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In this framework fiscal stimulus consists of utilityenhancing and productive public spending. The positive effect of higher share ofinvestment public spending in total expenditure and its productivity under positive interestrate is confirmed, along with an opposite effect under the ZLB. The results can provide anexplanation for the diverse empirical estimates of the government expenditure multiplier,since both the structure of the government expenditures and the heterogeneity of thepopulation affect the value of fiscal multiplier.•An overlapping generation model with two types of agents (Ricardian and non-Ricardianagents) and the unbalanced pension system was developed in Chapter 3.
The deficit of thepension fund is covered by the transfer from the public budget. In this setting an impact ofnon-Ricardian consumers on the optimal choice of fiscal instruments is shown, illustratinghow the pension system can help to smooth consumption of non-Ricardian agents.Main findings•On the basis of the developed framework for Russia the trajectories of public expenditurewere estimated for pension indexation to the inflation rate and higher. The estimations aremade for low, median and high official demographic forecasts of Rosstat and twoassumptions concerning the rate of economic growth.
It was shown that reforms with thecancellation of pension indexation for working retirees and an increase of the retirementage of state employees will have a limited effect on the value of pension expenditures.•It was shown that retention of the retirement age, along with pension indexation aimed atthe maintenance of the replacement coefficient, will lead to an increase in public spendingon pensions by 2035, either with the current economic growth or with an acceleration ofeconomic growth. At the same time, an increase of the retirement age would allow asignificant reduction of public expenditure on provision of retirement pensions by 2035 inthe considered demographic scenarios, even with the rate of pension indexation aimed atthe maintenance of the replacement coefficient at the current level.
Indexation by theinflation level (it is lower than the level needed to maintain the replacement coefficient atits current level) will lead to an even higher decrease in public spending on pensions.•On the basis of an extended New-Keynesian model of Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), animpact on the multiplier by the key economic characteristics of the model is derived forboth types of interest rate regimes. The change of this impact with the share of non9Ricardian agents is also considered. It is shown that the value of the multiplier can becomenegative under ZLB for the sufficiently high share of non-Ricardian agents.•A non-linear effect of the share of non-Ricardian agents on the fiscal multiplier, taking intoaccount the structure of public spending, is revealed for the first time in the literature.
It isshown that a higher share of non-Ricardian agents can partly compensate for a decrease inthe fiscal multiplier with a rise in investment expenditures under ZLB. An account for twotypes of government expenditure intensifies a non-linear effect of the share of nonRicardian agents on the fiscal multiplier under both positive interest rate and under ZLBconstraint.•On the basis of this model it is confirmed that the pension system is redundant in theeconomy with only Ricardian agents. When the level of pensions is fixed, optimal fiscalpolicy within unbalanced pension system consists of financing pension expenditure viataxes, with zero social contributions. An impact of population growth rate, retirement ageand labor productivity on an optimal income tax is defined.•A complimentary nature of income tax and social contributions is shown within acomparison of balanced and unbalanced pension system when both fiscal instruments exist.In the case of balanced pension system, optimal social contributions are positive and areused to finance pension spending, while the optimal tax rate is constant and does notchange with the growth rate of the population.
An unbalanced pension system allowsachievement of a higher level of social welfare and lower level of equilibrium public debt.•The optimal combination of fiscal instruments (income tax, social contributions and thelevel of public spending) is determined in the model with two types of agents, Ricardianand non-Ricardian.
After a certain threshold level of the share of non-Ricardian consumers,non-zero social contributions are optimal with the lower level of income tax. This resultremains the same when levels of social contributions differ for Ricardian and nonRicardian agents: with an increase of the share of non-Ricardian agents their socialcontributions become positive, with zero social contributions of Ricardian agents. Theoptimal choice of government expenditure is increasing with the share of non-Ricardianconsumers, compensating the decrease of their welfare at retirement.
The change ofindividual household profiles with an optimal fiscal policy for two types of agents isshown, and a redistributional effect of the government policy via pension system wasrevealed.10The results of the studies were presented at international conferences:•5th International Symposium in Computational Economics and Finance, (Paris, 2018).Optimal fiscal policy and pension system design;•8th International Research Meeting in Business and Management (Nice, 2017), chair of thesession “Debt, Tax and Pensions” and presenter, Optimal fiscal policy under theunbalanced pension system;•21st International Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis and International Finance(Crete, 2017), Fiscal policy under unbalanced pension system;•14th International Conference on Pensions, Insurance and Savings (Paris, 2016), Fiscalpolicy and the reform of the social security system;•19th International Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis and International Finance,(Crete, 2015), Analysis of the government expenditure multiplier under zero lower bound:the role of public investment.The results of the studies were also presented at national conferences:•XIX International scientific conference devoted to the questions of economic and socialdevelopment, (Moscow, 2018).
Unbalanced pension system in the economy withheterogeneous agents.•Second World Congress of Comparative Economics “1917 –2017: Revolution andEvolution in Economic Development” (Saint-Petersburg, 2017), Session Growth,Distribution and Policies, in collaboration with the Italian Economic Association, Fiscalpolicy under the unbalanced pension system;•XVIII International scientific conference devoted to the questions of economic and socialdevelopment (Moscow, 2017), Pension system and complementarity of fiscal policyinstruments;•XVII International scientific conference devoted to the questions of economic and socialdevelopment (Moscow, 2016), Fiscal policy and unbalanced pension system;•XVI International scientific conference devoted to the questions of economic and socialdevelopment, (Moscow, 2015), Analysis of the government expenditure multiplier underzero lower bound: the role of public investment.11.
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