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Rather he believes in athird term that is consciousness, between body and soul. Here, consciousness is notidentified with brain, because brain as a substance of body may change, the sameway that other substances might change. "Consciousness can be transferred fromone soul to another […] or from one substance to another". What matters is49Steve Matthews. Personal Identity, the Causal Condition, and the Simple View. Journal Philosophical Papers,39:2, 2010, pp.

183-208.50Noonan H.W. The Complex and Simple Views of Personal Identity. The Journal of Analysis, Vol. 71, Issue 1,2011, pp. 72-77.51Gasser G., Stefan M. Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Cambridge University Press. 2012. p. 1-17.52Noonan H.W. Personal Identity. Routledge. 1989. p. 2.53Swinburne R. The Evolution of the Soul. Oxford University Press. 1986. p. 153-154.20continuity of consciousness. If either the soul or substance is changed, the personalidentity can sustain under the conditions that consciousness remains the same54.

Inother words, "as far as consciousness can be extended backwards to any action orthought, so far reaches the identity of that person"55.In fact, Locke presents the issue of diachronic personal identity mainly toaddress the current matter of his day, the matter of resurrection. He seeks to givean account of how after bodily death and decay, an individual can be resurrectedeven in different bodies.56 The matter of continuation of being the same person isassociated with the notion of identity. To realize the meaning of sameness ofperson, we must know what Locke means by the word person.

He defines personas "A thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consideritself as itself"57. Person as a rational being receives sensory information of theenvironment by the mind and then reflects on them. Consciousness is the base ofthese two functions of perception and reflection. It is impossible for anyone toperceive without perceiving that he does perceive.

At the same time, this consciousself is a forensic person who being conscious of the changes reacts to changes 58.From the above definition, John Perry construes, "while the intelligent beingcontinues to exist and to be intelligent, it must be the same person" 59. Lockewrites, "as far as any intelligent Being can repeat the Idea of any past action withthe same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it hasof any present Action; so far it is the same personal Self"60.54Nimbalkar N. John Locke on Personal Identity. Mens Sana Monographs, 9(1), 2011, pp. 268–275.Perry J. Personal Identity.

University of California Press. 2008. 360 p.56Forstorm K.J. John Locke and Personal Identity in the 17th century Philosophy. London: BloomsberryPublication. 2014. p. 4.57Locke J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P.H. Nidditch (ed.). Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1975.

p.335.58Ibid. p. 211.59Perry J. Personal Identity. University of California Press. 2008. p. 113.60Locke J. The works of John Locke, Esq; In three volumes: The sixth edition. To which is added, the life of theauthor; and a collection of several of his pieces published by Mr. Desmaizeaux. London: Gale ECCO, 2010. p.1485521Joseph Butler, with simple view on personal identity, criticized John Lockebelieving that "consciousness presupposes identity and thus cannot constitute it" 61.Butler, in his non-reductionist simple view, objects that Lock's account of identityis circular. According to Butler, it is self-evident that "consciousness of personalidentity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute personal identity".

Butlerbelieved, "present consciousness of past actions, or feelings is not necessary to ourbeing the same person"62. For Butler "a thing is what it is and not another thing’."Holding that persons are simply person continuants, Butler believes in no criteriaof identity through time63. For Butler identity is something that person feelsinwardly.However, Butler's circularity objection fails when we dig into what Lockemeant by consciousness.

By "consciousness" that constitutes personal identity,Locke does not mean consciousness of one's personal identity. Consciousnessimplies consciousness of our past thoughts or actions, and not consciousness ofbeing the same person. In this way, consciousness does not presuppose personalidentity. "X is the same person as Y if and only if X approves of some thought oraction of Y"64.Noonan also writes that Locke would simply answer Butler's objection.Locke's notion of consciousness is a notion of knowledge, but its content is notpersonal identity, and its possessors are not persons, but thinking substances"65.Reid, along with Butler, writes, "To say that my remembrance that I didsuch a thing, or my consciousness, makes me the person who did it, is anabsurdity"66.

He has a simple view, maintaining that identity is beyond thefluctuating properties of self. His perception of person is an indivisible something.61Butler J. Butler's Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature. London:Henry Frowde, 1895.259 p62Butler J. The Whole Works of Joseph Butler.

London: William Tegg and co, 1998. p.264.63Matthews S. Personal Identity, the Causal Condition, and the Simple View, Philosophical Papers, 39:2, 2010,pp.183-208.64Rickless S.C. Locke, Blackwell Great Minds. John Wiley & Sons, 2014. 240 p.65Noonan H.W. Personal Identity. Routledge. 1989. p. 57.66Reid T.

Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Cambridge: Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1969. p.116.22Though the person has different changing constituents, his self to which theybelong, remains permanent. Reid writes, "I am not action, I am not feeling, I amsomething that thinks and acts and suffers"67. Making a division between self andits properties, Reid insists that personal identity is far from its properties.Reid criticizes Locke believing that his theory is internally inconsistent.

Hegives the example of a general who was flogged as a boy at school. The generalnow has memory of his actions as officer but he has forgotten been flogged, so heis not that boy, but the officer. However, there is a transitive relation in personalidentity. If X is the same person as Y, and Y is the same person as Z, then X is thesame person Z. (X=Y, Y=Z, X=Z). In fact, the general of the mentioned examplehas the potential consciousness of his boyhood thoughts and actions, that at theDay of Judgment can be restored by God68.One of the other theories that is usually categorized under non-reductionalisttheories is soul theory. Defenders of it believe that person P2 at t2 is the same asP1 at t1 if and only if it shares the same soul.

For Plato the base of a person is hisimmaterial soul. Descartes, who demonstrated the separation of body and mind,promoted the idea that mind can persist without body. To establish this idea, heuses Leibniz principle of indiscernible; that is, if two objects numerically share thesame properties that are identical69.Since body and soul have different properties, they are different. While bodyis unconscious and changing, soul is conscious and permanent.

Because thechanging material cannot be the source of identity, soul is what identifies us70.The contemporary scholar, Swinburne, also believes in soul theory.According to Swinburne, the persons in addition to physical matter haveimmaterial stuff. The continuity of that material body is provided with immaterial67Gallie R.D. Thomas Reid: Ethics, Aesthetics and the Anatomy of the Self, Volume 78 of Philosophical StudiesSeries. University of Nottingham, Springer. 2013. p.

7168Rickless S.C. Locke, Blackwell Great Minds. John Wiley & Sons, 2014. 240 p.69The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. Identity of indiscernibles. 08.08.2016 [Electronic resource]. — Mode ofaccess: https://www.britannica.com/topic/identity-of-indiscernibles (Access date, Jan 16, 2018.)70Personal Identity & Mind/Body. Descartes to Michaels. [Electronic resource].

— Mode ofaccess:.http://www.cabrillo.edu/~cclose/docs/Personal%20Identity%20and%20Mind%20body.pdf23soul that persists over time71. In Islamic perspective, also soul is regarded as thesufficient condition for the persistence of identity.Psychological Notion of IdentityWhile the notion of personal identity concerns our persistence as the sameperson over time, psychological notion of it aims at finding the processes throughwhich this identity has developed and evolves.A psychologist named E. Erikson theorized the concept of identity.

ForErikson, identity is a "process and outcome of human development across the lifespan".72 The psychoanalytic theory that he proposed comprises eight stages frominfancy to adulthood. The person encounters psychological crisis in each stage.The resolve of these crises or its failure has positive or negative consequences inperson's developing identity. Successful completion of each stage leads to healthyidentity and acquisition of virtues in each stage as prerequisites for the crises offollowing stages.

The failure to complete a stage leads to a reduced ability toovercome next crisis, yet it can be compensated later73.Though a person challenges the crises psychologically, they are distinctlyset by society. The developmental stages of identity "embrace society's influence,stating, "Individual and society are intricately woven, dynamically related incontinual change"74.Sociological Notion of IdentitySociological notion of identity deals with the interaction of society and self,considering the way one identifies herself with same people and through thissameness differentiates herself from the others.71Berger J.A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 83(1), 2018, pp.41-55.72McLean K.C.

Syed M. The Oxford Handbook of Identity Development. Oxford University Press, 2016. p.17.73McLeod S. Erik Erikson. Simply Psychology. updated2018. [Electronic resource]. — Mode of access:https://www.simplypsychology.org/Erik-Erikson.html74Justin S.T. Identity Development Throughout the Lifetime: An Examination of Eriksonian Theory.

GraduateJournal of Counseling Psychology, Vol. 1: Iss. 2, Article 14, 2009, pp. 139-148.24Tajfel and Turner (1986) developed the concept of social identity.According to Turner, social identity refers to "those aspects of a person's selfconcept based upon their group membership"75. Tajfel and Turner proposed aparticular order in evaluating others as "us" or "them". This mental processincludes three stages of "social categorization", "social identification" and "socialcomparison". First through social categorization, we categorize people and knowour own category.