Диссертация (Конструирование дискуссии по экономическим вопросам в печатных СМИ (на примере вступления России в ВТО и введения экономических санкций)), страница 23

Thus, the counter-rhetoric ofinsincerity stresses that the groups that emphasize the negative impact ofthe sanctions on Russia are not concerned about the public good but aboutpromoting their own interests. In this case, business representatives can beaccused of trying to lobby on behalf of their industries to obtain preferentialtreatment (e.g., state subsidies, loans) under the pretext of the lossesincurred as a result of the sanctions.

Thus, these entrepreneurs onlypretended to suffer from complications in relations with Western countries.The representatives of other groups can also be accused of insincerity.Thus, politicians can use discussion about economic sanctions to attractpopular support. Even members of the expert community, who shouldprovide objective comments, may use the sanctions to pursue personalgoals, for example, self-promotion.45 Occasionally, this practice caninfluence the argumentation.However, this strategy does not necessarily enable one to identifyinterest groups with transparent motives. For example, the mediamentioned a group whose purpose according to an article in RossiyskayaGazeta was to “undermine the position of the flagships of the national(Russian) economy” (Table 2).

In the public discussion, this group waslabeled as “national traitors.” Based on the articles in the press, the group’sgoals are not clear. It appears that the group’s representatives seek only todestroy the existing order. We can assume that reality is not so simple.Most likely, the label “national traitors” hides political opponents of thegovernment, who (like the government) may attempt to use the crisis toobtain public support.46 Labels are used for their emotional impact on theaudience and to persuade readers that the alternative viewpoint isdestructive and dangerous.Another counter-rhetoric strategy (counter-rhetoric of hysteria)ta/2014/08/17/1314526842/WP4_2014_01_fff.pdf.45Olessia Koltsova.

2000. “Kto i Kak Vliyaet Na Proizvodstvo Novostey vSovremennoy Rossii [Who and How to Affect the Production of News in Modern Russia].”Pro et Contra 4 (5): 82–108.46Nicole Hirt. 2015. “The Eritrean Diaspora and Its Impact on Regime Stability:Responses to UN Sanctions.” African Affairs 114 (454): 115–135.closely resembles the previous strategy and involves accusing those whoproblematize economic sanctions with excessive emotionality. Thus, incertain cases, statements regarding the negative consequences of theeconomic sanctions are presented as unfounded panic reactions.

Opponents86Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media87are presented as incompetent and their actions depicted as emotional andillogical.Sympathetic counter-rhetoric, in which a situation is recognized asproblematic, is substantially less popular. These strategies emphasize thatattempts to solve the problem will result in more serious negativeconsequences.

Thus, at the initial stage of the debate on the sanctions, itwas mentioned that the alternative to the accession of Crimea, whichresulted in the sanctions, was a significant number of victims among thepeninsula’s Russian-speaking population. These views can be attributed tothe strategy of tactical criticism, in which the solutions proposed forproblems seem to be more dangerous than the problems themselves. Forexample, in this case, a set of alternatives was formulated in terms of theeconomic sanctions vs.

a potential military conflict in Crimea. Thus, thereader understood that the case required choosing between the greater andlesser evil. Accordingly, the current situation represents the bestalternative. When the president made his decision regarding the annexationof Crimea, he was forced to act as he did because of external threats.

Thus,Putin’s decisive action helped avoid significant losses. Naturally, thediscussion on the necessity of Crimea’s annexation ended as the focus ofthe debate subsequently shifted from an analysis of the causes of thesituation to an analysis its implications.In November and December 2014, the strategy of naturalizinggained a degree of popularity. In this strategy, the negative effects of thesanctions on the Russian economy are natural, because, for a long perioddomestic production, did not develop and the level of corruption was high.Thus, the deterioration of relations with Western countries was a blow forRussia but one that was bound to occur because the economy was indecline before the sanctions were implemented.

Therefore, according tothis strategy, it is now necessary to adapt to the new conditions, and thesanctions could be an incentive for development and an indicator ofinternal economic problems.After consideration of the main strategies used in the press todeproblematize the economic sanctions, we can explain the prevalence inthe discussion of unsympathetic counter-rhetoric by noting that in terms ofpropaganda this group of strategies was more effective. The public wasinsufficiently aware of the actual and potential consequences of theeconomic sanctions. Thus, it was possible to attempt to convince the publicthat negative effects of the sanctions were virtually absent.

