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A8 Taxable income received in calendar year. Source: Tax 96 TNI 4-1 (Foreign Taxation) (Doc 96-947)
less than 12 million Rubles 12 % from 12 million Rubles 1, 44 million Rubles +to 24 million Rubles 20 % of the sum exceeding 12 million Rubles from 24 million Rubles 3.84 million Rubles to 36 million Rbls, 25 percent of the sum exceeding 24 million Rubles above 48 million Rubles 10.44 million Rubles + 35 percent of the sum exceeding 48 million Rubles

1. Isaak I. Dore , 1995 Distribution of Governmental Power Under the Constitution of Russia" in Parker School Journal of Eastern European Law" v. 2 p. 675

2. ibid p. 681

3. ibid p. 865

4. ibid p. 691

5. ibid p. 678

6. ibid p. 688

7. With the current political situation we can say that the budget as a whole, without doubt, will not pass the Duma by the end of the year.

8. The Moscow Times May 21, 1996. p. 54.

9. World Paper. September, 1996 p. 33

10. TNI 73-22, 1996

11. TNI 22/16, 1992, John Turro

12. Joint Letter No VG-4-12/25N of June 16, 1995

13. Doc 96-947

14. Much of the literature on tax assignment argues that the personal income tax(PIT), generally one of the more important taxes in revenue terms, should be retained by the central government, largely for redistributional and stabilization reasons. Nevertheless, the central government may give local governments a share in the PIT.

15. Tax Analysts, Tax Notes International. January 25, 1993

16. NOVECONCOMMERSANT. July 28, 1994. p. 2

17. In Russia, this tax is mostly levied at a national level because of the administrative convenience, these taxes have been levied at the producer level, not the retail level; and in the transition economy context this often translates into a tax on a few manufacturers as in Russia, for example, there are cigarette factories in only 21 of its 2000 "raions" (Comparative Economic Studies Winter 1994, Vol. 36, No. 4), or sometimes on the single monopoly producer. Thus, only a few producing districts would benefit from levying these taxes and revenues from them would accrue to only a few localities

18. Tax Analysts, Tax Notes International. January 25, 1993

19. Tax Analysts, Tax Notes International. January 25, 1993

20. Tax Analysts, Tax Notes International.January 25, 1993

21. The British Broadcasting Corporation March 15, 1991

22. Scot Antel. The Moscow Times. May 21, 1996

23. Though temporary steps were made like creating special colleges that are attached to courts of arbitration, we suppose that creating a special tax courts is essential here

24. Of course, taxes existed but people could not evade them as they were centralized and in theory all means of production were owned by the state.

25. Washington Post. October 12, 1996. p. A25

26. But we are afraid that this provision will not benefit the economy

27. Betsy McKay. The Wall Street Journal.October 29, 1996. p. A12

28. Comment & Analysis; Statistics; Forecast; November 1996 p. 2

29. Information Services Quest Economics Database Credit Suisse Financial Forecast, 1996

30. Reuter Textline Reinsurance, October 31, 1996

31. In our opinion, inflation will come down further in 1997, to approximately 15 percent. Also, Russia continues to fail in its economic performance of it fiscal and monetary policy within the framework established by the International Monetary Fund.

32. The Moscow Times. March 27, 1996

33. Dmitry Falcovich, head of the macroeconomic department with Alliance-Menatep

34. Russian Federation: Toward Medium-Term Viability. 1996. IBRD/World Bank p.39

35. Fiscal Management in Russia. 1996. IBRD p. 39

36. Fiscal Management in Russia. p. 22

37. John E. Elliot and A.F. Dowla. Gorbachev, Perestroika and Democratizing Socialism" in International Journal of Social Economics" v. 21 p. 78

38. Linda J. Cook. 1995 The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed." Harvard University Press: Cambridge p.2 Cook suggests the following as empirical evidence: 1. That the Soviet regime consistently deliver to workers economic security and social welfare; 2. That the regime deliver these policy goods because it is constrained by it perception of workers' expectations or its fear of labor discontent if it fails to deliver them; [and] 3. that workers give in exchange political compliance and quiescence. p. 5

39. Vladmir Mau. 1996 The Political History of Economic Reform in Russia, 1985-1994. Center for Research into Communist Economies p. 59

40. John Dunlop. 1993. The Rise of Russia and the Collapse of the Soviet Empire. Princeton University Press: Princeton. p. 267

41. Cook p.141

42. ibid p.187

43. Thomas A. Mroz and Barry M. Popkin. 1995. Poverty and Economic Transition in the Russian Federation" in Economic Development and Cultural Change . V 44 p.3

44. ibid p.4

45. ibid p. 4

46. Russia: Social Protection During Transition and Beyond International Bank For Reconstruction and Development Report No. 11748-RU. p. 23

47. Vladimir Mikhalev Social Security in Russia under Economic Transformation" in Europe-Asia Studies v. 48 n.1 (note: As this source came from an electronic medium, I have omitted page numbers--DL)

48. ibid

49. IBRD Report No. 11748-Ru. p. 35

50. ibid p. 11

51. EBRD p. 40

52. ibid

53. BISNIS Country Report

54. OMRI November 31, 1996

55. OMRI October 4, 1996

56. Financial Times. September 23, 1996

57. Of course, it is possible to lower administrative costs and improve overall efficiency in the tax system by going to a more computerized system but resistance to change due to unquestionable job loss is quite evident in the Russian government.

58. Komsomol'skaya Pravda. Sept. 24, 1996

The file was preapred by Dmitri Maslitchenko dmitri@mailroom.com

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