Шалагинов Денис_RESUME_04052018 (Проблемы имманентизма в нестабильных онтологиях), страница 3

The reason for this is simple: while the real exists in the image and similarityof the possible realized by it, the actual, for its part, does not куыуьиду thevirtuality embodied by it at all. It is the difference that is primary in the process ofactualization”19.

In other words, the concept of the virtual is a necessary means ofbreaking with the logic of the pre-existent sample and priority of identity, becausethe very virtual refers to the differentiation as the process of production of the new.In this sense, virtuality is just another name of time: differentiation and time aresynonymous20. This synonymy is due to the fact that it is time that acts as a sourceof difference, the force of de-identification and destabilization, while time is not                                                            17Massumi B.

Voobrazhaya virtualnoye. URL: https://iphras.ru/uplfile/root/biblio/pj/pj_12/2.pdfDeleuze G. Empirizm I subjektivnost: opyt o chelovecheskoy prirode po Yumu. Kriticheskaya filosofiya Kanta:ucheniye o sposobnostyah. Bergsonizm. Spinoza. M., 2001. P. 306-307.19Ibid. P. 307. 20Marrati P. Life and Event: Deleuze on Newness // A Time for the Humanities: Futurity and the Limits ofAutonomy. New York, 2008. P. 18.18thought of as discrete21.

This continual process corresponds to what Bergsondescribed as duration22. The concepts of duration, memory and life impulse (ÉlanVital) allow Bergson/Deleuze to describe the mechanism of becoming asactualization23. At every moment, time splits into “passing present” and“remaining past”24, while the past is for time the same as the meaning for thelanguage, and the idea – for thought: “the World is rooted in the previous / internal,fixed time, in the virtual horizon", i. e . in cosmological memory, therefore, if inthe context of ontology of abundance we can talk about “being”, then this beingrefers to the past as a kind of fixed engine, paradoxical nature of which is due tothe fact that, being “still”, the past is constantly growing: “if the past is constantlygrowing, it is preserved endlessly”25.

Virtual and actual, as mentioned above, donot form an opposition: here we deal with the quasi-dualistic distinction betweenextensive and intensive multiplicities. It is with this operation of separation of twomodes of multiplicities – intensive and extensive (virtual and actual) that the ideaof abundance is related: the virtual is understood as an infinite resource becauseany measure cannot be applied to it. In the framework of the ontology ofabundance we encounter: [1] a complete rejection of teleology – the actualizationis conceived as Becoming without purpose; [2] the idea of fundamentally indefiniteBeing; [3] understanding of all things as (self)differing; [4] the postulation ofontological co-existence of the virtual and the actual.The described model of becoming distinguishes the Deleuzian “picture” ofthe world from the closed metaphysical universes of stability, with which we meet,                                                            21The fact is that “the more something is humanized, the less the side of the natural process that is associated withmovement and decompensation affects it.

In everything that lasts for some time as a human, man maintains a certainconstancy – and above all in himself” (Lacan J. Imena otsа. М., 2006. P. 34).22Bergson defines duration as “the continuous development of the past, absorbing the future and swelling as itmoves forward» (Bergson H. Tvorcheskaya evolutsiya. M., 2015. P. 12); duration assembles the past and the futurein “variation of its eternally alive present” (Deleuze G., Guattari F. Tysjacha plato: Kapitalizm I shyzofreniya.Ekaterinburg, M., 2010.

P. 316).23“…Duration, in fact, defines a virtual multiplicity (what differs in nature). While Memory appears as thecoexistence of all the degrees of difference in this multiplicity, in this virtuality. Finally, the Life-Impulse refers tothe actualization of this virtual according to the lines of differentiation in accordance with degrees…” (Deleuze G.Empirizm I subjektivnost: opyt o chelovecheskoy prirode po Yumu. Kriticheskaya filosofiya Kanta: ucheniye osposobnostyah.

