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Also, it seems that households are paying more, The population paid 75 per cent of housing services in Jan-Sept 2000, while it was 48 per cent for the same period in 1999. However, in some oblasts, like Kharkiv, the collection rate went down.^li

One part of the reform of the energy sector is the privatisation of oblenergos. Early 2000 six oblenergos have been privatised. However, the effect was that privatised oblenergos paid only 7 per cent of delivered electricity while state owned oblenergos paid 60 to 98 per cent (also with help of the government- see above).

Energorynok, that got the role of state owned electricity wholesaler and overseeer of the electricity market, profited from the new arrangement.

The ban on barter hit the energy traders who based their shadowy profitable deals on barter trade. Many members of parliament derived profits from energy trade and energy traders financed the re-election of president Leonid Kuchma. Therefore the energy reforms were under continuous attack and reform efforts were undermined by the state bureaucracy and parliament. Moreover, the judiciary failed to tackle corruption in the energy sector. Yulia Timoshenko complained that the general prosecutor failed to instigate criminal proceedings against embezzlement in the energy sector.^lii

Generally, the situation in the energy sector continued to deteriorate, owing to insufficient liquidity and political disagreement. In autumn 2000, Ukrainian government had to resort to external borrowing to secure energy supplies. 100 million dollars was provided by the EBRD for the purchase of fossil fuels, while 300 million dollars was provided by the bank Credit Suisse First Boston. ^liii Total debts of the fuel and energy sector increased during the first 9 months of 2000 by 1.1 billion hryvnas and totalled 13.6 billion hryvnas in October 2000. ^liv

Power outages are occurring more frequently, often blamed on bad weather. Large part of customers in Ukraine is regularly disconnected from the energy supply.

Although Timoshenko urges for enhancement of payment discipline, she said that she would not allow electricity cut offs to the population.^lv This may be related to the fact that households are not the worst offenders with respect to non-payments of energy. Nevertheless electricity cut offs occurred, for example in Kharkiv.

Also, 42 per cent of energy indebted enterprises continued to function.^lvi

The position of the thermal power stations worsened as they were forced to pay more for coal deliveries. As a result, their payments for gas deliveries worsened. In September, Itera told that thermal power stations paid for only 27.4 per cent of the gas supplied.^lvii

Nevertheless, Timoshenko claims that, due to more cash payments. 178 million dollars has been paid for fresh fuel for nuclear power stations, and half of the gas debt for Turkmenistan has been paid while the debt to Itera has been slashed by more than 40 per cent.^lviii

Although the energy reform was half hearted and obstructed by many in the energy sector, oligarchs who made their fortunes with energy trade felt threatened and tried to undermine the position of the Yushchenko government and more in particular Yulia Timoshenko. Her husband has been arrested, being accused of embezzlement. Also, the Russian prosecutor opened a case against her involving bribes in dealing with Russian officials. This is noticeable as it happens so many years after the assumed bribing took place (1996). Some argue that Russia is not interested in energy reforms and market oriented reforms in Ukraine as this may allow Ukraine to turn to the West. The argument is that Russia can better deal with a non-reformed Ukraine.

The attempts to reform the energy sector show how deeply rooted vested interests are that profited from the non-reformed energy sector, based on barter trade.

5. Energy imports

During the 1990s, on average half of domestically consumed energy was imported and between 35 and 50 per cent of imports consisted of energy, mainly delivered by Russia.

During 1991-1994, Ukraine had great difficulties in paying for delivered oil and gas and Ukraine accumulated debts with Russia despite the fact that Russia continued to deliver gas and oil below world market prices and on favourable conditions. Nevertheless, Russia tried to use its leverage and linked energy deliveries to political demands, especially during 1993-1994 when interruptions of energy deliveries led to closures of enterprises and schools. October 1993, the energy crisis had forced the closure of half of Kyiv's industrial enterprises. Through the winter of 1993-4, most public buildings were not heated, most streetlights were turned out and Ukrainian television began operating on a reduced schedule in order to conserve energy. ^lix

In the early 1990s, Ukrainian government put priority in developing coal mining and nuclear power in order to diminish energy dependence.

