Диссертация (Манипулирование в задаче коллективного принятия решений), страница 21
Описание файла
Файл "Диссертация" внутри архива находится в папке "Манипулирование в задаче коллективного принятия решений". PDF-файл из архива "Манипулирование в задаче коллективного принятия решений", который расположен в категории "". Всё это находится в предмете "экономика" из Аспирантура и докторантура, которые можно найти в файловом архиве НИУ ВШЭ. Не смотря на прямую связь этого архива с НИУ ВШЭ, его также можно найти и в других разделах. , а ещё этот архив представляет собой кандидатскую диссертацию, поэтому ещё представлен в разделе всех диссертаций на соискание учёной степени кандидата экономических наук.
Просмотр PDF-файла онлайн
Текст 21 страницы из PDF
P. 349–371.16036. Campbell K. Impossibility Theorems in the Arrovian Framework //Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 1, K.J. Arrow, A.K. Senand K. Suzumura Ed. Ch. 1. 2002. P. 35—94.37. Can B., Erdamar B., Sanver M. Expected Utility Consistent Extensions ofPreferences // Theory and Decision. 2009. Vol. 67(2).
P. 123-144.38. Chamberlin J. R. An investigation into the relative manipulability of fourvoting systems // Behavioral Science. 1985. Vol. 30(4). P. 195-203.39. Chamberlin J.R., Featherston F. Selecting a voting system// The Journalof Politics. 1986. Vol. 48(2). P. 347–369.40. Ching S., Zhou L. Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules// SocialChoice and Welfare. 2002. Vol. 19. Р. 569–580.41.
Clarke E.H. Multipart pricing of public goods // Public Choise. 1971. Vol.11. P. 17-33.42. Downs A. An economic theory of democracy. New York: HarperCollin.1957.43. Duggan J., Schwartz T. Strategic manipulability without resoluteness orshared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized// Social Choice andWelfare.
2000. Vol. 17. Р. 85–93.44. Dummett M., Farquharson R. Stability in voting// Econometrica. 1961.Vol. 29(1). Р. 33–43.45. Eggenberger F., Pólya G. Über die Statistik verketteter Vorgänge //Zeitschrift für Angewandte Mathematik und Mechanik. 1923. Vol. 3(4). P.279-289.46. Farquharson R. Theory of Voting. New Haven: Yale University Press,1969.47. Favardin P., Lepelley D., Serais J.
Borda rule, Copeland method andstrategic manipulation// Review of Economic Design. 2002. Vol. 7. P. 213–228.48. Favardin P., Lepelley D. Some further results on the manipulability of161social choice rules // Social Choice and Welfare. 2006. Vol.
26. Р. 485–509.49. Feldman A. Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice rules// Public Choice. 1980. Vol. 35. P. 503-509.50. Gärdenfors P. Manipulation of social choice functions // Journal ofEconomic Theory. 1976. Vol. 13. Р. 217–228.51. Gehrlein W.V., Fishburn P.C. Condorcet’s paradox and anonymouspreference profiles// Public Choice. 1976. Vol. 26(1). P. 1–18.52. Gibbard A.
Manipulation of voting schemes // Econometrica. 1973. Vol.41. Р. 587–601.53. Gibbard A. Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance//Econometrica. 1977. Vol. 45. Р. 665–681.54. Gibbard A. Straightforwardness of game forms with lotteries as outcomes//Econometrica. 1978. Vol. 46. Р. 595–614.55. Groves T. Incentives in teams // Econometrica. 1973.
Vol. 41. P. 617-631.56. Hotelling H. Stability in Competition // The Economic Journal. 1929. Vol.39, № 153. P. 41-57.57. Huang H.C., Chua V.C.H. Analitycal representation of probabilities underthe IAC condition// Social Choice and Welfare. 2000. Vol. 17. Р. 143–155.58. Hurwicz L. On the Concept and Possibility of InformationalDecentralization // American Economic Review.
1969. № 59(2). P. 513—524.59. Inada K.I. Majority rule and rationality // Journal of Economic Theory.1970. № 2. P. 27-40.60. Jones P., Sugden R. Evaluating choice // International Review of Law andEconomics. 1982. № 2. Р. 47–69.61. Kalai E., Muller E. Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorialsocial welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures// Journal ofEconomic Theory. 1977. Vol. 16. P. 457–469.62.
Kannai Y., Peleg B. A note on the extension of an order on a set to the162power set // Journal of Economic Theory. 1984. № 32. Р. 172–175.63. Kelly J. Strategy-proofness and social choice functions without singlevaluedness // Econometrica. 1977. № 45. Р. 439–446.64. Kelly J. Profile restrictions and strategy-proofness // Social Choice andWelfare. 1987.
