Диссертация (1137854), страница 4
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R-:*-10%-, *** -1421%-,,,,.,., .Property rights � = const +Turnover � +Controls � +�,(3.8),%,4.,,,,.().–,,,,.,,,143,,.,:Property rights �= const ++Turnover �chief executive tenure > s+Controls � +��,+ � Interaction �chief executive tenure > s –,(3.9)«1»,«0».(3.9)= , ,… ,,,–.,,.
19=.=1%-14.,.,,,,197382012),«6»–,.,(HШХМШЦЛО, Boudreaux, 2013).«»–.144(Svolik,–.,(Ezrow, Franz, 2013),-,.,,.,«»,,,(AМОЦШРХЮ, 2006).(HШХМШЦЛО,Boudreaux, 2013),.,,,,.«14.2,888***[1,153]TurnoverTurnover *1(executive age in office >6)1(executive age in office >6)»Зави и ая е е е ая: property rights, t2,807***1,6181,372[1,041][1,122][1,111]1,859[1,075]2,924***2,538***2,950***2,748***2,200***[1,043][0,728][0,822][0,816][0,745]-0,190*-0,178*-0,207*-0,186*-0,194*[0,102]ln(GDP)[0,093][0,107][0,106][0,114]1,164**1,387***1,429***0,731*[0,457][0,258][0,217][0,426]2,488***2,859***1,015[0,760][0,764][1,110]-0,008*-0,004[0,004][0,005]ln(Population)Natural resourcesSchool enrolment-0,003[0,003]298460,483.
R-:*-10%-298460,511298460,533, ** -1%145297460,5355%-242400,531, ***4.1463.3.3,,,.–,.,,.,(Grainger, 1969),.,Property rights,,.,,.-.,(Lagged,Dependent Variable, LDV).,LDV,-(Judsen, Owen, 1999),(LSDV,(Kiviet, 1995)Least-square-dummy-variable),.,,,147SЭКЭК 12(Bruno, 2005).xtlsdvc,,:,1.,,;2.,;3.8,..,13,.Property rights,.Property rights15 (1-3).,,13.,,,,.15.Turnover, t-1Property_rights, t-1Зави и ая е е е ая: Turnover, t0,582***0,538***0,479***[0,04][0,05][0,04]-0,002[0,00]Property_rights, t-20,002[0,00]148Property_rights, t-30,00005[0,00]-0,001[0,00]-0,0001[0,00]-0,020[0,04]0,012[0,0172]0,00005[0,00]719930,405Non-democracy score, t-1School enrollment, t-1ln(Population), t-1ln(GDP), t-1Natural resources, t-1.
R-:*-10%--0,001[0,00]-0,0001[0,00]-0,052[0,04]0,008[0,0203]0,0002[0,00]629930,318, ** --0,001[0,00]-0,0002[0,00]-0,034[0,04]-0,006[0,02]0,0002[0,00]541930,2565%-, ***1%--15.,-(ArОХХКЧШ, BШЧН 1991);20.,(3.6), . .,.,.13,16,,10%.2416,.17,12.,,.149,,17(12-4).,,,.«».16.1(gini>40)=1Property rights, t-1TurnoverSchool enrollmentln(Population)ln(GDP)Natural resources:*-0,370***[0,08]1,367*[0,75]-0,005[0,01]0,0310[1,61]0,633[0,56]-0,005[0,01]259401(gini>40)=0Зави и ая е е е0,489***[0,05]-0,489[1,01]0,002[0,00]1,216[0,79]0,863***[0,26]-0,001[0,01]4476210%-, ** -1(gini>40)=11(gini>40)=0ая: property rights, t0,377***0,549***[0,08][0,05]1,360*-0,0880[0,80][0,98]-0,0050,003[0,01][0,00]-0,6770,214[1,74][0,82]-0,004[0,01]259400,004[0,01]447625%-, ***1%17.Non-democracy score >1(gini>40)=1Property rights, t-10,294***Non-democracy score >1(gini>40)=01(gini>40)=11(gini>40)=0Зави и ая е е е ая: property rights, t0,554***0,594***0,463***150[0,11]2,792*[1,59]13324Turnover:*-[0,08]-0,384[1,00]16624[0,06]-0,161[0,86]3804610%-[0,14]-1,749[2,61]11622, ** -5%-, ***1%-3.4,,:-.-.,,12,,«,,.,,,,.,20001-1112009.2,,.,,.151,,.,3.152,,.,,,.,,.,.
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