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Adequacy of the retirement income and income inequality inRussiaGross and net replacement rates are widely used as an indicator of pension systemadequacy. Figure 1.7 presents the results of OECD estimates of theoretical gross replacementrates, the ratio of pensions to pre-retirement earnings, for OECD and G20 countries. It isassumed in the estimation that individuals have a full career entering the labor market at theage of 20 in 2016 until reaching the normal retirement age specific to each country.For mandatory pensions OECD estimates of replacement rates vary from 22% for theUnited Kingdom to 97% in the Netherlands. In some countries, for example, Ireland, Japan,the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, replacement rates rise significantly ifvoluntary private pensions are taken into account.
According to these estimates, Russia has areplacement rate at 33.7% if only mandatory pensions are considered. It is the lowest rate innon-OECD countries other than South Africa (16%). However, when taking voluntarypensions into account, Russia has the lowest replacement rate according to OECD estimates,with the one for South Africa reaching 49% (Figure 1.7).24120mandatory100mandatory + voluntary806040200Figure 1.7. Projected gross pension replacement rates for full-career averagewage workers in OECD and G20 countriesSource: OECD calculations based on the pension model (Ch.
4, Pensions at a Glance, 2017)Net replacement rates can be a better indicator of the adequacy of pension income. Netreplacement rates are calculated as the ratio of net pensions to after-tax pre-retirementearnings, taking into account income tax and social security contributions.
17 Russia still hasone of the lowest replacement rates according to OECD estimates if net rates for mandatoryschemes for average income earners are considered (38.8%). This is still far below the OECDaverage of 63% (OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2017), with replacement rates varying from29% for the United Kingdom to 102% in Turkey. The estimates are presented in Figure 1.8.Although the OECD estimates show that the level of pension provision in Russia islower than in most of the OECD countries, it satisfies the International Labour Organization(ILO) standard. As Lyashok et al. (2016) showed, the replacement coefficient calculated notas a ratio of the average pension to the average wage (33.2% in 2017), 18 but, following themethodology of ILO, as a ratio of the after-tax wage before retirement for a median employee,is far above the standard of 40%. According to their estimates on the basis of micro data froman RLMS survey,19 the replacement coefficient in 2014 adjusted with respect to the ILOmethodology for the median pension and wage was equal to 45.1%, versus 34.3% calculatedas a ratio of the average pension to the average wage.
Our calculations based on this17OECD defines the net replacement rate as the individual net pension entitlement divided by net pre-retirementearnings, taking account of personal income taxes and social security contributions paid by workers andpensioners. (OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2017, p. 106).18Not taking into account the one-time payment in January.19Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey.25methodology show that for 2017 the corresponding adjusted coefficient is 44.3%. This allowsus to conclude that not only does the current replacement coefficient in Russia (33.2 in 2017)satisfy the ILO standard, but that it can be lowered further to a level slightly below 30% andstill satisfy the ILO standard.120average earner (AW)low earner (50% AW)100806040200Figure 1.8.
Projected net replacement rates for low and average income earners inOECD and G20 countriesSource: OECD calculations based on the pension model (Pensions at a Glance, 2017)However, income inequality is an important problem in Russia, with the Ginicoefficient decreasing from 0.421 to 0.41 from 2010 to 2017 (Rosstat), yet remaining at ahigh level. According to Rosstat preliminary estimate in 2017, 13.2% of the total populationin Russia had an income below the minimum cost of living. Moreover, the standard of livingof retirees is even worse taking into account the fact that private pension schemes andvoluntary savings are not widespread in Russia.
According to the estimates on the basis ofRosstat data, 15% of retirees are recipients of additional public social payments aimed atbringing the living conditions of retirees to the minimum cost of living for retirees. This islower than the common cost of living, constituting 90% of it in 2016.1.2.4. Projections of public pension expenditure in OECD and G20countriesOne of the aims for recent pension reforms in many countries was the need to lowerreplacement rates in order to improve pension finance. However, taking into account currentdemographic trends and improving longevity the need to reform pension systems remainsurgent in many countries.
