диссертация (1169188), страница 35
Текст из файла (страница 35)
sharply objected to Russia’s submission to the Commissionappears strange at first glance. After all, it was to the benefit of the U.S. that in theeast, in its submission Russia did not go further north (into the American sector) ofthe sectoral boundary provided by the 1867 Russian-American Treaty. Russia thusguaranteed U.S. rights in its Arctic sector. As to the west, pursuant to the 2001submission, Russia voluntarily abandoned over 300 thousand sq.km of space in itsArctic sector, and for the U.S. a new area in the Russian sector became “high seas”pursuant to the 1958 Convention on the High Seas (as we may recall, the U.S.
is175United Nations. Denmark: “Notification regarding the submission made by the Russian Federation to theCommission on the Limits on the Continental Shelf. Reference: CLCS.01.2001.LOS/DNK. 26 February 2002.176United Nations. Norway: “Notification regarding the submission made by the Russian Federation to theCommission on the Limits on the Continental Shelf. Reference: CLCS.01.2001.LOS/NOR. 2 April 2002.156not a party to the UNCLOS). So it might seem that the U.S.
should havecommended the Russian MNR and MFA and supported the Russian submission inits review in the UN.The U.S., however, considered that Russia could have abandoned even moreshelf space in its Arctic sector. A rather voluminous note of the U.S. PermanentMission with the UN dated 28 February 2002 was divided into two unequal parts:1) the brief one (complimenting the Russian agencies for respecting theeastern sectoral boundary under the 1867 Treaty, endorsed in the Soviet-AmericanAgreement of 1990 on the Delimitation of Maritime Areas); and2) the long one, explaining why the U.S.
believes that in the west, Russia’sArctic shelf is smaller than described in its submission:“The Government of the United States of America wishes to note thatRussian submission utilizes the boundary embodied in the Maritime BoundaryAgreement between the United States of America and the Union of the SovietSocialist Republics (signed on June 1, 1990), notwithstanding the fact that theRussian Duma has not yet approved the treaty. The use of that boundary isconsistent with the mutual interests of Russia and the United States in stability ofexpectations.”Save for this praise in the US document with respect to Russia’s submission,the rest is criticism, starting from the supposition that the Commission mightapprove Russia’s baselines along its Arctic coast:“The Government of the United States of America is of the view that, whilethe Commission has no competence over questions of baselines from which thebreadth of the territorial sea is measured, it should not be perceived as endorsingparticular baselines.
In any event, the Commission should ensure that it does not,on a global basis, endorse baselines, whether or not they may be inconsistent withinternational law. It might, for example, indicate in all recommendations regardingall submissions, that it is not taking a position regarding baselines.”157Further, the U.S. document questions the data of the Russian submission asto the location of the 2,500 m fathom line, as well as the location of the foot of thecontinental slope:“Critical to the Russian submission relating to the Arctic Ocean are thepositions of the 2,500 meter isobaths and the foot of the continental slope.
Thepositions of these lines in the Russian presentation could not be examined foraccuracy and completeness.”It is clear that if the material submitted by the Russian agencies was seen asinauthentic by the U.S. Government, that would already have an adverse effect onRussia’s international legal image.But further criticism of the Russian submission on the part of the U.S. iseven more scorching.
Where the Russian document focuses on the geological dataon the Mendeleev Ridge, the U.S. focuses on the representative data on the “singlecontinuous geologic feature” – the “Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge System.”“The Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge System is therefore a volcanic feature ofoceanic origin that was formed on, and occurs only within the area of, the oceaniccrust that underlies the Amerasia Subbasin of the deep Arctic Ocean Basin. It isnot part of any State’s continental shelf.”It is enough that the US is demonstrating, before the UN member states, thatby its 2001 submission Russia is showing its ignorance of the geologicalcharacteristics of the Arctic Ocean floor; but, more than that, the US, as it were,crushes the very basis of Russia’s governmental document and triumphantlyconcludes:“The Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge System is not, therefore, a submergedprolongation of the land mass of Russia.”The US criticism of the provisions of the Russian submission on the“Lomonosov Ridge”, however, looks less convincing.
Here, the U.S. does not evenbother to supply any arguments:“Lomonosov Ridge raises questions relating to natural prolongation. Theridge is a freestanding feature in the deep, oceanic part of the Arctic Ocean Basin,158and not a natural component of the continental margins of either Russia or anyother State.”Nevertheless, against the backdrop of the devastating criticism of theRussian submission on the Mendeleev Ridge and the very method of geologicalproof, the final “U.S.
