The.Economist.2007-02-10 (966424), страница 19

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Mr Aliev will surely win his; the whisper in Baku is thathis wife will take over next. But another whisper is that, in the absence of democracy, Islamism is on therise—encouraged, say some, by Iran to the south.The Islamists, says Ali Kerimli, a disgruntled oppositionist, curry favour with their complaint that “theWest sells democracy for oil.” Others say the threat is fanciful. The call to prayer rings across theboutiques and restaurants of downtown Baku, but there are actually more hijabs on the streets of London,says Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, an imam.

All the same, things may change if too much of the oil money goes intonepotistic contracts and vanity projects, and too little on diversifying the economy and easing the grindingpoverty in which many Azerbaijanis still live.The other big Caucasian danger is war. Russian support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two enclaves thatbroke away from Georgia in the 1990s (see map), is one of Mr Saakashvili's main gripes. Azerbaijan alsolost a secessionist conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, a part of Soviet Azerbaijan mostly populated byArmenians. Mr Aliev periodically makes dark threats about retaking Azerbaijan's lost territory by force,though a flare-up in Georgia currently looks likelier.Mr Saakashvili says Russia's economic embargo “achieved the opposite of what was intended”, and thatGeorgia has found new markets.

Suitably cheered, he this week hosted Mr Aliev and Turkey's RecepTayyip Erdogan, shaking hands on a new railway that will link the Caucasus to Europe—but miss outArmenia. Vartan Oskanian, Armenia's foreign minister, complains that there is an existing railway acrossArmenian-controlled territory that could be used instead. The railway, like the pipelines, symbolises whatthe countries of the Caucasus can achieve together, but also how far apart they remain.Copyright © 2007 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.About sponsorshipGermany's nuclear powerA policy of denialFeb 8th 2007 | BERLINFrom The Economist print editionThe nuclear lobby warms to a changing future in the energy worldGet article backgroundSTEPHAN KOHLER climbs mountains and used to assess the safety of nuclear power plants.

Now he ischief executive of DENA, a government agency to promote energy efficiency. Nothing can persuade himthat nuclear power is an acceptable risk—unlike mountain-climbing, which, he says, puts only his life indanger.Mr Kohler is not alone. Millions of Germans want to end theirexposure to atomic power, hence the agreement back in June 2000by the main political parties and the nuclear industry to shorten thelife of the country's 17 plants and shut them all down by around2020. In November 2005 that timetable was confirmed by the newgovernment's coalition agreement.AFPBut the world has changed. Amid the political games being played byRussia and its neighbours, Germany's oil and gas supplies appearless secure.

And as the current president of the European Union andthe G8, Germany is trying to provide leadership in the new waragainst CO2 emissions. It wants to reduce greenhouse-gas emissionsto 40% below 1990 levels by 2020. Key to the energy plan, besidesmore wind farms and solar panels, and less leaky buildings, is thedevelopment of clean coal-fired power plants. But the technology isin its infancy.

Two pilot plants will not be ready before 2014.One answer: stretch the average life of nuclear plants, which areemission-free, from the agreed 32 years to a scientifically acceptable40 (in America their life is already being stretched to 60 years). Thenthere would be time to develop better clean and renewabletechnology. “The disadvantages are hard to see,” says ManuelThought embargo?Frondel at RWI, a research group. “Even if we shut down all our atomplants we would probably import nuclear power from France or central Europe: that would be pushing theproblem to the west and east. We still haven't found more than interim solutions for storing nuclearwaste, but that quest is not insoluble, and it is not exacerbated by continuing to run plants.”A timely piece of research by Deutsche Bank boldly states that phasing out nuclear power plants “is not aviable policy option.” Instead it recommends stretching their life to 60 years and taxing the windfall profitsto subsidise clean coal plants, which could not otherwise compete with gas-fired alternatives.

So confidentis Deutsche Bank that this government, or the next, will have to revise its nuclear policy, that it assumesthe change in its forecasts for the share prices of RWE and E.ON, Germany's two biggest nuclearoperators.The power companies have started manoeuvring. In December, RWE and EnBW, another German nuclearoperator, each made applications, under the terms of the 2000 agreement, to shift capacity from ayounger nuclear plant to one that is older.