Ukrainians decided not to give in to Russia's demands and refused, among others, the hand over of a majority stake in the transit gas pipeline. From mid 1994 the situation began to stabilise and Western lending to Ukraine helped Ukraine in paying its energy bill. Especially the USA realised that Ukrainian independence was at stake. In the meantime, Russia enhanced further the price of delivered gas. The average price of Russian gas increased from 45.2 dollars per 1000 cubic metres in 1993 to 80 dollars per 1000 cubic metres in 1996.

Ukraine did not react by reforming the energy sector and despite Western assistance, difficulties arose around securing energy supplies from Russia, although Russia was pressed by the West to be lenient towards Ukraine. Russia accepted barter arrangements that were not always favourable for Russia.

Gazprom accepted in 1994 and 1995 settlement of gas debts worth 1.4 million dollars with the delivery of paper.^lx Later, gas was delivered in exchange for eleven strategic bombers and food. Payment arrears were accepted.

The fee Russia paid for the transit of Russian gas had declined since 1996 to offset a drop in gas import prices.^lxi Ukrainian service surplus in 1999 had fallen by more than 50 per cent since 1996.

Since the advent of president Vladimir Putin, in December 1999, Russia became less lenient towards Ukraine and demanded higher prices for delivered gas. Prompt cash payment was expected. Also, a value added tax was levied on the export of oil and gas (a 30 per cent excise duty on gas, per 1 June 2000). Russia protested against the unauthorised siphoning of gas. Russian vice prime minister Viktor Khryshenko complained about the fact that 'Russia practically subsidises Ukrainian industry'.^lxii

According to media reports in March 2000, Russia proposed in the negotiations about settling the outstanding gas debts, to offset debts with stakes in strategic Ukrainian enterprises. According to the Eastern Economist, Russian vice prime minister Kasyanov handed over a list with Ukrainian enterprises.^lxiii In December 2000, this issue surfaced again.

It became more difficult to negotiate a settlement about gas deliveries with Russia. The main negotiator in 2000 was Yulia Timoshenko. United Energy Systems, that she headed in 1995-97, had an outstanding debt with Gazprom worth 334 million dollars. As a minister, Timoshenko tried to settle this debt.

From 1999 onwards, Ukraine siphoned of large quantities of gas destined for Central, Western Europe and Turkey. According to President Kuchma, during the first nine months of 2000, 700 million m3 have been stolen ^lxiv It caused great problems. Altogether, for 1.4 billion dollars worth of gas was siphoned of in 1999.

For example, in 1999, Turkey got 40 per cent less gas from Russia than foreseen. Three big power stations had to stop working and big industrial enterprises had to interrupt production. Turkey protested with the Ukrainian government.^lxv

At the same time, Ukraine continued to re-export gas. In 1999, 8.5 of Ukraine's exports consisted of fuels. Ukraine Russia protested against this re-export (17 November 2000).

Ukrainian government was unable to prevent the unauthorised siphoning of gas by Naftogaz, despite the fact that Itera, an Ukrainian-Russian joint venture, got the exclusive right to buy gas from Gazprom. Ukraine reached an agreement with Russia that siphoned of gas would automatically be added to the state debt of Ukraine.^lxvi

Ukraine responded to Russia's demands by trying to diversify gas and oil deliveries. This was difficult because earlier Ukraine failed to pay for gas from Turkmenistan. May 1999 Turkmenistan halted gas deliveries to Ukraine due to non-payment of gas worth 315 million dollars. Mid 2000, President Kuchma secured a gas deal with Turkmenistan, to be delivered through a gas pipeline passing Russia. Under this deal, former gas debts were settled and new gas would be delivered by immediate payment in cash, goods and investment projects, through Naftogaz. (40 per cent in cash, 60 per cent in goods and investments).^lxvii

In December 2000 it has been agreed in Minsk that in 2001 30 billion cubic metres of gas will be provided by Russia (including gas delivered as transit fee) and another 30 billion cubic metres by Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan is interested in joining the GUUAM group, consisting of a group of CIS states that want to distance from Russia (Georgia, Azerbaizjan, Moldova, Ukraine, Turkmenistan). On the other hand, Russia founded recently the Eurasian Economic Community, consisting of Russia, Belarus, Kazachstan, Kyrgysistan and Tajikistan.

