CONASE (712056), страница 2
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In March 1983 President Reagan announced Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as “Star Wars”. The US shifted the focus from offense to defense. The new strategy suggested a profound shift in US nuclear strategy away from reliance on offensive missiles to deter an attack - that is, from dependence on MAD, which Reagan deemed “morally unacceptable.”44
The new strategy led to a major increase in defense spending. Real spending in fiscal year 1985 was over 50 per cent greater than in fiscal year 1980.45 Reagan administration also focused its atention on regional problems. In 1983, a new joint service command - CENTCOM - was established to deal specifically with contingents in Southwest Asia. By early 1986, a new element of strategy informally known as the “Reagan Doctrine” had appeared. This policy sought to roll back Soviet and Cuban gains in the Third World by active support of liberation movements in areas such as Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan.46
During this period the relations between the superpowers were highly escalated. But situation changed when Gorbachev came to power in the SU in 1985.
Ending the Cold War, 1987-1990.
Gorbachev’s ‘Novoye Myshlenniye’ or New Thinking in international affairs was first spelt out at the Geneva summit with President Reagan in October 1985, when they agreed in principle to work towards a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to cut their nuclear arsenals in half.47
Probably the most radical summit was the Reykjavik summit in October 1986. Despite that fact that no agreement was signed, “it succeeded beyond the limited horizons of diplomats and arms controllers in that it shocked the US-Soviet negotiations into a wholly new dimension. The old ground rules of superpower poker, of incremental gains and minimal concessions, had been ripped up.”48 In fact, both Reagan and Gorbachev recognized the posibility of nuclear free world. More, they both made it their major mutual goal.
The real agreement was reached at the Washington summit in December 1987. The US and the SU signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and formalized their commitment to a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms.49 “The signing of the INF Treaty signalled an end to the New Cold War.”50
Following a meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Schevardnadze in Wyoming in September, Secretary Baker suggested that the “era of containment” had perhaps come to an end.51
Then followed the Malta summit in December 1989, where President Bush and Gorbachev recognized common interests in maintaining stability in the midst of revolutionary political changes and were even explicit about accepting each others legitimate security interests and role in preserving European security.52
The end of the Cold War solved one great problem for the US - the nuclear threat from the Soviet side was eliminated. But it caused a series of other problems. “The Cold War ended wih the US and Britain in recession, the Japanese stock market tumbling by 40 per cent, with the wealth of Germany devoted to the rescue of its reunited compatriots, and the world poised for war in the Persian Gulf.53
The Post-Cold War Era, 1991 onwards.
With the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) and the dissolution of the SU after the failed coup, August 1991, the US faced the another problem - the lack of a coherent American foreign policy. There is no clear consensus in the US over the threats to the security and economic well-being of the US.54
Bush administration’s emphasis was on prudence and pragmatism. The Bush record of six military interventions in four years is remarkable.55 In the invasion of Panama (Operation Just Came) in December 1989, the Persian Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) in January and February 1991, and the intervention in Somalia in 1992 (Operation Restore Hope), the US was motivated by the desire to impose order in the international system.56
But neither the foreign nor the defense policy of the Clinton administration is yet well defined.57 Through the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton emphasized the following new priorities for the post-Cold War American foreign policy: (1) to relink foreign and domestic policies; (2) the reassertion of “the moral principles most Americans share”; (3) to understand that American security is largely economic.58 He also campaigned for the restructuring US military forces. The new military force must be capable of: (1) nuclear deterrence; (2) rapid deployment; (3) technology; and (4) better intelligence.59
As president, Clinton directed Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to conduct a review of military requirements. In September 1, 1993, the Clinton administration’s first defense planning document named “Bottom-Up Review” (BUR) was announced. The BUR identifies four major sources of danger to US security: (1) aggression instigated by major regional powers; (2) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (3) the failure of former communist states to make a succesful transition to democracy; (4) a failure to maintain a strong and growing US economic base.60 (Recently, one more danger has been added: “transnational threats.”61 The BUR offers a force structure oriented around three general missions: (1) waging two “nearly simultaneous” major regional conflicts (the two-MRC requirement); (2) conducting peace operations; and (3) maintaining forward presence in areas where the US has vital interests.62 The BUR accords significant weight to maintaining the overseas military presence of US forces in sizing America’s post-Cold War force structure. The plan is to retain roughly 100,000 troops in Europe and some 98,000 troops in East Asia.63
The BUR received a lot of criticims since it was announced. “There is no logical flow from the “top” - political guidance based on the imperative to protect US interests in a new security environment - to the “bottom”, i.e., planned forces.”64 The other problem that “there are grounds for suspecting that the force structure selected for the late 1990s is geared more to meet fiscal goals than strategic ones.”65