Conclusions and Recommendations” appear ratherrepresentative:“In the aforementioned scientific respects there are substantial differencesbetween the Russian submission on the one hand and others in the relevantscientific community on the other hand, regarding key aspects of the proposedsubmission, based on reports in the open, peer-reviewed scientific literature. TheGovernment of the United States of America proposes further consideration andbroad debate before any recommendation is made by the Commission.”Thus, not only did the US (just as Canada, Denmark, and Norway) notsupport the outer limit of the continental shelf depicted by the Russian agencies inthe 2001 submission; in addition to that, the Commission received advice from theUS before issuing any recommendation on the submission, to hold a “broaddebate” involving scholars from states that are not parties to the UNCLOS.The US document ends very nearly in a prescription to the Commission:“The Russian submission is particularly complex and should be consideredin a deliberate manner.
A significant period of debate and reflection will berequired for the Convention to be carefully applied in a manner to promotestability. Insofar as no applications to explore or exploit the Area have been madeor are likely to be made in the Arctic for the foreseeable future, no prejudice islikely to result from a deliberative process.”177Before, Russia’s rights to the continental shelf in its Arctic sector were notofficially contested by any of these states. Moreover, Canada, as it has beenshown, tacitly supported the boundaries of the Soviet Arctic sector.177United Nations.
United States of America: “Notification regarding the submission made by the RussianFederation to the Commission on the Limits on the Continental Shelf. Reference: CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA. 18March 2002.159In sum, Anglo-American legal sources reflect the predominantly positiveopinions towards Russia for its new position as such – to follow the option ofaddressing the CLCS under Art. 76 of the UNCLOS to draw the outer limits of itscontinental shelf. These, however, are not positive opinions of the outer limit of theshelf proposed by the Russian agencies in 2001 per se. This is most evident in theUS materials on its Arctic policy and academic publications in this respect (thiswill be discussed specifically below). At the same time, at the level of practice, theUS is quite professionally steering towards having Russia abandon even more ofthe floor of its Arctic sector, believing that Russia’s denunciation of around 300thousand sq.km by Russia was insufficient.
Here, however, Russia, according tothe US plans, should remain in the “Procrustean bed” of Art. 76, while the USwould remain free of that and other limitations under the UNCLOS.This follows, in particular, from a letter of the US Permanent Representativewith the UN responding to the Russian 2001 submission to the Commission, “TheUnited States believes that the submission has major flaws as it relates to thecontinental shelf in the Arctic.”While “pushing” Russia to self-limiting its shelf in the Arctic under Art. 76of the UNCLOS, the US, however, does not stand for Russia legally qualifying aportion of shelf within the limits of its Arctic sector as an area of “the commonheritage of mankind.” Not only the US generally does not intend to create an areaof the “common heritage of mankind” in the Arctic, but, more than that, for theUS, as American analysts explain, it would be better to “oppose Russia’s territorialclaims in the Arctic without becoming party” to the UNCLOS.
Thus, Professor A.Cohen writes in his article:“…the US should oppose Russia's territory grab without joining the U.N.Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the Law of the SeaTreaty (LOST). The U.S. should raise the Arctic as a priority on NATO’s agendaand explore an agreement with Canada on joint management of navigation,security, and commercial exploitation of hydrocarbons in the Northwest Passage.Finally, Congress should authorize expanded oil exploration and production in the160Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and other promising Arctic areas toincrease the national energy supply.”178He regards it as an advantage that the U.S.
is not restricted by UNCLOS’srules, both procedural and substantive:“…the U.S. can execute its Arctic policy without ratifying LOST.”US objections against Russia’s “submission” to the CLCS are largely due totwo reasons. First of all, in 1997 to 2001, the Russian agencies never asked the US(just like they never asked Canada) if such a “gift of precedent” in the Arctic infavour of the “Area” (“the common heritage of mankind”) was desirable for theArctic states; after all, creating the “Area” in the Arctic means, to the prejudice ofthe interests of the US, Canada, Russia, Denmark, and Norway, adding to theexploitation of natural resources in the Arctic Ocean floor the activities of nonArctic states, which does not correspond to the interests of the Arctic states;creation in the high-latitude Arctic of the “common heritage of mankind” whichgenerally is not in line with the interests of the international community forecological reasons.
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