Bergsonizm. Spinoza. M., 2001. P. 322).24Deleuze G. Kino. M., 2013. P. 336.25Montebello P. Bergson I Deleuze, kontr-fenomenologiya // Logos. 2009. # 3 (71). P. 104. for example, in the philosophy of Leibniz or Spinoza, whose “Ethics” tells aboutthe universe, in which nothing “new” occurs26. While in all of the three presentedabove ontological types – “lack”, “difference”, “abundance” – we are faced withthe instability and goundlessness27.The appearance of unstable ontologies, in my opinion, is associated with animportant trend in the continental philosophy of the XX century – a movementtowards the final rejection of the division of the world into sensual and intelligible,or phenomenal and noumenal.

The beginning of this operation, which can be called“de-transcending”28, was laid in the XIX century, namely – in the philosophy ofHegel: “... «The Phenomenology of Spirit» – is just the great book that proclaimsthe disappearance of the two worlds; from now on there is a single world. Theformula of Hegel is this: behind the curtain there is nothing to see. From aphilosophical point of view, this means that the phenomenon is no longer aphenomenon, behind which there is a certain entity; the phenomenon is aphenomenon that refers to the conditions of its appearance. There is only oneworld.

At this point, the philosophy breaks the last tie that binds her to theology”29.It is the system of Hegel, in whose eyes the world is becoming both a platform anda product of the desire of absolute spirit to perfection, to the final identity, givesrise to the emergence of the ontology of lack, because it is the interpretation of“The Phenomenology of Spirit” which the Alexander Kojeve's seminar wasdedicated to, it had been led in the Higher practical school in Paris from 1933 to1939. Kojevian project was aimed at the production of a kind of anthropologicaltheory of negativity, lack and desire.

It was a kind of attempt to “heideggerizationof Hegel”30. Hegel’s ideas are important to Kojeve because it was Hegel who                                                            26This is due to the presence in this universe of an actor who is “the cause of his absolute unchangeabilitythroughout time (and even before time)” (Eco U. Rol chitatelja.

Issledovaniya po semiotike teksta. SPb., 2007. P.60).27Marсhart O. The Absence at the Heart of Presence: Radical Democracy and the ‘Ontology of Lack’ // RadicalDemocracy between Abundance and Lack. Manchester, 2005. P. 27.28In other words – the overthrow of Platonism, coupled with the arbitrary assumption of the illusion of the “rearworlds”, criticized by Nietzsche (Gasparyan D. E. Vvedeniye v neklassicheskuyu filosofiyu. M., 2011. 398 pp.).29Deleuze G. Lektsii o Leibnitse. M., 2015.

P. 122. 30Marсhart O. The Absence at the Heart of Presence: Radical Democracy and the ‘Ontology of Lack’ // RadicalDemocracy between Abundance and Lack. Manchester, 2005. P. 19.introduced the fundamental to the latter category of negativity. But through theassimilation of negativity and Heideggerian idea of the finitude (internaltemporality of Dasein) Kojeve creates existential, anthropological version of theHegelian dialectic, the application of which excludes nature. This version ofHegel’s philosophy became very popular in France in the 1930s-1960s, and in thisconnection, negativity rose to the status of a tool of liberation, because the dialecticof slavery and domination, interpreted as a struggle for recognition, starts the“locomotive” of history, which is the history of gradual human emancipation.Thus, Kojeve, in some way distancing from Heideggerian contemplation andradicalizing Hegelian idea of historicity, understood the negation as a trulyconstructive act.

Nevertheless, Kojevian reading of dialectics, in which the lordand the slave are inextricably linked to each other in the struggle for recognition,which is a fundamental historical antagonism, involves a somewhat distortedunderstanding of the Heideggerian idea of the finitude.

In “Being and time”, theGerman philosopher postulates the internal temporality of Dasein based on itsfinitude, thus defining Dasein as being-to-death. In the same time finitude cannotbe confused with the end of life, because death never can be achieved as such – wecan only watch another death, but not our own. Whereas, according to Kojeve, thelord is the one who is ready to accept his finitude and risk his life in the strugglefor recognition, thus forcing the slave to recognize the lord in him. But thisrecognition is forced.