The.Economist.2007-02-10 (966424), страница 42
Текст из файла (страница 42)
Evenindependent record labels or booking agents struggle to provide insurance for their employees.Unions help a bit. The American Federation of Musicians offers health insurance for members, but fewtravelling musicians take it up. As for pensions, “it's tough for a band or band leader to put a pension plantogether,” says Tom Lee, president of the American Federation of Musicians.
The union offers a multiemployer set-up, into which labels are supposed to pay a percentage of artists' wages, but things are stilltough. Often, according to Mr Keen, musicians “get gypped at all kinds of levels”—not getting paid in fullfor their performance, or playing too long without overtime. The minimum wage bill just passed byCongress will be of little help.
But recently, the state of New York approved a law that redirects the foodand beverage tax at jazz clubs into musicians' pension funds.Of course, there are always benefit concerts for the truly destitute. And with musicians like Chuck Berryand BB King rocking into their 80s, retirement for some seems a notional concept.Copyright © 2007 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.About sponsorshipChina's stockmarketHot and coldFeb 8th 2007 | HONG KONGFrom The Economist print editionNervous officials talk down the market after its scorching runAPJUST when it looked as if prices of domestically traded shares in China wereapproaching lunatic levels, a reassuring thing happened: the stockmarket cooleddown. After more than doubling in 2006 and setting new highs in January, theShanghai and Shenzhen markets fell for five straight days after January 30th, losing11% and 8% respectively before bouncing back a bit on February 6th.The cold shower came after warnings from Chinese officials, and some regulatorypressure.
Banks were put on notice to restrict credit, following reports that peoplewere taking out loans—and even re-mortgaging their homes—to buy shares. Stateenterprises were told to restrict their share purchases. Approvals for the listing of newmutual funds were briefly slowed or suspended. And rumours circulated that somefund managers might be fingered for insider trading and that the dealing records oftheir families would have to be scrutinised.Most striking of all, Cheng Siwei, vice chairman of the National People's Congress, thecountry's highest legislative body, said 70% of the domestically traded companieswere worthless and should be delisted. “We must”, he said, “force bad children out.”Shanghai surpriseHe faulted investors swept up in the bull market.
“Some people's brains are obviouslystarting to get hot.”The concern is justified. Each of the 38 companies listed on both the mainland and in Hong Kong has domestic Ashares trading at a premium. This includes the large banks such as ICBC (8%) and Bank of China (17.5%), whichare avidly followed abroad and have non-Chinese share prices set in large liquid markets.Since China's stockmarkets began operating in the early 1990s, there have been several euphoric periods, eachending in disaster. Mr Siwei's comments were widely interpreted as reflecting concern across the upper reaches ofChina's government about another potential bust.But they also sent a subtler message, that it is permissible to criticise the market, says James Cheng, manager ofMorgan Stanley's A-share closed-end China Fund.
He notes the sharp contrast with four years ago when critics ofa previous bull market faced harsh rebukes and even death threats. It is, he believes, a good sign that theChinese government understands that a high market is not necessarily a healthy one, nor, for that matter, is itinevitably a sign of a sound economy.There are grounds for believing this was a correction, not the prelude to a crash. Chinese companies continue togenerate impressive returns.
Corporate profits should be up more than 20% this year, reckons Jing Ulrich, ofJPMorgan. Also, the pipeline for new listings remains packed. On February 5th China's Industrial Bank went publicin Shanghai and its shares closed up 39%.The market for bankers who can bring in new offerings is even hotter. Merrill Lynch generated much publicity withnews that it had hired Margaret Ren, an astute and politically connected banker who had been forced out byCitigroup in 2004 after a probe by America's Security and Exchange Commission that was dropped last autumn.Citigroup has not recovered as well as Ms Ren.
Since the incident, the bank has been an also-ran in the new-issuemarket, costing it a fortune.Copyright © 2007 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.About sponsorshipCash-handling in GermanyWe were HerosFeb 8th 2007 | HILDESHEIMFrom The Economist print editionAn armoured-car scam raises questions about business ethicsTHE four accused sit soberly in a Hildesheim courtroom as details emerge of more than a decade of highliving: a €250m ($300m) spending spree with money supposedly safely on its way in armoured trucksfrom shops and bank branches to customers' bank accounts.The case interests not just the tabloid press. Insurers and company lawyers are arguing about up to whatpoint the money was insured.
Cash-transport insurance contracts have been written differently since.There has also been a rethink of how to supervise the whole cash-transport industry.Germany has by far the biggest number of independent cash-transport firms in Europe and they have animpressive safety record, suffering only 12 raids in 2005; that compares with over 100 in France, andmore than 700 in Britain, according to the federation of German cash transporters.
But internal fraud isanother matter. The case in Hildesheim is the biggest of several being pursued by prosecutors.Karl-Heinz Weis and his three co-defendants ran Heros which, until its bankruptcy a year ago, was thebiggest cash-transport firm in Germany, with 50% of the market. At its zenith it had 4,600 employees and1,500 trucks ferrying €500m a day across the country.By his own admission, Mr Weis, the founder and chief executive, began pilfering client money in the 1990sto fill gaps and shortfalls in the daily delivery of cash.
He could use this “float” because of the delaybetween collecting cash, booking it into a pooled account at the Bundesbank and then transferring it tothe customer's account. All sorts of excuses were invented to explain the extended “delays” as they gotmore frequent, such as computer failures and truck breakdowns.Mr Weis and a few colleagues were able to finance a life of expensive cars, foreign travel, gambling—and,occasionally, philanthropy. But in December 2005 a big retail customer, Lidl, cancelled its account. So didseveral others, making it difficult for the fraudsters to keep things going.In February 2006 the game was up.
In a final “Robin Hood” gesture Mr Weis and his chums seized around€50m of banknotes destined to fill cash machines and credited them to Heros's smaller clients, judgingthat banks could better bear the loss. Such actions suggest they could not quite see what they were doingwrong. The trial is complicated by suspicions that individuals working for some of its customers, andperhaps even for its insurers, were accessories to the fraud as well. If that turns out to be so, not onlyHeros executives will be in the dock. Broader business ethics in Germany will be, too.Copyright © 2007 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group.
All rights reserved.About sponsorshipEconomics focusA fluid conceptFeb 8th 2007From The Economist print editionJust about everyone agrees that there's a lot of liquidity about—whatever it isLIQUIDITY is everywhere. Depending on what you read, you may learn that the world's financial marketsare awash with it, that there is a glut of it or even that there is a wall of it. But what exactly is it? Againdepending on what you read, you may be told that “it is one of the most mentioned, but least understood,concepts in the financial market debate today” or that “there is rarely much clarity about what ‘buoyantliquidity’ actually means.” An economics textbook may bring you clarity—or confusion.
It is likely to defineliquidity as the ease with which assets can be converted into money. Fine: but that is scarcely the stuff ofdramatic metaphors. Liquidity thus defined is surely to be welcomed; floods, gluts and walls of watersurely not.Helpfully, Martin Barnes, of BCA Research, an economic research firm, has laid out three ways of lookingat liquidity. The first has to do with overall monetary conditions: money supply, official interest rates andthe price of credit. The second is the state of balance sheets—the share of money, or things that can beexchanged for it in a hurry, in the assets of firms, households and financial institutions. The third,financial-market liquidity, is close to the textbook definition: the ability to buy and sell securities withouttriggering big changes in prices.Bath timeWhen people worry about a glut of liquidity, they are thinking of the first of these concepts.
![](https://s.studizba.com/z.php?f=/templates/si/i/noavatar.png&w=100&h=100&t=1"){kind=avatar}
