Диссертация (Конструирование дискуссии по экономическим вопросам в печатных СМИ (на примере вступления России в ВТО и введения экономических санкций)), страница 25

Putin’s ratingincreased in crisis situations in the past (Figure 2). Thus, the president’shigh approval rating at the turn of 1999-2000 can be attributed to Putin’sparticipation in resolving the conflict in Chechnya (The Second ChechenWar). In addition, a “honeymoon effect,” whereby immediately after anelection victory a president receives considerable support from the public,92was also significant. Putin became acting president after the early departureof Boris Yeltsin, who resigned on December 31, 1999.

As a result of thehoneymoon effect, Putin’s approval rating was 84 percent in January 2000.The Moscow theater hostage crisis (also known as the Nord-Ost siege) alsoresulted in a short-term increase in Putin’s support in 2002. The next timethe president’s popularity was significantly higher than 80 percentoccurred in 2003 due to the confrontation with the U.S.

over Iraq. Althoughin this case the conflict was diplomatic, not military, the image of anexternal enemy was successfully formed, which resulted in an increase insupport for the national leader. Later, an increase in Putin’s popularityoccurred against the background of the conflict with Georgia in 2008.Thus, the rally-around-the-flag effect has been observed in Russia afternumerous acts of terrorism and armed conflicts.Ibid.Matthew N. Beckmann and Joseph Godfrey. 2007.

“The Policy Opportunities inPresidential Honeymoons.” Political Research Quarterly 60 (2): 250–262; Paul Gronke andJohn Brehm. 2002. “History, Heterogeneity, and Presidential Approval: A Modified ARCHApproach.” Electoral Studies 21 (3): 425–452.919293Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media94However, President Putin’s rating was closely linked not only withinternational crises but also with Russia’s economic situation. This effectwas significant after the president’s assumption of office in 2000 andbefore the start of mass protests in 2011-2012.

It was assumed that Putin’sdecreasing level of support during this period, when a deterioration of theeconomic situation was not observed, would be short-lived and theeconomy would remain a significant factor. 93 Additionally, nationalturmoil, nationalism and anti-Americanism would not significantly affectPutin’s popularity. However, this forecast was inaccurate.

The mostsignificant and steady increase in Putin’s approval rating was recordedafter the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This effect persists despite theeconomic sanctions and the Russian food embargo, the ruble’s devaluationand the deterioration of relations with many countries (including Turkey atthe end of 2015). Accordingly, the economic situation has ceased to bedecisive in determining the national leader’s approval rating.Figure 2. Approval rating of Vladimir Putin as president or prime ministerNote: 1. The honeymoon effect and the Second Chechen War; 2. TheMoscow theater hostage crisis; 3. Confrontation with the U.S.

over Iraq; 4.The armed conflict in Georgia (South Ossetia); 5. Crimea annexation, theconflict in eastern Ukraine, the economic sanctions.Source:LevadaCenter,http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/Daniel Treisman. 2014. “Putin’s Popularity since 2010: Why Did Support for the KremlinPlunge, Then Stabilize?” Post-Soviet Affairs 30 (5): 370–388.9394Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media95However, this situation was not fully unexpected. Researchers notethat the rally-around-the-flag effect against the background of a crisis candistract attention from economic problems.94 The effect’s stability is moresurprising.

Generally, the rally effect is maintained for a relatively shortperiod. According to estimates, the president’s popularity typically returnsto the original level within 6 months.95 Other researchers have noted thatthe decrease in popularity after the rally event is 5-6 percent per month onaverage96 (however, considering the scope of the effect, these estimates aresimilar). In Russia, Putin’s approval rating has been above 80 percent fortwo years. In part, this all-time high stability of the rally effect can beexplained by Russian cultural characteristics.

Researchers have noted thatthe increase in the national leader’s rating after a tragedy lasts longer incertain countries than in others.97 However, Russian cultural characteristicscannot fully explain such large differences in rally-effect longevitycompared with other countries.

Typically, the cultural factor can explaindifferences of a few months but not a year and a half.Another possible explanation for Putin’s unusually stable popularityis that several rally events have affected the president’s approval rating.Thus, initially, the consolidation of society occurred against thebackground of the annexation of Crimea, followed by a rally effect fueledby the economic sanctions, the imposed food embargo, the destruction ofsanctioned products during live broadcasts, the conflict with Turkey, andso on. Thus, we have been observing a series of conflicts that couldgenerate rally effects.

However, the question arises: “Why aren’t peopledisappointed in the government, which is unable to solve the problem butonly provokes more conflict?” Studies on terrorist attacks reveal thatrepeated attacks typically result in a decrease in the popularity of theauthorities rather than additional increases.98 Thus, this explanation is alsoquestionable.Therefore, we propose another interpretation for the stability of rallyeffect: the media coverage of the problems and conflicts in contemporaryTir Jaroslav and Shane P.