Vol. 4. Р. 63–67.65. Kelly J. Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but fewaren't // Social Choice and Welfare. 1993. Vol. 10. Р. 161–175.66. Kemp M.C. Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem // Review of EconomicStudies. 1954. № 21(3). P. 240-243.67.Kim K.H., Roush F.W. Special domains and nonmanipulability //Mathematical Social Sciences. 1980. Vol. 1. P. 85–92.68. Le Breton M., Weymark J. Arrovian Social Choice Theory on EconomicDomains // Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. 2011. Volume II. Ch.17.
P. 191—299.69. Lepelley D., Valognes F. Voting rules, manipulability and socialhomogeneity// Public Choice. 2003. Vol. 116. P. 165–184.70. Mashler, M. The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleoulus // Handbook ofGame Theory, (eds. Aumann R.J. and Hart S.). 1992. Vol. 1. P. 591–66771. Maskin E. Social welfare functions on restricted domains.
HarvardUniversity and Darwin College, Cambridge. 1976.72. Maskin E. On strategy proofness and social welfare functions whenpreferences are restricted. Harvard University and Darwin College,Cambridge. 1976.73. Maskin E. The Arrow Impossibility Theorem: Where Do We Go FromHere? // Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science EconomicsWorking Papers. 2009. № 93.74.
Maskin E. Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality // Review ofEconomic Studies. 1999. № 66(1). P. 23—38.16375. Moulin H. On strategy-proofness and single peakedness// Public Choice.1980. Vol. 35. P. 437–455.76. Muller E., Satterthwaite M. The equivalence of strong positive associationand strategy-proofness // Journal of Economic Theory 14. 1977. P. 412-418.77. Muller E., Satterthwaite M. Strategy-proofness: the existence ofdominant-strategy mechanisms // in L. Hurwicz, D.
Schmeidler and H.Sonnenschein (eds.). Social Goals and Social Organization. CambridgeUniversity Press. Cambridge. 198578. Myerson R. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem //Econometrica Vol. 47. 1979 . P. 61-73.79. Nanson E.J. Methods of election. Report of the Royal Society of Victoria.1882.80. Nitzan S.
The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preferencevariation and strategic manipulation// Public Choice. 1985. Vol. 47. P. 349–370.81. Ozyurt S., Sanver R. A general impossibility result on strategy-proofsocial choice hyperfunctions // Games and Economic Behavior. 2009. Vol.66. P. 880-892.82. Pattanaik P.K. Strategic Voting without Collusion under Binary andDemocratic Group Decision Procedures // Review of Economic Studies.1975.
Vol. P. 93-104.83. Pattanaik P.K. Collective rationality and strategy-proofness// Theory andDecision. 1976. Vol. 7. P. 191–203.84. Pattanaik P.K. Strategy and group choice. Amsterdam: North-Holland,1978.85. Pattanaik P.K., Peleg B. An axiomatic characterization of thelexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set //Social Choice and Welfare. 1984.
№ 1. Р. 113–122.86. Pattanaik P.K., Xu Y. On ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom of164choice // Recherches Economiques de Louvain. 1990. № 56. Р. 383–390.87. Pen E.M., Patty J.W., Gailmard S. Manipulation and single-peakedness: ageneral result// American Journal of Political Science. 2011. Vol. 55(2). P.436–44988. Plott C.R. Recent results in the theory of voting // Frontier of QuantitativeEconomics, M. Intrilligator ed.
1971. P. 109-127.89. Pritchard G., Slinko A. On the average minimum size of a manipulatingcoalition// Social Choice and Welfare. 2006. Vol. 27. Р. 263–277.90. Pritchard G., Wilson M. Exact results on manipulability of positionalvoting rules// Social Choice and Welfare. 2007. Vol. 29.
Р. 487–513.91. Rodríguez-Álvarez C. On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: acomment// Social Choice and Welfare. 2009. Vol. 32. Р. 29–35.92. Roth A., Sotomayor M.A.O. Two-sided matching: a study in gametheoretic modelling and analysis // Cambridge University Press, 1990. 280 p.93. Saari D.G. Susceptibility to manipulation// Public Choice.
1990. Vol.64(1). P. 21–41.94. Satterthwaite M. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existenceand correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfarefunctions // Journal of Economic Theory. 1975. Vol. 10. Р. 187–217.95. Sato S. On strategy-proof social choice correspondences // Social Choiceand Welfare. 2008. Vol 31. P. 331-34396. Sen A. Collective choice and social welfare. Holden-Day. San Francisco,1970. 255 p.97. Sen A. Maximization and the act of choice // Econometrica. 1997.
Vol. 65.№ 4. Р. 745–779.98. Serais J. Sensivity to strategic candidacy by exiting for scoring rules andCopeland. mimeo.99. Slinko A. On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the runoff rules// Social Choice and Welfare. 2002. Vol. 19. Р. 313–324.165100. Smith D.A. Manipulability measures of common social choicefunctions// Social Choice and Welfare. 1999. Vol.
