The.Economist.2007-02-10 (966424), страница 7
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Lastweek, for the first time, a newspaper editorial even argued the case for suspending nuclear work, as theUN has demanded. Mr Ahmadinejad's wings have been clipped a little. But there is no sign yet that Iran'sleaders will reconsider their nuclear ambitions.The ticking atom bombLast summer Mr Negroponte reckoned that Iran could become a nuclear power sometime between 2010and the middle of the next decade. A recent study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS) in London reckoned that it would take two to three years “at the earliest” for Iran to go nuclear.Once Iran has learned how to enrich uranium to make nuclear fuel, itwill quickly be able to make highly enriched uranium for bombs. So far,it has assembled two experimental “cascades” of 164 interconnectedhigh-speed centrifuges to produce small amounts of the low-enrichedsort.
It may soon announce the first cascades in the underground hallat Natanz, where it seeks to link up 3,000 centrifuges by June. Onceup and running, these could produce enough highly enriched uraniumfor one bomb in less than a year—if left undisturbed.AFPNuclear experts, however, are sceptical about Iran's real progress.Running high-speed centrifuges reliably for a long period of time is adifficult task which Iranian engineers appear not to have mastered.According to the IISS, setting up the 3,000-centrifuge plant would be a“political act”, designed to show defiance and improve Iran'sbargaining position if negotiations are resumed.Israel, which has tried for years to mobilise international action againstIran, suddenly appears more sanguine. Ehud Olmert, the primeminister, this week insisted “there is still time” to apply diplomaticpressure.
Many people, including America's vice-president, DickCheney, have suggested that Israel could take matters into its ownSmall but defianthands and bomb Iran's nuclear facilities as it did Saddam Hussein'sOsirak nuclear reactor in 1981. But the task may defeat even Israel's air force. Iran has buried many ofits nuclear facilities deep underground and has carefully dispersed them, so there is no single target.Senior Israeli security officials argue that, if there is to be military action, it should be carried out by theUnited States.Arguably, the best opportunity for a surgical strike has already passed. The Isfahan conversion plant,which produces uranium hexafluoride (UF6, the uranium compound that is passed as a gas into thecentrifuges to be enriched), is above ground and vulnerable to attack.
It was the first part of the nuclearprogramme to be restarted by Iran in 2004, and has since produced about 250 tonnes of UF6—enoughfor 30-50 atomic bombs. But it is now thought to be stored in underground bunkers, much harder to hit.Another choke-point is the Natanz enrichment facility; but this is buried some 15-18 metres under soiland concrete, and modern bunker-busting bombs might not be able to destroy it. The use of groundforces to secure the area long enough to do the job would be highly risky; the use of a low-yield nuclearweapon, as some suggest, might work physically but is hardly conscionable politically—or morally.In any case, centrifuges can be rebuilt and hidden elsewhere in a large, mountainous country like Iran.
Astudy last August by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a think-tank inWashington, DC, said there were 18 known nuclear sites, many of them underground or close topopulated areas, and perhaps as many as 70 unknown ones. One place alone, the Parchin militarycomplex (where research on nuclear warheads may be being done), has hundreds of bunkers and severaltunnels.Many of the sites are protected, and any operation would have to suppress at least part of Iran's airdefences, and all its missiles and naval power, to limit any retaliation.
The CSIS study concluded thateven a large-scale attack, taking several weeks to complete, could leave much of Iran's technologicalbase intact, and allow the country eventually to reconstitute an underground nuclear programme. Inshort, it would be very difficult to stop a determined Iranian regime from going nuclear, either by militaryaction or by sanctions, if it were willing to pay the cost.The cost of strikingMilitary action could be painful not just for Iran, but for America as well.
The Muslim world would see itas yet another instance of “attacking Islam”. Iran, moreover, has several means of retaliation. It couldfire missiles at American bases or Israel, perhaps tipped with chemical or biological weapons. It couldalso attempt to close off the flow of oil from the Gulf.A less overt response would be to stir up its allies to attackcoalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran could do muchworse than its current meddling in those places.