In contrast,sympathetic counter-rhetoric is useful in those cases in which aproblematic situation is obvious to the audience. In such circumstances, itis easier to convince the reader that the alternatives are less favorable than87Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media88trying to make the reader believe that the difficulties that he or she sensesdo not exist.Which Media Were Most Important to the Deproblematization ofEconomic Sanctions?Media owned by the government play the most important role in thedeproblematization of economic sanctions. These media supportgovernment decisions and provide information regarding the actions of thegovernment and the president in the desired manner. Of course, thegovernment can also influence the media that it does not own.

However,the potential impact on public debate in its own media is much larger. Thisstudy demonstrates that counter-rhetoric strategies were most often used inRossiyskaya Gazeta, which is the official newspaper of the Russiangovernment. Articles in Argumenty i Fakty also frequently containedstrategies to deproblematize economic sanctions because this newspaperbelongs to the Moscow city administration.

Many Russian media areaffiliated with the government. This situation creates the possibility ofmaintaining the desired image of the government and of affecting publicopinion. However, despite the limited freedom of the Russian media, theimages of the economic sanctions that were created in the mass media werevaried and not always positive.Thus, the business paper Kommersant published primarily neutralarticles on the economic sanctions that presented a variety of views on theimplications of the measures. Most of the articles that useddeproblematization strategies were published in the paper during the firstmonths after the sanctions were implemented (spring-summer 2014).Subsequently, the articles were generally neutral.

Novaya Gazeta did notparticipate in deproblematizing the deterioration of Russian relations withWestern countries. On the contrary, most of the articles in the newspaperemphasized the significant losses to the economy and Russia’s reputationthat would result from the economic sanctions and food embargo.This distribution of roles among newspapers is not surprising. It isrelated to their editorial policies. Thus, considering that the governmentwas most interested in deproblematizing the sanctions, it is logical thatcounter-rhetoric strategies prevailed in the newspapers which are aplatform for statements by this interest group and to a certain extent loyalto the government. Novaya Gazeta can be grouped among the oppositionalmedia outlets, which explains why this newspaper covered the difficultiesconnected with the sanctions.

The ideological neutrality of Kommersantmay be related to the characteristics of its readership. In part, the paper isoriented toward businesspeople, who to a certain extent are aware of the88Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media89consequences of the sanctions. Accordingly, Kommersant tried to maintainthe discussion at the expert level and based primarily on rational argumentswhile avoiding emotional assessments and statements.DiscussionTo what extent is the deproblematization of sanctions in the Russian mediaimportant for domestic policy? In this section we examine the possibleeffects of media discussion on political stability.

Influencing publicopinion is definitely the purpose of the heads of pro-government media77in Russia and to some extent they succeed. We assume that thecharacteristics of media discussion about economic sanctions may partlyexplain the paradox of Putin’s rising popularity during the conflict withWestern countries and the economic crisis.Vladimir Putin is the most popular political figure in modern Russiahistory. According to opinion polls, Putin’s approval rating increased from61-65 percent in late 2013 to 80 percent in March 2014 and reaching 89percent in the summer of 2015. 78 In addition, these dramatic increasesoccurred during episodes of strife, e.g., the conflict in Ukraine, thedeterioration of relations with the Western countries after the annexationof Crimea, the imposition of economic sanctions and the Russian foodembargo.

In fact, Russia is politically isolated and faces serious economicproblems (e.g., the devaluation of the ruble, falling oil prices).79 Obviously,the situation in the country does not appear favorable with respect to thegrowth of the national leader’s popularity. However, the latest researchindicates that President Putin’s approval rating is real and that the possibleoverstatement of his approval rating does not exceed a small number ofpercentage points.80 Thus, public approval of government actions began toincrease after the large-scale protests of the winter of 2011-2012, despite adifficult economic and political period when there was little to celebrate.Is the national leader’s popularity growth in such circumstancesabsurd and unprecedented? In reality, no. History provides examples ofmore remarkable increases in the popularity of national leaders against thebackdrop of crisis than that of Putin.