диссертация (1169188), страница 44
Текст из файла (страница 44)
The U.S. supports many rules of the UNCLOS favourable to it (on freedom of thehigh seas, on the EEZ, on transit passage through international straits, etc.). But that stopsat the UNCLOS provisions that are not beneficial for the US economy (on thedelineation of the continental shelf under Art. 76 and drawing a boundary between theUS shelf and the “common heritage of mankind”, on contributions to the InternationalSeabed Authority, etc.). The US does not deem those provisions of the UNCLOS generalinternational law rules as custom. The US is not party to the UNCLOS, and believes itsprovisions to be obstacles reducing the efficiency of its energy policy that are nonethelessnon-binding on the US.
By virtue of the increasing competition in the development of themineral resources of the shelf, it is, however, more advantageous for the US if othercountries, including Russia, respect those conventional obstacles and encumbrances.3. The national maritime economic law of the US largely supplements and developsthe customary international law of the sea, economic law, that is, its main component. Thehigh level of elaboration of the domestic economic law of the US increases the efficiencyof normative regulation.
The above example – the existence of the institute of temporarysuspension of operations for the exploitation of resources in specific areas of the193continental shelf – allows the state to react in a timely manner and effectively to arisingeconomic threats, including large-scale ones, such as the explosion at the DeepwaterHorizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico.Another example is the existence of the environmental assessment of potentialrisks in the preparation of five-year plans for the development of continental shelf plots.Detailed normative development of environmental impact assessment (EIA), thepossibility of challenging the five-year plan where the claimant believes that the EIA wasnot conducted properly, effectively allows mitigation of the potential risks of polluting themarine environment and to prevent economic and environmental losses.4.
An analysis of US domestic law, the level of its elaboration, not only itscongruity with the most promising rules of international law, but also stimulating itsdevelopment, warrant a conclusion that its provisions noted above can be borrowed forimproving the economic block of Russia’s legal system. In particular, the provision onmoratoriums, temporary suspension of operations for the exploitation of mineral resourcesin certain areas of continental shelf, and on marine preserves within the continental shelfare all applicable, provided they are adapted accordingly, to the regulation of activities inthe continental shelf of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.It is feasible for Russia to consider the legal positions of Norway on theArctic shelf and its legislative practices for the following principal reasons:1.Norway’s laws on the outer limits of internal sea waters (including onstraight baselines) for measuring the breadth of its territorial sea and EEZ, withoutdoubt, are of interest for Russia’s respective revision of its maritime borders.2.The Norwegian example of a “partial” submission under Art.
76 of theUNCLOS should undeniably be taken into account for Russia’s preparation of itssecond “application”.Pursuant to Norway’s legislation, its internal waters include coastal maritimeareas, whose outer boundaries (the straight baselines forming the same)considerably exceed the 24-mile limit in view of the extreme indentation andsinuosity of some portions of the coastline. That also holds true for the coastline194within the skerry belt where Norway’s national navigation route – Inderlee – runs.All those maritime areas fall under the sovereignty of Norway, although the latterallows navigation of foreign commercial vessels and military ships there by adomestic law, save for the specifically established forbidden zones.By a Royal Decree dated 17 December 1976 and Law No.
91 dated 17December 1976, Norway established a 200-nm EEZ along its mainland coast.Within the EEZ, foreign vessels cannot fish unless they hold a special permitissued based on an interstate agreement. Establishing an EEZ does not affect theright of passage of foreign vessels and airplanes through the respective maritimezones.224Law No.
91 of 1976 determines that, subject to compliance with therespective international law, the King of Norway may, as appropriate, enactspecific rules with respect to the EEZ on a number of matters related to operationsin that maritime space. At the same time, the Law notes that establishment of theEEZ does not alter the status or scope of application of Law No. 12 of 21 June1963 concerning the exploration and use of natural subsoil resources of thecontinental shelf.
In other words, the exploration and use of natural resources ofthe seabed of Norway’s EEZ is regulated by normative acts issued for thecontinental shelf.According to the Royal Decree, the width of the EEZ shall be measuredfrom straight baselines, but shall not extend further than the median line withrespect to other states. In Norway’s EEZ, the rights of foreign vessels fornavigation, of airplanes for overflight, as well as the right to lay submarine cablesand pipelines, are retained.Above, I have considered the key political and legal motives, as well as theresults of Norway’s partial “submission” to the CLCS under Art. 76 of theUNCLOS.
I have also shown the juridical mechanisms and legal ways Norway is224There is a 200-mile fisheries zone around the Jan Mayen Island (Royal Order dated 13 May 1980), and a 200mile fisheries conservation zone around the Spitsbergen archipelago (Royal Order dated 16 June 1977).195using to achieve serious foreign political results in asserting its rights to theSpitsbergen shelf by way of performing Art. 76 of the UNCLOS. The Norwegianpractice of “partial submission” is used during the preparation of Russia’s second“application” to the CLCS in 2015, by legally executing that application preciselyas a “partial” submission.In this context, it is proposed the following:Given that in the high-latitude regions north of Spitsbergen the geologicaldata speak rather in favour of Denmark and Canada than Norway, the issue of theboundary of Russia’s Arctic shelf north of the northernmost point of thedelimitation line provided by the 2010 Russian-Norwegian Agreement shall beresolved in consultations and cooperation with Denmark primarily, rather thansolely with Norway.As for Canada the early domestic laws of Great Britain/Canada on its Arcticsector characterized above are now “reinforced” by the legally careful wording attreaty level.
It is suggested that that practice should be meaningfully taken intoaccount in the treaty practice of the Russian Federation. There is positive proof tothat effect. Thus, the Agreement between the Government of the RussianFederation and the Government of Canada signed in Ottawa on 5 October 1995 forthe Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion withRespect to Taxes on Income and on Capital contains the following definition: “theterm ‘Canada’ used in a geographical sense, means the territory of Canada,including: i) any area beyond the territorial seas of Canada which, in accordancewith international law and the laws of Canada, is an area within which Canada mayexercise rights with respect to the seabed and subsoil and their natural resources;ii) the seas and airspace above every area referred to in subparagraph (i) in respectof any activity carried on in connection with the exploration for or the exploitationof the natural resources referred to therein” (Art.
3). This kind of legal draftingcorresponds to Canada’s policy of protecting its interests related to Arctic naturalresources: by abstaining from express proclamation of sovereignty or sovereign196rights over the entire Arctic sector, Canada nevertheless actually enforces itsdomestic laws here; Canada’s authority shows that the ice-bound Arctic spaces inits sector are not free for all. By carefully avoiding actions suggesting a waiver ofthe “implied” boundaries of the Arctic sector, Canada is consistently officiallymapping those boundaries as the state-drawn limits of the country’s Arctic sector.As noted in legal scholarship, “in such legal environment, a foreign state is notallowed to commence, for instance, the exploitation of mineral resources withoutCanada’s permission in its Arctic sector, even by the North Pole.”225The 6th edition of the fundamental course International Law Chiefly asInterpreted and Applied in Canada has a special section on the Legal Status of IceIslands.
Massive ice blocks found in the Canadian and Russian Arctic sectors areadrift. Activities carried on such an ice island of one state, as Canadian legalscholars note, “might understandably become of concern” to the coastal Statetowards whose shores the island in question is moving; meaning concern to ensure“that its security and other national interests are not affected”. Given “theextensive use being made of ice islands for marine scientific research, as well as alimited use for the exploration of the continental shelf”, Canadian legal scholarsadvocate specifying their legal regime.226 From the standpoint of international law(Art.
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