So, it is obvious that the end of the Cold War was not the end of the threats for US national security , and not the end of the problems for the US defense planners. More, it seems that it was easier to deal with one big threat rather than with a complex of relatively small threats.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Brown, S., The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983)
2. Clark, M.T., ‘The Future of Clinton’s Foreign and Defense Policy: Multilateral Security’, Comparative Strategy, Vol.13, 1994, pp.181-195
3. Foerster, Sch., ‘The United States as a World Power: An Overview’, in Foerster, Sch. and Wright, E.N. (eds.), American Defense Policy (6th. ed. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990) pp.165-187
4. Gaddis, J.L., Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982)
5. Gray, C.S., ‘Off the Map: Defense Planning After the Soviet Threat’, Strategic Review, Spring 1994, pp.26-35
6.Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., American Foregn Policy: Pattern and Process (3rd. ed. London: Macmillan, 1987)
7. Korb, L.J., ‘The United States’, in Murray, D.J. and Viotti, P.R. (eds.), The Defense Policies of Nations (3rd. ed. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp.19-56
8. Krepinevich, A.F., ‘The Clinton Defense Program: Assessing the Bottom-Up Review’, Strategic Review, Spring 1994, pp.15-25
9.Leffler, M.P., ‘National Security and US Foreign Policy’, in Leffler, M.P. and Painter, D.S. (eds.), Origins of the Cold War: An International History (London: Routledge, 1994), pp.15-52
10. Nitze, P.H., ‘Grand Strategy Then and Now: NSC-68 and its Lessons for the Future’, Strategic Review, Winter 1994, pp.12-19
11. Sullivan, R.S., ‘Dealing with the Soviets’, in Foerster, Sch. and Wright, E.N. (eds.), American Defense Policy (6th. ed. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp.165-187
12. Trachtenberg, M., ‘American Policy and Shifting Nuclear Balance’, in Leffler, M.P. and Painter, D.S. (eds.), Origins of the Cold War: An International History (London: Routledge, 1994), pp.107-122
13. Walker, M., The Cold War: And the Making of the Modern World (London: Vintage, 1994)
14. Williams, Ph., ‘U.S. Defense Policy’, in Baylis, J., Booth, K., Garnett, J., and Williams, Ph., Contemporary Strategy. Volume 2: The Nuclear Powers (2nd. ed. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987), pp.28-55
1 Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process (3rd. ed. London: Macmillan, 1987), p.56
2 Korb, L.J., ‘The United States’, in Murray, D.J. and Viotti, P.R. (eds.), The Defense Policies of Nations (3rd. ed. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), p.30
3 Foerster, Sch., ‘The United States as a World Power: An Overview’, in Foerster, Sch. and Wright, E.N. (eds.), American Defense Policy (6th. ed. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), p.152
4 Gaddis, J.L., Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.10
5 Ibid., p.18
6 Brown, S., The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman To Reagan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p.31
7 Ibid., p.34
8 Leffler, M.P., ‘National Security and US Foreign Policy’, in Leffler, M.P. and Painter, D.S. (eds.), Origins of the Cold War: An International History (London: Routledge, 1994), p.23
9 Walker, M., The Cold War: And the Making of the Modern World (London: Vintage, 1994), p.59
10 Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., op.cit., p.56
11 Ibid., p.58
12 Ibid., p.58
13 Sullivan, R.S., ‘Dealing with the Soviets’, in Foerster, Sch. and Wright, E.N. (eds.), American Defense Policy (6th. ed. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), p.165
14 Ibid., p.169
15 Ibid., p.170
16 Leffler, M.P., op.cit., p.34
17 Nitze, P.H., ‘Grand Strategy Then and Now: NSC-68 and its Lessons for the Future’, Strategic Review, Winter 1994, p.16
18 Trachtenberg, M., ‘American Policy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance’, in Leffler, M.P. and Painter, D.S. (eds.), Origins of the Cold War: An International History (London: Routledge, 1994), p.113
19 Williams, Ph., ‘US Defense Policy’, in Baylis, J., Booth, K., Garnett, J., and Williams, Ph., Contemporary Strategy. Volume 2: The Nuclear Powers (2nd. ed. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987), p.34
20 Brown, S., op.cit., p.58
21 Korb, L.J., op.cit., p.27
22 Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.172
23 Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., op.cit., p.83
24 Ibid., p.83
25 Ibid., p.84
26 Ibid., p.84
27 Ibid., p.86
28 Ibid., p.109
29 Williams, Ph., op.cit., p.29
30 Walker, M., op.cit., p.171
31 Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., op.cit., p.61
32 Ibid., p.63
33 Gaddis, J.L., op.cit., p.289
34 Ibid., p.298
35 Ibid., pp.289-292
36 Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.177
37 Gaddis, J.L., op.cit., p.295
38 Korb, L.J., op.cit., p.25
39 Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.179
40 Ibid., p.181
41 Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., op.cit., p.65
42 Ibid., p.65
43 Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.181
44 Kegley, Ch.W. and Wittkopf, E.R., op.cit., p.95
45 Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.182
46 Ibid., p.184
47 Walker, M., op.cit., p.290
48 Ibid., p.294
49 Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.184
50 Walker, M., op.cit., p.300
51 Sullivan, R.S., op.cit., p.185
52 Ibid., p.185
53 Walker, M., op.cit., p.326
54 Korb, L.J., op.cit., p.30
55 Walker, M., op.cit., p.340
56 Korb, L.J., op.cit., p.54
57 Clark, M.T., ‘The Future of Clinton’s Foreign and Defense Policy: Multilateral Security’, Comparative Strategy, Vol.13, 1994, p.181
58 Ibid., p.182
59 Ibid., pp. 184-185
60 Krepinevich, A.F., ‘The Clinton Defense Program: Assessing the Bottom-Up Review’, Strategic Review, Spring 1994, p.16
61 Gray, C.S., ‘Off the Mapp: Defense Planning After the Soviet Threat’, Strategic Review, Spring 1994, p.31
62 Krepinevich, A.F., op.cit., p.16
63 Ibid., p.21
64 Ibid., p.34
65 Gray, C.S., op.cit., p.33
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