(Indeed, thoughits political influence in Iraq is undisputed, the scale of itsmilitary involvement in the anti-American insurgency has still notbeen proved for sure.) It could also resort to terrorist tacticsfarther afield, perhaps even assisting al-Qaeda, some of whoseleaders may be under house arrest in Iran.AFPAccording to Mr Negroponte, the ability to carry out terroristattacks is “a key element” of Iran's security strategy. “It believesthis capability helps safeguard the regime by deterring UnitedStates or Israeli attacks, distracting and weakening Israel,enhancing Iran's regional influence through intimidation, andhelping to drive the United States from the region,” he said lastHow much will she suffer for what hermonth. For the moment, everything Iran does is drawinggovernment does?America in closer, and the risks of an Iranian miscalculation aregrowing by the day.
But America is still uncertain which is worse:to let Iran go nuclear, or to try to stop it by force.Copyright © 2007 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.About sponsorshipIsrael and IranHow MAD can they be?Feb 8th 2007 | TEL AVIVFrom The Economist print editionDeterrence and its limitsGet article backgroundEVEN if Iran got the bomb, it would know that Israel had one too, and that knowledge would deter bothcountries from using their weapons, just as the doctrine of “Mutual Assured Destruction” kept Americaand the Soviet Union at peace during the cold war. That is the soothing assumption of those who sayIsrael can live with a nuclear Iran.
Is it correct?In the cold war, the foes were both big countries with big populations. But at 65m Iran's population is tentimes bigger than Israel's, and Iran is 80 times bigger. In 2001 Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,Iran's once and perhaps future president, mused ominously in a Friday sermon that “an atomic bombwould not leave anything in Israel, but the same thing would just produce damage in the Muslim world”.This lack of symmetry may be more apparent than real.
Israel is reckoned to have around 200 nuclearwarheads, more than enough to destroy all Iran's towns and cities. Some strategists argue that tinyIsrael could be disabled by a first strike. But to prevent any Israeli retaliation, an Iranian attack wouldnot only have to overcome Israel's Arrow air-defence missiles and destroy its airfields but also penetratethe silos of its nuclear-tipped Jericho missiles. In recent years, moreover, Israel is rumoured to have putnuclear cruise missiles on board its three Dolphin submarines.In contemplating an attack on Israel, Iran would have also to weigh the (possibly nuclear) reaction of theUnited States. “In the event of any attack on Israel,” George Bush said last May, “the United States willcome to Israel's aid.” If Iran got the bomb, America might formalise this promise—and maybe put anumbrella of “extended deterrence” over other American allies in the region.All in all, this suggests that deterrence can be made to work.
But for Israel it would still be a gamble.During the cold war America and the Soviet Union communicated constantly in order to avoid amiscalculation. Even so, they came close to nuclear war over Cuba. Iran, in contrast, refuses to talk to“the Zionist entity”, and its president yearns noisily for Israel's disappearance. Indeed, his apocalypticthreats have started to erode the previous conviction of most Israeli analysts that, for all its proclaimedreligiosity, Iran is still a rational actor.Copyright © 2007 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group.
All rights reserved.About sponsorshipThe budgetFiscal frustrationsFeb 8th 2007 | WASHINGTON, DCFrom The Economist print editionGeorge Bush's budget has scant chance of becoming law. Too bad, for it contains some goodideas.Getty ImagesFOUR hefty volumes filled with charts and statistics may not sound much like a novel. But judging byWashington's reaction, Mr Bush's 2008 budget, which was presented to Congress on February 5th, ismore a work of fiction than fiscal policy.The White House laid out $2.9 trillion of spending for the fiscal year that begins on October 1st.
Itpromised to eliminate America's budget deficit by 2012 while making Mr Bush's tax cuts permanent andboosting cash for defence and homeland security. Other domestic spending would be squeezed. Mr Busheven proposed some cuts in Medicare, America's huge government health scheme for old people.The plans were widely dismissed as being “dead on arrival”. Unlike parliamentary systems wheregovernment budgets are the blueprint for legislation, America's presidential budgets are never more thanthe opening gambit of a long legislative tussle.
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