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They make a unity andwholeness of our identity that is different from others. Although many individualsmight share attachment to each of these elements, "the same combination of themis never encountered in different people, and it is this that makes each humanbeing unique and irreplaceable"32.27Berger H.M., Negro G.P. Identity and Everyday Life: Essays in the Study of Folklore, Music and Popular Culture.Wesleyan University Press, 2004. p.126..28See at: http://www.dictionary.com/browse/identity29Woodward K.

Identity and Difference, Volume 3 of Culture, Media and Identities series. London: SAGEPublications Inc, 1997. p. 1.30Ibid. p. 1-2.31Alcoff L.M. Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. P. 5.32Maalouf A. In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong. New York: Penguin Group, 2003. p.11.16To answer the question of "Who are you?" we have a number of possibleanswers, ranging from items registered in our identity card such name andnationality, or our beliefs, religion, interests, values or social roles. These multipleanswers evidently imply a multifaceted identity, against which a person attempts topresent a unified identity. There is a theory stating that to reconcile this apparentinconsistency, individuals "construct narratives […] or they create personalizedredefinitions of the meanings of the identity categories they occupy." 33Such a storyis the individual's narrative identity.

Narrative identity "is a person’s internalizedand evolving life story, integrating the reconstructed past and imagined future toprovide life with some degree of unity and purpose"34. It is "the internalized andevolving story of the self that a person constructs to make sense and meaning outof his or her life". The notion of narrative identity emerged in the social sciencewith the works of McAdams .He proposed the idea that people construct narrativeidentities in their late adolescent years by making a narrative story of their lives" 35.Narrative identity goes beyond the objective facts with which the person isuniquely known, such as names or fingerprints. It is composed of the salient pointsin one's life that become part of her identity. This first-person perspective story isone's interpretation of the facts.

As a story with theme, beginning, middle and end,it reveals the identity of the character. In this narrative, "the past event isappropriated into one's inner story, and the possible future state is appropriated asa possible continuation of the story"36In constructing their subjective self-defining life stories, people draw heavily on prevailing cultural norms and considerthe moral codes of their given culture.

Therefore, it is "the joint product of theperson him/herself and the culture wherein the person acts, strives and narrates"37.33Seth J. Schwartz S.J. Luyckx K. Vignoles V.L. Handbook of Identity Theory and Research. New York: Springer,2011.

Print. p. 6.34McAdams D.P., McLean K.C. Narrative Identity. Journal of Current Directions in Psychological Science, 3 (22)3,2013. pp 233-238.35Ibid. p. 99.36DeGrazia D. Human Identity and Bioethics. New York. Cambridge University Press, 2005. P. 83.37Seth J. Schwartz., Koen Luyckx., Vivian L.

Vignoles. Handbook of Identity Theory and Research. New York:Springer, 2011. Print. p. 112.17The concept of identity has been a philosophical, sociological andpsychological, and cultural notion38.Philosophical Notion of IdentityPhilosophical concept of identity concerns the ultimate question of "who arewe" and "what does consist our existence as a person over time?" It gives anaccount of the essential property that makes one who she is over time andpreserves it knowable through time.

How an individual preserves its sameness overtime is the main concern of philosophical concept of identity. According toLeibniz's law in logic "if A is identical with B, then A and B share all theirproperties"39. Philosophically, sameness is considered in two aspects of numericaland qualitative. Qualitative identity concerns the same qualities of two things suchas the same shape or color40.

The sameness of two billiard balls refers to theirqualitative identity, that these two objects share the same qualitative features.Numerical identity, on the other hand, concerns the sameness of a thing or personthrough time. It is being the same physical object"41. While these two identitytypes might be essential in identification of a person, numerical identity comes tobe more significant in philosophical account of an individual essence, and notindividual type. "The question of what makes persons numerically the same overtime is known to philosophers as the question of personal identity"42.Study of the personal identity over time is associated with diachronic aspectof identity, while different aspects of identity at a single time are referred to by thecategory of synchronic identity.

The issue of changes in diachronic aspect ofidentity over time has been a philosophical problem43. That is how an object suchas Theseus's ship or an oak tree or a human being keeps its identity over time38Sollberger D. On identity: From a philosophical point of view. Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and MentalHealth, No.7 (1), 2013, pp.1-1039Jolley N.

Leibniz. London and New York. Routledge. 2005. p. 226.40Perry Th. D. Professional Philosophy: What it is and why it Matters. Netherlands, Springer. 1986. P. 41.41Moreman C.M. The Routledge Companion to Death and Dying. New York, NY: Routledge. 2017. p. 97.42Parfit D. Personal Identity. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 80, No. 1. 1971. pp. 3-27.43Pruss A.R. A Deflationary Theory of Diachronic Identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

[Electronicresource]. — Mode of access: http://alexanderpruss.com/papers/DiachronicIdentity.html18against the fact that its material substance undergoes change, total or partial. Withsubstituted molecules of the living things or the removing and substituting thedamaged parts of the ship, they still preserve their numerical identity.To explain this problem many identity theories have been established.Generally the theories are divided to two general views of complex and simpleidentity.The complex view has a reductionist account, reducing the identity tonecessary constituent parts of it, whether psychological or biological, material orimmaterial. It "aims to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for personalidentity, thereby reducing it to the holding of basic biological or psychologicalrelations"44.By contrast, the simple view of identity holds "There are no non-circular,informative necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity: personalidentity consists in nothing other than itself"45.

Such a view is an independentaccount of identity. According to this non-reductionist view, bodies, brains ormemories are not necessary condition for personal identity. For them "personalidentity does not just consist in these continuities (physical or psychological], butit is a quite separate thing"46.

It explicitly claims that "personal identity is one thingand the extent of similarity in matter and memory another" 47. Some of the theoristof this approach believe that "a person is a separately existing entity, distinct fromhis brain and body and his various experience, […], a Cartesian Pure Ego, orspiritual substance"48. To sum up, there is no ground for personal identity, and theidentity does not consist in anything.

" An object such as a person at a time t1 isidentical with an object such as a person at 2 if the very t1object and the44Gasser G., Stefan M. Personal Identity: complex or simple. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Reprintedition 2015. p. 3.45Ibid. p.4.46Parfit D. Reasons and Persons.

Oxford, Oxford University Press. 1986. p. 227.47Noonan H.W. Personal Identity. Routledge. 1989. p. 1648Parfit D. Reasons and Persons. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1984. p. 219.19very t2 object in question are one and the same" 49. Persons are entitiesseparate from their physical body or brain and cannot be reduced to facts about thebrain or body.Some known defenders of the complex view are said to include lock andHume and defenders of simple view are George Butler and Reid50. Complex viewseeks to find the necessary and sufficient conditions of personal identity.Therefore, it reduces personal identity to its biological or psychological elements.As long as these conditions sustain, personal identity sustains51.One of the criterions of complex view is body theory.

It maintains, "P2 at t2is the same person as P1 at t1 if and only if p2 has the same body"52. In this theory,the persistence of matter is central to personal identity. This theory is elaboratedfrom Aristotle's discussion on substance and matter. In body theory S2 at t2 has thesame mater as S1 at t1, or at least, in the case of gradual replacement, the matter beobtained from S1. This is what Aristotle believed as the necessary continuation ofmatter for existence of substance53.Brain is the other element of body theory. Brain theory holds, "P2 at t2 isthe same person as P1 at t1 if and only if enough of brain of P1 at t1 survives in P2at t2 to be the brain of the living person".John Lock, to deal with the problem of personal identity, presented thememory theory. For Locke neither body, a thinking substance nor soul can be theessential and sufficient conditions of personal identity.