Singh. 2013. “Is It the Economy or Foreign Policy, Stupid? TheImpact of Foreign Crises on Leader Support.” Comparative Politics 46 (1): 83–101.95Barbara Norrander and Clyde Wilcox. 1993. “Rallying around the Flag and PartisanChange: The Case of the Persian Gulf War.” Political Research Quarterly 46 (4): 759–770.96John E. Mueller. 1970. “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson.” The AmericanPolitical Science Review 64 (1): 18–34.97Peter Thisted Dinesen and Mads Meier Jæger. 2013.

“The Effect of Terror on InstitutionalTrust: New Evidence from the 3/11 Madrid Terrorist Attack.” Political Psychology 34 (6):917–926.98Christophe Chowanietz. 2011. “Rallying around the Flag or Railing Against theGovernment? Political Parties’ Reactions to Terrorist Acts.” Party Politics 17 (5): 673–698.9495Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media96Russia. Deproblematization strategies of the press enable maintainingpublic attention on an issue without provoking public anxiety. Thus,considerable attention by citizens to an event is essential to the creation ofthe rally-around-the-flag effect. In addition, to sustain the effect, thepublic’s attention must not weaken, and the public must not problematizethe issue and associate it with incompetence by the authorities.

All of theseproblems can be solved using counter-rhetoric strategies; examples ofwhich have been provided in the article.ConclusionsThe media framing of sanctions may explain why the consolidation ofRussian society in a situation of external threat is more stable than usual.The deproblematization of the economic sanctions has several objectives.The counter-rhetoric strategies convince readers that the consequences ofthe imposed restrictions are not serious and can be overcome by uniting thepopulation and implementing import substitution policies. Previously,researchers have noted that the consolidation of society around the nationalleader as a result of sanctions is only possible when the sanctions do notcause catastrophic damage to the economy.99 The Russian media that areloyal to the government tried to convince the population of precisely thisabsence of negative effects of the sanctions.

Second, the construction inthe media of Vladimir Putin’s image as a strong leader who can withstandexternal threats was no less important. Thus, the annexation of Crimea wasdescribed as a necessary measure related to the situation in Ukraine (i.e.,mass protests, nationalists coming to power). The introduction of theRussian food embargo (anti-sanctions) was similarly explained. Thesemeasures are described as a reaction to the aggressive actions of the Westwith the aim of protecting Russia against an expansion of the sanctions.Currently, Russia faces a severe economic crisis (e.g., thedevaluation of the ruble, increasing inflation and decreasing oil prices,which are important for the Russian economy). Additionally, Russia’srelations with many countries have deteriorated since the annexation ofCrimea.

The national leader’s popularity should decrease under suchcircumstances, particularly because Putin’s approval rating has long beenclosely associated with assessments of the country’s economic situation.100However, the decrease in his approval rating has not occurred. On theJulia Grauvogel and Christian von Soest. 2014. “Claims to Legitimacy Count: WhySanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes.” European Journal ofPolitical Research 53 (4): 635–653.100Daniel Treisman.

2014. “Putin’s Popularity since 2010: Why Did Support for theKremlin Plunge, Then Stabilize?” Post-Soviet Affairs 30 (5): 370–388.9996Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media97contrary, the president’s popularity has substantially increased. Thisphenomenon can be explained by the rally-around-the-flag effect, whichcauses the popularity of national leaders to increase during internationalconflicts and crises. The rally effect has been strengthened by thediscussions in the media, which contribute to a consolidation of society asit confronts external threats.

In the case of economic sanctions, strategiesof deproblematization played an important role in structuring the publicunderstanding of the issue.AcknowledgementsThe study was implemented in the framework of the Basic ResearchProgram at the National Research University Higher School of Economics(HSE) in 2016.97РАБОТЫ МОЛОДЫХ:ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЯ НАКОНФЕРЕНЦИИ Ю.ЛЕВАДЫАнастасия КАЗУНОткуда берется повестка дня? РольСМИ в конструированиизначимости событийЖурналистика – это когда сообщают: «Лорд Джон умер», –людям, которые и не знали, что лорд Джон жил.Гилберт ЧестертонВведениеВ сатирической книге Ивлина Во «Сенсация»,напутствуя журналиста перед отправкой в качествеспециального корреспондента в охваченнуюгражданской войной Эсмаилию, его коллега говорит,что главному редактору нужны репортажи пропобеды патриотов. В целом описание ситуации втерминахборьбымежду«патриотами»и«предателями» не вызывает большого удивления икажется смутно знакомым.

Однако смущает тот факт,что воюющие стороны имеют различные мнения отом, кто есть кто в этом конфликте. Впрочем, дляхорошего репортера это не проблема, а простор дляманевра. Ведь в данных условиях корректноназывать патриотом любого, кто одержит победу. Иуже не важно, что в действительности гражданскойвойны в стране не наблюдается и что воображаемыйлагерь повстанцев находится в местечке, где дажеместные жители не бывают. Еще меньшее значениеимеет то, что до недавнего времени о существованииЭсмаилии почти никто не знал. Конвейер запущен, ивесь мир с замиранием сердца следит за новостями.Например,Collective1971.№101Blumer G.Behaviour18.P.Вестник общественного мненияРазумеется, описание, предложенное Ивлином Во,несколько утрировано.