Диссертация (1137741), страница 9
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An additional budget burden coming only from the size and agestructure of the population compared to the median forecast is rather low. The smaller numberof people over the retirement age would lead to a decrease of pension expenditures by 0.2-0.4p.p. of GDP depending on the scenario (Figure 1.17, Figure 1.18).34The notation RC denotes the replacement coefficient.3998growth at 1.5%, maintenance of the replacement coefficientgrowth at 3%, maintenance of the replacement coefficientgrowth at 1.5%, indexation by inflation rategrowth at 3%, indexation by inflation rate765432013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035Figure 1.17.
Pension expenditures under low demographic forecast withoutthe reform of an increase of the retirement age, % of GDP*Dashed lines – scenarios with renewal of pension indexation for working retirees since 2019.Source: Russian Ministry of Economic Development, Rosstat, authors’ calculations.At the same time the smaller size of the working age population would presumablyresult in even lower social contributions to the budget. As a result, the deficit of the pensionfund would be higher than in the case of the median forecast, but only slightly. However, theconsequences of this scenario for macroeconomic indicators and for the general governmentoverall revenues could be much greater.98growth at 1.5%, maintenance of the replacement coefficientgrowth at 3%, maintenance of the replacement coefficientgrowth at 1.5%, indexation by inflation rategrowth at 3%, indexation by inflation rate765432013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035Figure 1.18.
Pension expenditures under low demographic forecast with areform of an increase of the retirement age, % of GDP*Dashed lines – scenarios with renewal of pension indexation for working retirees since 2019.Source: Russian Ministry of Economic Development, Rosstat, authors’ calculations.40The logic is similar in the case of the high demographic scenario. A higher number ofretirees would lead to an increase of public expenditures on pensions by 0.35-0.7 p.p.
of GDP.At the same time, the positive effect of higher social contributions and budget income canmore than compensate for the increase in expenditures compared to the medium scenario(Figure 1.19, Figure 1.20).9876543growth at 1.5%, maintenance of the replacement coefficientgrowth at 3%, maintenance of the replacement coefficientgrowth at 1.5%, indexation by inflation rategrowth at 3%, indexation by inflation rate2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035Figure 1.19.
Pension expenditures under high demographic forecast withoutthe reform of an increase of the retirement age, % of GDP*Dashed lines – scenarios with renewal of pension indexation for working retirees since 2019.Source: Russian Ministry of Economic Development, Rosstat, authors’ calculations.98growth at 1.5%, maintenance of the replacement coefficientgrowth at 3%, maintenance of the replacement coefficientgrowth at 1.5%, indexation by inflation rategrowth at 3%, indexation by inflation rate765432013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035Figure 1.20.
Pension expenditures under high demographic forecast without thereform of an increase of the retirement age, % of GDP*Dashed lines – scenarios with renewal of pension indexation for working retirees since 2019.Source: Russian Ministry of Economic Development, Rosstat, authors’ calculations.411.4. ConclusionThe level of the pension provision is rather low in Russia: the replacement coefficient isone of the lowest among the OECD and G20 countries, with a relatively high share of retireesbelow the minimum cost of living.
Meanwhile, the deficit of the Pension fund and the needfor transfers from the federal budget are increasing. The official demographic forecasts implycontinued population aging, which may continue to worsen the situation. This is intensifiedby the risks of a significant decrease in budget revenues in the long run, especially from oiland gas.
Maintenance of the deficit at the current sustainable level would require acomparable decrease in government expenditures.The factor that aggravates the negative trends in pension expenditures in Russia is arelatively low retirement age, especially for women, even taking life expectancy into account.While most countries implemented pension reforms in the post-crisis period, Russia hasimplemented them only recently. Although the abandonment of pension indexation ofworking retirees and an increase in the retirement age for public servants partly mitigate thenegative trends, these measures do not solve the existing problems.This chapter also presented a developed framework for the analysis of the consequencesfor public expenditures of different pension reforms under three demographic scenarios andtwo scenarios of economic growth.
The estimates from the application of this approach to thecase of Russia suggest that an increase of the retirement age for the entire population by half ayear annually starting from 2019 will allow retirement pension expenditures to start on adownward trajectory, regardless of other assumptions on economic growth, demographictrends and other possible pension reforms. This will offset about half of the expected decreaseof the overall budget revenues in the long run, contributing to the maintenance of other publicexpenditures at a stable level relative to GDP.One of the other factors that can limit the growth of pension expenditures as a percent ofGDP is accelerated economic growth. We assume that in the absence of structural reformsRussia’s potential economic growth is limited to around 1.5%.
Active structural reforms,including the encouragement of higher employment of the elderly and improvement of theefficiency of public spending, could increase the potential growth to 3%, close to the growthrate of the world economy, which is the goal of the Russian government. Under the mediandemographic forecast, the economic growth of 3% should allow the pension expenditures tostabilize relative to GDP even without an increase in the retirement age.42An additional decrease in pension expenditures could be realized if the maintenance ofthe replacement coefficient were to be abandoned. According to the estimates provided in thischapter, a decrease of the replacement coefficient to 30% will not lead to a violation of theILO standard of 40% because of the differences in the methodology used.
However, takinginto account the relatively low level of the pension provision in Russia, we do not advocatefor this measure. Moreover, we believe that funds saved due to an increase of the retirementage could be partly directed to an accelerated increase in pensions to improve the retirees’welfare in comparison to other countries. We also see that it could be favourable for thewelfare of the retirees to reintroduce the modified saving part of the pension and to encouragethe saving behaviour of the population.43Chapter 2.
Fiscal multiplier and the role of non-Ricardianagents352.1. IntroductionIn this chapter we investigate the impact of the share of non-Ricardian agents on thefiscal multiplier under zero lower bound and in the case of a positive interest rate.Under the zero lower bound (ZLB), short-term interest rates have virtually stoppedbeing the instrument of monetary policy, leaving stabilizing economic measures to the fiscalauthorities. Although a wide range of theoretical research has investigated the size of fiscalmultipliers, there is still a continuing debate on the size of the government expendituremultiplier under the ZLB.
The two closest to the current research papers, Eggertsson andKrugman (2012) and Roulleau-Pasdeloup (2013), provide different calculations of the size ofthe multiplier in and out of the ZLB.Eggertsson (2011) illustrates that the effect of macroeconomic policies is differentunder the ZLB and under a positive interest rate.
Under the ZLB larger increase in the outputcan be obtained by policies aimed at stimulating aggregate demand (AD). On the contrary,policies that stimulate aggregate supply (AS), like a cut in labor or capital income taxes,which are expansionary under a positive interest rate, can worsen the recession under the ZLBdue to the upward-sloping demand curve. The results of Eggertsson (2011) were confirmed byother research in the DSGE framework (see Christiano et al., 2011; Cogan et al., 2009; Ercegand Lindé, 2010), where a higher multiplier under the ZLB was obtained.
Eggertsson andKrugman (2012) focus on the government expenditure multiplier under the ZLB in theframework of heterogeneous agents (borrower-saver model). According to them, themultiplier of the utility-enhancing government expenditures exceeds 1 under the ZLB. In thisframework, apart from the standard demand-increasing effect of the public spending,government expenditures increase the output through the channel of liquidity-constrainedborrowers who consume all their disposable income.
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