the UN sanctions againstEritrea.89 In 2009, an arms embargo was imposed on Eritrea, the country’sbank assets were frozen, and a ban on the entry of Eritrean leaders intoUnited Nations countries entered into force. Under these circumstances,representatives of the government and the opposition attempted to exploitthe sanctions for their own purposes.

For the authorities, such measureshave become a way to create a rally-around-the-flag effect and attractresources (including taxes) to reduce the negative effects of sanctions. Thisstrategy has been successfully implemented and enabled the governmentnot only to maintain but also to strengthen its position.Researchers note that sanctions imposed on a country with anundemocratic regime often do not achieve their original objectives.90 InTimur Kuran. 1995. “The Inevitability of Future Revolutionary Surprises.” AmericanJournal of Sociology 100 (6): 1528–1551.89Nicole Hirt.

2015. “The Eritrean Diaspora and Its Impact on Regime Stability: Responsesto UN Sanctions.” African Affairs 114 (454): 115–135.90Julia Grauvogel and Christian von Soest. 2014. “Claims to Legitimacy Count: WhySanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes.” European Journal ofPolitical Research 53 (4): 635–653.8892Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media93certain cases, they result in an increase in support for the national leader.However, this outcome is only possible under certain conditions.91 First, itis important that public approval of a government be high prior to thesanctions. The choice of the rhetorical strategies that will be used to justifythe circumstances is also significant.

In addition, the sanction should notbe applied by the key partners of the country or should only apply to certainaspects of the economic relations between countries. Under theseconditions, economic sanctions cause the rally effect and increase the levelof support for the government.Obviously, these conditions are fulfilled in modern Russia. Forexample, the economic sanctions and the Russian-imposed food embargocounter-sanctions only apply to certain groups of goods and services, andPutin’s popularity before the annexation of Crimea exceeded 60 percent.Thus, the level of support for the president was high at the time that thesanctions were implemented. Accordingly, it is appropriate to speak of arally-around-the-flag effect in this context.The rally effect works in Russia for reasons that go beyond theCrimean annexation and sanctions implementation.