Despite the undertaken pension reforms, public expenditure on26pensions as a percentage of GDP has increased and is expected to rise further in the nearfuture in most OECD countries. For the OECD as a whole, public spending on pensions hasincreased from 6.7% to 8.2% of GDP from 2000 to 2013. It remains the largest part of socialexpenditure (18% on average of total expenditures in 2013). 20 According to OECD estimatesthe highest level of such spending was registered in Greece, reaching 17.4% of GDP, whilethe lowest was 2% of GDP in Iceland.
Long-term OECD projections of public spending onpensions indicate that this tendency would remain for most OECD countries. The spending isprojected to grow in 21 countries and fall in 14. As a result, pension expenditures areexpected to increase from 8.9% of GDP in 2013-2015 to 9.5% of GDP by 2050, reaching10.9% in 2060 (Table 1.2).21Table 1.2. Projections of public expenditure on pensions, 2013-60BelgiumCzech RepublicFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceItalyPolandSlovak RepublicSloveniaUnited KingdomUnited StatesOECDBrazilChinaIndiaRussian FederationSaudi ArabiaSouth AfricaEU282013-201511.89.012.914.910.016.215.711.38.111.87.74.98.99.14.11.09.12.72.211.3205012.99.612.812.812.514.414.810.49.115.68.15.99.516.89.51.012.49.43.311.4206013.09.712.912.112.714.313.810.710.215.38.410.911.2Source: OECD, Pensions at a Glance (2017), European Commission (2015), 2015Ageing Report; Standard & Poor’s (2016), Global Aging 2016: 58 Shades of Gray.In Russia, public pension expenditures are projected to increase from 9.1% of GDP in2013-2015 to 12.4% of GDP in 2050, implying a 3.3 p.p.
change in expenditures over 35years (S&P Global Aging 2016). These estimates conform to the more recent IMF forecasts,according to which pension spending will increase by 1.8% of GDP from 2015-2030.2220Chapter 7, Pensions at a Glance (2017), OECD Social Expenditures Database (SOCX).The numbers for 2013-2015 may differ from the values presented in the OECD Social Expenditures Database(SOCX) because of the different range of benefits covered and the definitions used (Pensions at a Glance, 2017).22International Monetary Fund, Fiscal monitor: Tackling inequality, 2017.21271.3.Pension system in Russia: challenges, projections and policyimplications1.3.1.
Population forecastsIn February 2018 Rosstat updated its population forecast through 2035 in low, medianand high scenarios (Figure 1.9, Figure 1.10, Figure 1.11). In the median scenario thepopulation grows up to 2019 and falls afterwards. The population decreases due to negativenatural population growth, which is no longer balanced by migration. Compared to theprevious Rosstat forecasts, the updated version assumes less favorable dynamics ofpopulation growth due to a lower birth rate.
The number of retirees is growing on average by0.35 million persons per year. Up to 2020 it grows at an accelerated rate of 0.55 millionpersons on average. By the mid 2020s it falls to 0.15 million persons and accelerates again to0.5 million persons by the end of the forecasting period.
In the updated median demographicforecast the upward trend of demographic burden remains: for the population older than theretirement age the coefficient of demographic burden increases up to 2035 along with thestabilization of the total coefficient after 2024 due to the smaller population younger thanworking age (Figure 1.9).504744Without pension reformWith reform for civil servants (since 2017)With general reform (since 2019)Population (right-hand scale)15715415141148381453514232139292010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034136Figure 1.9. Overall population and population over working age in themedian demographic forecast under different pension reforms, mln. per.Source: Rosstat, authors’ calculations.In order to investigate the possible demographic risks we also consider the scenario withlow demographic forecast (Figure 1.10).28504744Without pension reformWith reform for civil servants (since 2017)With general reform (since 2019)Population (right-hand scale)15715415141148381453514232139292010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034136Figure 1.10.
Overall population and population over working age in the lowdemographic forecast under different pension reforms, mln. per.Source: Rosstat, authors’ calculations.The low demographic scenario is characterized by a lower population, which starts todecrease from 2025. By 2035 the population is 6.9% lower than in 2017 and 6.3% lower thanin the median forecast. 23 The population over working age is lower, but their proportion of thetotal population is higher due to the smaller working age and less than working agepopulation. This is due to the fact that, as opposed to the median forecast, the higher deathrate is accompanied by a significantly lower birth rate.
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