Диссертация (Влияние сменяемости властных элит на защиту прав собственности теоретический и эмпирический анализ), страница 5
Описание файла
Файл "Диссертация" внутри архива находится в папке "Влияние сменяемости властных элит на защиту прав собственности теоретический и эмпирический анализ". PDF-файл из архива "Влияние сменяемости властных элит на защиту прав собственности теоретический и эмпирический анализ", который расположен в категории "". Всё это находится в предмете "экономика" из Аспирантура и докторантура, которые можно найти в файловом архиве НИУ ВШЭ. Не смотря на прямую связь этого архива с НИУ ВШЭ, его также можно найти и в других разделах. , а ещё этот архив представляет собой кандидатскую диссертацию, поэтому ещё представлен в разделе всех диссертаций на соискание учёной степени кандидата экономических наук.
Просмотр PDF-файла онлайн
Текст 5 страницы из PDF
– 2010. –Vol. 78. – No. 6. – pp. 1863-1903.51.Dixit, A. K. Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance. –Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004. – 184 p.15852.Dixit, A., Grossman, G. M., Gul, F. The dynamics of political compromise //Journal of Political Economy. – 2000, – Vol. 108. – No. 3. – pp. 531-568.53.Doing Business. Doing Business 2014: Understanding Regulations for Smalland Medium-Size Enterprises. – The World Bank Group, 2013.54.Donchev, D., Ujhelyi, G. What Do Corruption Indices Measure? // Economics &Politics. – 2014. – Vol. 26.
– No. 2. – pp. 309–331.55.Ezrow, N. M., Frantz, E. Dictators and dictatorships: Understandingauthoritarian regimes and their leaders. – London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011. – 336p.56.Freedom in the World 2013. - Freedom House, 2013.:http://www.freedomhouse.org/report–types/freedom–world57.Frye, T. Capture or Exchange? Business Lobbying in Russia // Europe–AsiaStudies. – 2002.
– Vol 54. – No. 7. – pp. 1017–1036.58.Frye, T. Credible Commitment and Property Rights: Evidence from Russia //American Political Science Review. – 2004. – Vol. 98. – No. 3. – pp. 453–466.59.Frye, T. Original Sin, Good Works, and Property Rights in Russia // WorldPolitics. –2006. – Vol. 58. – No. 4. – pp.
479–504.60.Frye, T., Reuter, O. J., Szakonyi, D. Political Machines at Work VoterMobilization and electoral subversion in the Workplace // World Politics. – 2014. – Vol.66. – No. 02. – pp. 195-228.61.Gehlbach, S., Keefer, P. Private Investment and the Institutionalization ofCollective Action in Autocracies: Ruling Parties and Legislatures // The Journal ofPolitics.
– 2011. – Vol. 74. – No.2. – pp. 621–635.62.Gehlbach, S., Sonin, K., Zhuravskaya, E. Businessman Candidates // AmericanJournal of Political Science. – 2010, – Vol. 54. – No. 3. – pp.718–736.63.Giordano, R., Tommasino, P. What determines debt intolerance? The role ofpolitical and monetary institutions // European Journal of Political Economy. – 2011. –Vol. 27.
– No. 3. – pp. 471-484.64.Glaeser, E.L., La Porta, R., Lopez–De–Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. Do institutionscause growth? // Journal of Economic Growth. – 2004. – Vol. 9. – pp. 271–303.65.Gradstein, M. Inequality, Democracy and the Protection of Property Rights //Economic Journal. – 2007. – Vol.
117. – No. 516. – pp. 252–269.15966.Granger, C. W. J. Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models andCross–spectral Methods // Econometrica. – 1969. – Vol. 37. – No. 3. – pp. 424–438.67.Greif, A. Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: theMКРСrТЛТ ЭrКНОrs’ МШКХТЭТШЧ // AЦОrТМКЧ EМШЧШЦТМ RОЯТОа. – 1993. – Vol. 83. – No. 3. –pp. 525–548.68.Greif, A. Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade: evidence on the Maghribitraders // Journal of Economic History. – 1989.
– Vol. 49. – No. 4. – pp. 857–882.69.Greif, A. The Maghribi traders: a reappraisal? // Economic History Review. –2012. – Vol. 65. – No. 2. – pp. 445–469.70.Grossman, G. M., Helpman, E. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy.– Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991. – 375 p.71.Grossman, H., Kim, M.
Swords or ploughshares? A theory of the security ofclaims to property rights // Journal of Political Economy. – 1995. – Vol. 103. – No. 6. –pp. 1275–1288.72.Gwartney, J., Lawson, R., Hall, J. 2012 Economic Freedom Dataset.In: Economic Freedom of the World: 2012 Annual Report.
– Fraser Institute, 2012. –322 p.73.Haber S., Maurer N., Razo A. The politics of property rights: politicalinstability, credible commitments, and economic growth in Mexico, 1876-1929. –Cambridge University Press, 2003.74.Hall, R., Jones, C. Why do some countries produce so much more output perworker than others? // The Quarterly Journal of Economics. – 1999. – Vol. 114. – No. 1.– pp. 83–116.75.Hall, J., Sobel, R. Institutions, Entrepreneurship, and Regional Differences inEconomic Growth // American Journal of Entrepreneurship.
– 2008. – Vol. 1. – pp. 6996.76.Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., Kaufmann, D. Seize the state, seize the day: statecapture and influence in transition economies // Journal of Comparative Economics. –2003. –Vol. 31. – pp. 751–773.77.Helpman, E. The Mystery of Economic Growth.
– Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press, 2004. – 240 p.78.Hirshleifer, J. The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of ConflictTheory // Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2001. – 366 p.16079.Holcombe, R. G., Boudreaux, C. J. Institutional quality and the tenure ofautocrats // Public Choice.
– 2013. – Vol. 156. – No. 3–4. – pp. 409–421.80.Høyland, B., Moene, K., Willumsen, F. The tyranny of international indexrankings // Journal of Development Economics. – 2012. – Vol. 97. – No. 1. – pp. 1–14.81.Iaryczower, M., Spiller, P., Tommasi, M. Judicial independence in unstableenvironments, Argentina 1935-1998 // American Journal of Political Science. – 2002. –Vol. 46. – No.
4. – pp. 699–716.82.International Country Risk Guide Dataset. – The PRS Group, 2009.: https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-methodologies/icrg83.Iyer, L. Direct versus indirect colonial rule in India: Long-term consequences//The Review of Economics and Statistics.
– 2010. – Vol. 92. – No. 4. – pp. 693-713.84.Judson, R.A., Owen, A.L. Estimating dynamic panel models: A practical guidefor macroeconomists // Economics Letters. – 1999. – Vol. 65. – No. 1. – pp. 9–15.85.Justesen, M. K. Making and breaking property rights: Coalitions, veto players,and the institutional foundation of markets. Working Paper. – 2012.86.Kapeliushnikov, R., Kuznetsov, A., Demina, N., Kuznetsova, O.
Threats tosecurity of property rights in a transition economy: An empirical perspective // Journalof Comparative Economics. – 2013. – Vol. 41. – No. 1. – pp. 245-264.87.Karabegovic, A., McMahon, F. Economic Freedom of North America: 2008Annual Report. – The Fraser Institute, 2008.88.Kaufman, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M. The Worldwide Governance Indicators:Methodology and Analytical Issues // Hague Journal on the Rule of Law. – 2011. – Vol.3. – No 2. – pp. 220-246.89.Keefer, P. Database of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable Definitions// Development Research Group.
– World Bank, 2010,90.Keefer, P., Knack, S. Polarization, politics and property rights: Links betweeninequality and growth // Public Choice. – 2002. – Vol. 111. – No. 1-2. – pp.127–154.91.KОrОФОs, C. B., АТХХТКЦsШЧ, C. R. UЧЯОТХТЧР НО SШЭШ’s ЦвsЭОrв: property rights,capital formation, and development // Journal of Institutional Economics. – 2008. – Vol.4. – No. 03. –pp. 299–325.92.Kiviet, J.F. On Bias, Inconsistency, and Efficiency of Various Estimators inDynamic Panel Models // Journal of Econometrics.
– 1995. – Vol. 68. – No. 1. – pp.53–78.16193.Knack S. Governance and growth: measurement and evidence. – UniversityLibrary of Munich, Germany, 2002. – №. 28050.94.Lambsdorff, J. The Methodology of the 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index. –TransparencyInternational,2005.–:http://www.icgg.org/downloads/CPI Methodology.pdf95.Langbein, L., Knack, S. The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Six, One, orNone? // The Journal of Development Studies. – 2010, – Vol. 46. – No. 2. – pp. 350370,96.Leigh, A. How Closely do Top Income Shares Track Other Measures ofInequality? // Economic Journal.
– 2007. – Vol. 117. – No. 524. – pp. 619–633.97.Libman, A., Kozlov, V. Sub–National Variation of Corruption in Russia: WhatDo We Know About It? // Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, andCentral Asia. – 2013. – Vol. 2. – No. 2. – pp. 153–180.98.Libman, A., Kozlov, V., Schultz, A. Roving Bandits in Action: Outside Optionand Governmental Predation in Autocracies // Kyklos.
– 2012. – Vol. 65. – No. 4. – pp.526–562.99.Lizzeri, A., Persico, N. A Drawback of Electoral Competition // Journal ofthe European Economic Association. – 2005. – Vol. 3. – No. 6. – pp. 1318–1348.100.Lizzeri, A., Persico, N. Why Did the Elites Extended the Suffrage? DemocracyКЧН ЭСО SМШpО ШП GШЯОrЧЦОЧЭ, аТЭС КЧ AppХТМКЭТШЧ ЭШ BrТЭКТЧ’s “AРО ШП RОПШrЦ” //Quarterly Journal of Economics.
– 2004. – Vol. 119. – No. 2. – pp. 707–765.101.Luxembourg Income Study Database. – LIS Cross-National Data Center inLuxembourg, 2008.102.: http://www.lisproject.org/techdoc.htm.Magalhaes P. C. The politics of judicial reform in Eastern Europe //ComparativePolitics. – 1999. – . 43-62.103.Magaloni, B. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demisein Mexico. – Cambridge University Press, 2006. – 296 p.104.Manion, M.
Corruption by design: Building clean government in mainlandChina and Hong Kong. – Harvard University Press, 2009. – 296 p.105.MКrsСКХХ, M. G., JКРРОrs, K., GЮrr, T.R. PШХТЭв IV PrШУОМЭ: DКЭКsОЭ UsОrs’Manual. – The Center for Systemic Peace: Polity IV Project, 2011. – 87 p.106.Mehlum, H., Moene, K. O., Torvik, R.