Both argue that this will allow them to operate and phase outtwo side-by-side plants—one old, one newer—in harmony, and it will buy them time to develop alternativetechnologies. “This is not just cosmetic pre-election tactics,” says Utz Claassen, chief executive of EnBW.But Mr Claassen—not known for his political naivety—is aware that 2009 will bring new federal electionsand the end of the coalition agreement. Unless the lives of his and RWE's oldest plants are reprieved by acapacity shift, then that is about the time they will have to be shut down. A Deutsche Bank-styleextension to 60 years would allow the veteran plants to purr on beyond 2030.The nuclear lobby is being very careful, but “there should be no Denkverbot [thought embargo]”, saysBernd Arts of the Atomforum in Berlin.

Chancellor Angela Merkel herself is displaying symptoms ofschizophrenia on the subject: “I stick to the coalition agreement,” she told the Sunday Bild newspaper onFebruary 4th. “But whoever wants to get out of nuclear energy must find some serious answers tomeeting environmental targets.

Renewable energy cannot be a complete answer by 2020.”Copyright © 2007 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.About sponsorshipEurope's car emissionsSetting the targetFeb 8th 2007From The Economist print editionNational lobbies are trying to outrun the CommissionYOU know a row has turned venomous in the European Unionwhen the squabblers resort to national name-calling. The currentfight pits Europe's carmakers, notably from Germany, against theEuropean Commission, which wants to impose sharp reductions onthe amount of carbon dioxide that new cars sold in Europe from2012 may pump out.

The lobbying has been ferocious. When itcomes to cars, national passions run deep.Calling for tweaks to the plan in favour of gas-guzzling cars, theGerman chancellor, Angela Merkel, said her country would “fightwith all its strength” to get its way.

The boss of Porsche talked lastmonth of a “business war” against countries that make mostlysmaller cars, such as France and Italy. Volkswagen told theCommission the cuts were unworkable.And so at the last minute, the proposals, announced on February7th, were watered down: they would now trim the CO2 emissionsof the average new car sold in Europe to 130 grams per km driven, a cut of about a fifth from presentlevels. A further 10g of CO2/km would be saved with more efficient tyres, air-conditioning and so on.On the face of it, the ferocious lobbying is rather odd. Germany pledged that the fight against globalwarming would lie at the heart of its current six-month shift as president of the European Union.The whiff of hypocrisy has not escaped the EU environment commissioner, Stavros Dimas, who this monthdemanded that Germany should live up to its “nice speeches”.

In case anyone missed the point, he let itbe known that he was ditching his official Mercedes in favour of a hybrid car from Japan.That hurts. Europeans are deeply nationalistic about the cars they drive. Nine out of the top ten cars soldin France in 2005 were French. German brands achieved the same score in their own home market. InItaly, Fiat and Lancia grabbed three out of the top five spots. Swedes love their Volvos and Saabs.Horsepower also varies widely from country to country, and that matters.

For all the improvements inengine technology, there remains a link between oomph under the bonnet, fuel consumed and the amountof CO2 you leave trailing behind you. Germans, Swedes and British drivers favour relatively powerfulengines, while the French and Italians make do with markedly less horsepower.Size matters, too. French and Italian drivers may love speed, but they zoom about in relatively small cars.Practicality plays a part, and psychology. If you live in an ancient, congested city, a tiny car is all youneed. You can also park it near your inamorata's flat, which is cool.There is no inherent difficulty in making cars that emit 130gCO2/km.

It is just hard to meet the target ifyou want a big car, or one with blistering acceleration. Italy's top two sellers, the Fiat Punto and Panda,already match or beat the proposed target. Several Peugeot, Citroën and Renault diesels do even better.But these are small cars, or mid-sized runabouts with sluggish acceleration. None of which is much help tofirms with luxury and performance at the centre of their brands. The average new Porsche emits297gCO2/km.The commission proposal must now be considered by national governments and the European Parliament.More fights loom.

Makers of beefy cars, worried that they cannot hit CO2 targets as individual companies,want average emissions calculated across the entire European market. Mrs Merkel wants different targetsfor different weight-classes of car.The carmakers say that they are being made to carry too much of the burden for cutting emissions.Cutting traffic congestion, they argue, can be more cost-effective. They may win some of the comingfights in Brussels. But the European Commission is not alone in looking at CO2 emissions.

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