Russia responded to the continuing stealing of gas by Ukraine by proposing a gas pipeline through Belarus, bypassing Ukraine. Re-routing gas supplies to Western Europe through Belarus would deprive Ukraine of transit fees, worth one third of the natural gas consumed by Ukraine. It would it also make easier to cut gas supplies to Ukraine all together. Nowadays this is very difficult given the fact that gas destined for customers in Western Europe has to go through Ukrainian pipelines.

Ukraine reckons with the co-operation of Poland that is interested in diminished Russian influence in Central Europe. However, also Poland suffered from the stealing of gas by Ukraine, destined for Poland. The European Union expects a doubling of gas imports from Russia and EU firms are involved in plans for a new pipeline through Belarus. The pipeline could be laid within two years. It means that within two years Ukraine could be faced with a loss of transit fee worth 18 billion cu m3 annually.

Hitherto, it seems that Russia has not been able to use its leverage with respect to energy dependence of Ukraine adequately. Ukraine did not concede to Russia's demands with respect to handing over shares in the transit pipeline, improved payments discipline and the Russian wish to acquire major stakes in strategic Ukrainian enterprises. However, it seems that with the new gas pipeline bypassing Ukraine, the Russian leverage may increase significantly.

Ukraine pretends to be at the crossroads of Europe. However, increasingly transporters try to avoid Ukraine. The Odessa-Brody oil pipeline that would connect the Black Sea with Poland was for 85 per cent ready in 1996 but was never finished due to lack of funds. This is another missed opportunity. There appears to be no interest from the side of foreign investors. This makes it more difficult to diversify oil supplies. In 1999, almost all oil imports originated in Russia (8.5 million tonnes) and Kazachstan (1.37 million tonnes). ^lxviii

End 2000, energy reforms are obstructed by the presidential administration, state bureaucracy and major players in the energy market and, moreover, undermined by inconsistent government policies.

Conclusion

During ten years of regular reductions of energy supplies from Russia and continuous shortfalls of energy supplies, especially during winter time, Ukraine has done very little to promote energy conversation measures that could diminish energy dependence significantly and has done very little to reform the energy sector, that could free billions of hryvnas yearly.

The energy reform, embarked upon early 2000, was half hearted and failed to raise significantly collection rates of energy payments. It highlighted bottlenecks in the energy sector and deeply rooted vested interests that block energy reform.

Under President Putin, Russian attitude towards accumulating energy debts of Ukraine and non-authorised siphoning of gas by Ukraine became tougher. Diversification of energy supplies is rendered difficult by the bad payments record of Ukraine. This is making import prices of gas higher. Lack of reform in the energy sector will further undermine Ukrainian sovereignty while giving Russia more economic leverage.

Literature

Bojcun, M. (1999) The Ukrainian economy since independence.

Clover, C. (2000), 'Le Donbass: une йconomie de prйdation', Le courrier des pays de l'Est. Nr 1002, February.

Cornelius,P.K.,Lenain,P. (Eds) (1997) Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market. Washington: IMF.

D'Anieri, P.J. (1999) Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Hirschhausen, C. von, Lunina, I., Vachnenko, T. (1997) ‘Die Energiewirtschaft der Ukraine - Bestandsaufnahme und Reformbedarf zur Unternehmisierung’, in Hoffman, L. and Siedenberg, A., pp. 144-62.

Hirschhausen, C. von, (1999) ‘Gas Sector Restructuring in Ukraine: Analysis of Import Dependence, Price Formation and Socio-Economic Effects’ in Hoffmann, L. and Siedenberg, A., pp. 391-408.

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